Atomic Bomb Plans Still For Sale

Atomic Bomb Plans Still For Sale - NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (NSI News Source Info) September 15, 2008: The UN IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) has continued investigating Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist A Q Khan's illegal nuclear weapons technology smuggling organization. IAEA believes that Khan's group not only had a wider reach than previously thought, but is still in business. Khan himself recently admitted that the Pakistani Army knew he was selling nuclear weapons secrets to Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Previously, he had insisted that he, and his small group of accomplices, had done it all themselves. Back in 2003, the U.S. imposed sanction on a North Korean and Pakistani firm (Changgwang Sinyong Corporation and A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories) for illegally trading missile technology for nuclear weapons. Khan had been suspected of peddling nuclear secrets as far back as the late 1990s. In 2004, Khan finally admitted it. There was popular outrage in Pakistan at a local politicians suggestion that A Q Khan, who originally stole technology from the West and created Pakistans nuclear bombs, be questioned by foreign police for his role in selling that technology (as a private venture) to other nations (like Libya and North Korea). Khan was placed under house arrest after he confessed, and kept away from journalists, but was otherwise untouchable, because he was a national hero for creating the "Islamic Bomb." Popular demand eventually led to Khan being released from house arrest earlier this year. But the IAEA continued to question Khan's customers, some of whom (particularly Libya) have been very cooperative. It is now known, for example, that most of the nuclear weapons documents provided were in electronic form. Thus the information could be easily copied and distributed. There's no way to track down how many copies there are or who has them. It is known that the documents are not in wide distribution, but it is likely that someone (especially in Iran and North Korea) has copies. But there are indications that the documents are still on the market. It gets more interesting. The U.S. CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) concluded that the 2006 nuclear weapons test in North Korea was a failure. This came after analysis of air samples, seismic (using earthquake detectors) and spy satellite data. There was a nuclear explosion, of about one kiloton, but it was the result of a improperly constructed nuclear weapon. Sort of a very low grade nuclear weapon that vaporized, rather than detonated, most of its nuclear material. This sort of explosion is called a "fizzle" and was last seen in 1998, when a Pakistani nuclear weapons test produced a very similar result. What's interesting about this is that the group of Pakistani nuclear scientists (the Kahn group) who were secretly peddling nuclear weapons technology during the 1990s, were apparently selling a defective design. But the IAEA investigation revealed that the Khan group was offering several different designs. Exactly who got what is unclear, and the fizzle that North Korea detonated was either one of the primitive designs, or a poorly put together version of one of the better ones. Khan received a pardon from Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, but was placed under house arrest and kept from the media. Musharraf was head of the army during the time that Khan and his cronies were peddling their nuclear secrets. Musharraf recently resigned as president, but the current government, controlled by opposition parties, does not appear eager to allow any more investigations of Khan inside Pakistan. Khan has not said that Musharraf knew specifically of the sale of Pakistani nuclear weapons secrets, or made any money from it. But someone had to be paid off to enable North Korean aircraft to load up with Pakistani nuclear weapons related equipment, and taking off for a flight home. The high level of corruption in Pakistan has always worried Western nations, because of the fear of weapons, or technology, being sold. The Khan group simply demonstrated that these fears were real. The Pakistanis have sold them once, and it is feared they would do so again. If not the weapons themselves, then the technology to build ones that work. But the remaining Khan network may no longer be controlled by Pakistanis. Whoever does control this material would also have to be very careful. The CIA, and most of the major intelligence agencies on the planet, are looking for this sort of activity, and will pounce if they get wind of it.

