M1 Abrams Tanks for Iraq

M1 Abrams Tanks for Iraq

(NSI News Source Info) August 6, 2008: On July 31/08, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced [PDF] Iraq’s formal request to buy M1 Abrams tanks, well as the associated vehicles, equipment and services required to keep these tanks in the field. It is likely that the tanks themselves will be transferred from US stocks, but this has not been verified. With this purchase, Iraq will become the 4th M1 Abrams operator in the region, joining Egypt (M1A1s), Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (M1A2-SEP variant). Defense-related order requests from Iraq over the last 2 weeks now total over $10.9 billion, and include tanks, wheeled LAV APCs ($3.0b), wheeled M1117 armored cars ($0.26b), armed reconnaissance helicopters ($2.4b), C-130J transport aircraft ($1.5b), and major infrastructure build-outs ($1.6b). Once a DSCA request is made, the rule is that Congress has 30 days to pass a blockage of the sale, or contracts may be negotiated and the sale can go through. This particular Iraqi request could be worth up to $2.16 billion, and includes… 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks, modified and upgraded to the M1A1M configuration 20 M1A1 engines 20 M1A1 Full Up Power Packs 8 of BAE’s tracked M88A2 HERCULES (Heavy Equipment Recovery Combat Utility Lift and Evacuation System) Armored Recovery Vehicles, with the pulling power to tow or winch even a 70-ton M1 out of trouble. 3 spare M88A2 engines 16 M548A1 tracked logistics vehicles, based on the M113 armored personnel carrier 8 M113A2 tracked armored ambulances 4 M577A2 spare engines 64 M1151A1B1 armored Hummers 92 M1152 Hummer Shelter carriers 12 M577A2 hummer Command Post Carriers 8 HMMWV Ambulances w/ Shelter 20 spare HMMWV engines 35 M1070 Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) Truck Tractors, which can truck tanks on their flatbeds to minimize tank and road wear when the tans need to move to new locations. 10 spare M1070 engines 40 M978A2 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) Tankers, which provide fuel for the M1’s gas-guzzling turbine engine 36 M985A2 HEMTT Cargo Trucks 4 M984A2 HEMTT Wrecker Trucks 20 spare HEMTT engines 16 2500 gal Water Tank Trucks 8 Contact Maintenance Trucks 140 M1085A1 5-ton Cargo Trucks 2 spare 5-ton truck engines 92 635NL Semi-Trailers 80 8-ton Heavy/Medium Trailers 32 500 gal Water Tank Trailers 92 M1102 Light Tactical trailers 16 Motorcycles 16 Sedans 4 5,500 lb Rough Terrain Forklifts 420 AN/VRC-92 Vehicular Receiver Transmitters Plus ammunition, spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $2.16 billion. Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of approximately 8 U.S. Government and 35 contractor representatives to Iraq for up to 4 years. The prime contractors will be: General Dynamics Land Systems Division of Sterling Heights, MI (M1 tanks) Honeywell International (M1 engines) General Motors Allison Transmission Division of Detroit, MI. Abrams for Iraq: Employment and Implications The DSCA adds that: “The proposed sale and upgrade will allow Iraq to operate and exercise a more lethal and survivable M1A1M tank for the protection of critical infrastructure. Iraq will have no difficulty absorbing these tanks into its armed forces.” While details of the M1A1M have yet to be released, it is likely to use the M1A1-SA variant as a base. Developed for use in Iraq, the M1A1-SA configuration adds a number of enhancements for use in cities and other built-up areas, but doesn’t include the remotely-operated machine gun, reactive armor from General Dynamics and Israel’s RAFAEL, et. al. that are found in full M1 TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit) variants. Other Arab armies in the region, whose recommendations reportedly influenced Iraq’s choice, operate either M1A1s (Egypt) or advanced M1A2-SEP variants (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia). The DSCA also says, as it almost always does, that the “proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.” That is true from one point of view, if one factors in the American presence in Iraq. If the Americans are removed from the equation, however, this purchase crosses a rubicon. Past Iraqi defense purchases, including its recent LAV/M1117 and helicopter buys, have all been focused on building forces whose primary focus was on enforcing internal law and order. LAVs can certainly be used in an offensive context, or the US Marines could not depend on them as they do. On the other hand, there are a number of opponents and situations that a USMC commander will not confront with LAVs. American M1 tanks have proven effective in counterinsurgency fights, where their outstanding defenses and the precision fire of their 120mm cannon offer a vital hammer against enemy strongpoints. What’s new, and different, is that they would also give Iraq a capability it has lacked – the ability to enforce its territorial integrity against incursions from its neighbors. Iraq’s 9th Division in Taji has done an excellent job with its refurbished T-72 tanks, aged T-55s, BMP-1 tracked APCs, and MT-LB wheeled APCs. Nevertheless, its equipment provided no significant edge over neighboring states, and is not fielded in sufficient numbers to provide real deterrence. 140 Abrams tanks and 392 LAVs would equip only 2-4 mechanized brigades, or about 1/2 to 1 division. That certainly isn’t an invasion force for anything. In a defensive role, however, they would present very formidable mobile opposition against even numerically superior foes. That is exactly what they were designed to do for the USMC in Norway and other areas on Europe’s Cold War front lines, after all. In addition, the Abrams’ battlefield performance against enemy T-72s and other Russian stock would have to give neighbors like Iran and Syria pause, if a North Vietnam-style armored invasion were ever contemplated. The new tanks may even have some deterrence value vis-a-vis Turkey, which has engaged in sporadic incursions into northern Iraq targeting the Marxist Kurdish terrorists of the PKK. Those incursions have had Iraq’s tacit acceptance, however, so long as they do not go too far. Turkey has an democratically accountable government, just as Iraq does, and the 2 countries have a number of interlocking economic and political interests than cannot be dismissed lightly no mater what sentiments rule the day. Turkey remains Iraq’s main gateway for its rich northern oil fields, and that transit revenue is important to Turkey as well. The Kurdish provinces’ booming economies since 2004 also have other desirable spinoff effects. Nevertheless, Turkey has shown that it will act regardless if it is pushed by the PKK. Iraq, in turn, knows that Turkey’s coordinated armor and air force power is something it cannot defeat. Nor does Iraq’s government have much sympathy for terrorists of any ilk, though its own ability to act against the PKK is tied by the threat of civil war within Iraq. Hence Iraq’s approach of warnings and protests to Turkey, coupled with tacit acceptance. The Kurdish PUK, which is the PKK’s main rival in the Kurdish provinces and plays a significant balancing role within the Iraqi government, has also remained tacitly neutral – so far. Turkey, in turn, knows that escalating too far risks the prospect of confrontation that spills well beyond Iraq into Turkey’s own Kurdish minorities. Their nightmare scenario would involve united opposition and funding from the Kurdish PUK and PKK parties, Iraq, and possible Arab allies – many of whom attained statehood by throwing off Turkish control. A corollary public campaign in Europe, where the Kurdish cause has been popular in the past, risks even further damage to the Turks. These balancing ties and risks, plus the potential fallout in the USA from a serious clash, can be expected to be far more effective than 140 Abrams tanks in deterring any larger conflict along Iraq’s northern border.