CHRONOLOGY: A.Q. Khan 1936 Khan is born in Bhopal, India. 1952 Khan immigrates with his family to Pakistan. 1961 Khan moves to Europe to complete his studies, first in West Berlin and later at the Technical University in Delft, Holland, where he receives a degree in metallurgical engineering in 1967. 1972 Khan receives Ph.D. in metallurgical engineering from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium. May: Khan begins work at Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory (FDO), a subcontractor of Ultra Centrifuge Nederland (UCN). UCN is the Dutch partner in the Urenco uranium enrichment consortium. May 8: Within one week of starting work at FDO, Khan visits the advanced UCN enrichment facility in Almelo, Netherlands to become familiar with Urenco centrifuge operations and the aspects relevant to his own work to strengthen the metal centrifuge components. Khan is not officially cleared to visit the facility, but does so many times with the consent of his employers. Early 1970s Dutch intelligence begins to monitor Khan soon after he begins work at FDO, concerned by a series of inquiries about technical information not related to Khan's own projects. 1974 May 18: India conducts its first nuclear test, a "peaceful nuclear explosion." September: Khan writes to Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to offer his services and expertise to Pakistan. Late: Khan is tasked by UCN at Almelo with translations of the more advanced German-designed G-1 and G-2 centrifuges from German to Dutch, to which he has unsupervised access for 16 days. Late 1970s and Early 1980s American intelligence officials convince Dutch authorities on two occasions not to arrest Khan for the purposes of monitoring his activities further. Abdul Qadeer Khan, nuclear scientist, father of Pakistan's nuclear program and rogue nuclear salesman.

1975 October: Khan is transferred away from enrichment work with FDO as Dutch authorities become increasingly concerned over his activities. He is reportedly observed asking "suspicious questions" at a nuclear trade show in Switzerland. December 15: Khan suddenly leaves FDO for Pakistan with copied blueprints for centrifuges and other components and contact information for nearly 100 companies that supply centrifuge components and materials. 1976 Khan begins centrifuge work with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) July: After conflicts at the PAEC, Prime Minister Bhutto gives Khan autonomous control over Pakistani uranium enrichment programs. Khan founds Engineering Research Laboratory (ERL) on July 31, which focuses exclusively on developing an indigenous uranium enrichment capability. 1978 ERL develops working prototypes of P-1 centrifuges, adapted from the German G-1 design Khan worked with at Urenco. Pakistan enriches uranium for the first time on April 4 at Khan's enrichment facility at Kahuta. Early 1980s Khan acquires blueprints for the Chinese bomb that was tested in China's fourth nuclear explosion in 1966. Khan is, reportedly, approached by an unknown Arab country (possibly Saudi Arabia or Syria) requesting nuclear assistance. Exterior of the A.Q.Khan Nuclear Research Laboratory. 1981 May 1: ERL is renamed A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) by President Zia ul-Haq in recognition of Khan's contributions to the operational enrichment facility at Kahuta. 1983 Khan is convicted, in absentia, in Dutch court for conducting nuclear espionage and sentenced to four years in prison. 1985 Khan's conviction is overturned based on an appeal that he had not received a proper summons. The Dutch prosecution does not renew charges because of the impossibility of serving Khan a summons given Pakistan security and the inability to obtain any of the documents that Khan had taken to Pakistan. Mid 1980s Pakistan produces enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon. KRL continues work on enrichment and is tasked with research and development of missile delivery systems. Khan, reportedly, begins to develop his export network and orders twice the number of components necessary for the indigenous Pakistani program. This transition from importer to exporter of centrifuge components is, apparently, completely missed by western intelligence services who believe Khan is only working on Pakistan's domestic nuclear weapons program. Benazir Bhutto, Former Prime Minister of Pakistan (centre) & Abdul Qadeer Khan (right) Late 1980s Khan and his network of international suppliers are reported to begin nuclear transfers to Iran. The period of cooperation is thought to continue through 1995 when P-2 centrifuge components are transferred. The Pakistani government claims no transfers occurred after the shipments of P-1 components and sub-assemblies from 1989 to 1991. 1987 Khan is believed to make a centrifuge deal with Iran to help build a cascade of 50,000 P-1 centrifuges. 1988 Iranian scientists are suspected of having received nuclear training in Pakistan. 1989 Iran is suspected of receiving its first centrifuge assemblies and components around this time. The shipped components are likely older P-1 centrifuge components that Khan no longer has use for in Pakistan. Through 1995, Khan is reported to have shipped over 2000 components and sub-assemblies for P-1, and later P-2, centrifuges to Iran. 1990 An Iraqi memo, found during inspections in 1995, indicates that Khan may have offered significant nuclear assistance to Iraq in late 1990. He offered to sell Iraq a nuclear bomb design and guarantee material support from Western Europe for a uranium enrichment program. However, Iraq is believed to have turned down the offer, suspecting it to be a sting and no known follow-ups were made after the 1991 Gulf War. 1994 or 1995 More advanced components for P-2 centrifuges are suspected to have arrived in Iran. B.S.A. Tahir, a Sri Lankan business man and Khan's chief lieutenant, told Malaysian police that Iran paid approximately $3 million for these centrifuge parts. Monument to A.Q. Khan, father of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Mid 1990s Khan starts travel to North Korea where he receives technical assistance for the development of the Ghauri missile, an adaptation of the North Korean No Dong design. Khan makes at least 13 visits before his public confession in 2004 and is suspected of arranging a barter deal to exchange nuclear and missile technologies, though the details of any nuclear transfers remain unknown. Khan is suspected to have met with a top Syrian official in Beirut to offer assistance with a centrifuge enrichment facility. 1997 Khan begins to transfer centrifuges and centrifuge components to Libya. Libya receives 20 assembled P-1 centrifuges and components for 200 additional units for a pilot enrichment facility. Khan's network will continue to supply with centrifuge components until late 2003. Khan is suspected of beginning nuclear transfers to North Korea around this time, though the dates of the first transfers are highly uncertain. Transfers to North Korea are believed to have continued through 2003, but the Pakistani government claims these transfers ceased in 2001. Over this period, Khan may have supplied North Korea with old and discarded centrifuge and enrichment machines together with sets of drawings, sketches, technical data, and depleted uranium hexafluoride. 1998 India detonates a total of five devices in nuclear tests on May 11 and 13. Pakistan responds with six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30. 2000 September: Libya receives two P-2 centrifuges as demonstrator models and places an order for components for 10,000 more to build a cascade. Each centrifuge contains around 100 parts, implying approximately 1 million parts total for the entire P-2 centrifuge cascade. A.Q. Khan (far left) and General Pervez Musharraf (far right), President of Pakistan 2001 Libya obtains 1.87 tons of uranium hexafluoride, the gas that is used to feed enrichment centrifuges. The amount is consistent with that required for a small pilot enrichment facility. March: Khan is forced into retirement. Khan refuses the compensatory position of "advisor to the chief executive" and is later given the ceremonial title of "Special Advisor to the Chief Executive on Strategic and KRL Affairs." Summer: American spy satellites detect missile components being loaded into a Pakistani cargo plane outside of Pyongyang. Intelligence services assume the cargo to be missile technology traded in direct exchange for nuclear technology, but no hard evidence exists. December: B.S.A. Tahir signs a $13 million contract with Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE) in Malaysia for 25,000 aluminum centrifuge components. Late 2001 or Early 2002 Libya receives blueprints for nuclear weapons plans. The plans are reported to be of Chinese origin with Chinese notes in the margins. 2002 December: Shipments begin from SCOPE of aluminum centrifuge components. Four shipments are believed to have been sent from Malaysia to Dubai before August 2003, en route to Libya. 2003 October: The German cargo ship BBC China is intercepted en route to Libya with components for 1,000 centrifuges. The parts were manufactured in Malaysia by SCOPE and shipped through Dubai. December: Libya renounces its nuclear weapons program and begins the process of full disclosure to the IAEA, including the declaration of all foreign procurements. 2004 February 4: Khan makes a public confession on Pakistani television (in English) of his illegal nuclear dealings. Khan claims that he initiated the transfers and cites an "error of judgment." He is pardoned soon after by President Musharraf and has been under house arrest since. The Pakistani government claims that Khan acted independently and without state knowledge. March: A container aboard the BBC China (the ship that was previously intercepted) arrives in Libya with one additional container of P-2 centrifuge components. Colonel Qaddafi reports the arrival to American intelligence and the IAEA. The Libyans warn American officials that not all of the components from Libya's orders had arrived and some might still show up in the future.