DIA Official Defends Russia-Georgia Reporting
(NSI News Source Info) September 3, 2008: The Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA's) top analyst says the U.S. agency provided Bush administration officials with ample warning that the simmering tensions between Georgia and Russia could erupt in fighting.
In the wake of fighting that broke out between the two nations, including a massive Russian offensive deep within Georgian territory, many observers have wondered why U.S. and western officials failed to predict Moscow was ready to launch an massive assault on Georgia. And while Robert Cardillo, DIA's deputy director of analysis, said he had to pull analysts from other desks when the conflict broke out Aug. 7, he also defended DIA's reporting on the situation before that day.
"I wouldn't say we were caught flat-footed," he said during an Aug. 27 interview. "I feel pretty good, from what I know now, about the reporting that we did and the intel community did ahead of" the conflict, which saw Russia occupy much of western Georgia by the third day.
Cardillo repeatedly noted that his agency's job is to "set the table," by providing information about developments in the proper context and with informed analysis of what might happen next, for policy-makers.
"We have a lot of debates about how far you can take a policy-maker," he said. "They have lots of information coming in."
Some former national security officials have said it appears the U.S. president and his team were caught off guard when Moscow ordered its troops to pound Georgia after the former Soviet state went into South Ossetia, a breakaway province, to allegedly take out separatist fighters.
"There certainly were plenty of indicators that business was picking up in the Ossetia border region," said Andrew Kuchins, director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
One of the largest signs, Kuchins said, came in the weeks before the conflict broke out. Russian troops held what he called "a major exercise" in the region, but with a catch: "The troops never left."
Another came Aug. 7, when a group of U.S. military trainers showed up for a session with Georgian troops only to find their cohorts nowhere to be found, Kuchins said. "That should have caused someone to ask: 'Where are they and what the hell are they doing?'" he added.
He called it "a mystery" why the Bush administration and its western allies appeared blind to the possibility that Russia would respond so forcefully.
Making matters worse, Kuchins said, as Russia was moving in, televisions around the world showed "George Bush sitting with Vladimir Putin at the Beijing Olympics," he said. He was referring to the American president and the Russian prime minister. Putin was until several months ago the Russian president and it is widely believed he still is the puppet master inside the Kremlin.
Cardillo said he could not "speak to what [administration] officials knew or how well informed they were.
"If you asked senior officials if they read that report or that cable from DIA, the answer is probably going to be no," the DIA analysis chief said. "They get large books in the morning to read every day. They're busy folks."
Another culprit for what some call a lack of understanding by American analysts and a slow response from the White House could have stemmed from daily monitoring of the long history of Russian-Georgian tensions, which never led to serious fighting, Cardillo said.
"The Georgia-Russia issue has been there for some time," Cardillo said. "There could have been a sense of complacency" throughout the U.S. national security apparatus, he added.
A long list of analysts and former security officials around the globe, in public statements and think tank white papers on both the conflict and the American response, have questioned western leaders' collective shock because Russia had massed tens of thousands of troops, as well as massive numbers of vehicles and weapons along its border with South Ossetia.
The DIA official responded to such questions by stating analysts following such years-long tensions might have based their predictions on what would happen if Georgia sent its troops into the province on past patterns. And never before had Russia responded by starting a war, he noted.
He said U.S. intelligence analysts likely took viewed the situation this way: "'Oh, we've seen this cycle before. Artillery shells cause this reaction. And then, this will happen. Georgia will move here, Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian president, will say a few things. Russia will respond with an exercise north of the border. There will be overflight issues.'"
Kuchins said that sounds like a likely scenario, based on conversations with some intel community insiders.
Although Cardillo expressed confidence in DIA's - and the broader intel community's - reporting before fighting broke out, the agency will review its performance.
"We will ask if we missed something, and did we use the information in a way that was useful to the policy-makers. We will ask if policy-makers saw these reports, if they made a difference in their decision-making processes, and if they were aware of the warning that had been provided," he said. "I relish after-action reports. They're healthy.
"In the grand scheme, if it was at some levels [of the administration] a surprise, then we need to relook at how we do business," Cardillo said.
DIA had only "a couple people who had maintained situational awareness and had an in-depth understanding of that region," he said. That is the result of an effort, conducted "in the open" and with approval of senior defense and intel officials, to build up "analytic rigor" of other hot spots in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, Cardillo said.
In the 1980s, the agency devoted about 80 percent of its personnel to studying the Soviet threat. While Cardillo said he will not build his Russian "bench strength" back to that Cold War-era level, he will beef it up as Moscow continues moving toward a stance that is more and more hostile toward the U.S. and Europe.
"I will not ramp back down to two," he said.
Kuchins said such an increase is sorely needed and speculated DIA probably has a far greater number of analysts studying China.
"The right number is somewhere between two and 80 percent, but certainly higher than two," Kuchins said.
Cardillo grouped Russia with Bush administration nemesis Iran, saying those are two nations on which DIA plans to "increase its analytic rigor."
Analysts around the world are signaling that would be a wise move as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Putin continue ramping up its rhetoric and hostile actions against the west.
Putin told the Russian parliament earlier this summer that it should continue funding the Kremlin's desired annual military spending increases because "only a battle-ready [and] well-equipped military with strong morale can defend" the nation.
But, as some defense experts have noted, Washington was an easy target for criticism no matter how it handled the conflict.
"From the start of the crisis, the U.S. was in a lose-lose situation: It would not risk engagement in military action against Russia, and so Georgia lost its faith in the viability of American support," wrote Alexis Crow, an analyst at the London-based Royal United Services Institute's International Security Studies Department, in a recent report. "Now Washington is in a diplomatic quandary with its European allies, and it remains to be seen how the Bush administration will approach it."
Wednesday, September 03, 2008
DIA Official Defends Russia-Georgia Reporting
DIA Official Defends Russia-Georgia Reporting
(NSI News Source Info) September 3, 2008: The Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA's) top analyst says the U.S. agency provided Bush administration officials with ample warning that the simmering tensions between Georgia and Russia could erupt in fighting.
In the wake of fighting that broke out between the two nations, including a massive Russian offensive deep within Georgian territory, many observers have wondered why U.S. and western officials failed to predict Moscow was ready to launch an massive assault on Georgia. And while Robert Cardillo, DIA's deputy director of analysis, said he had to pull analysts from other desks when the conflict broke out Aug. 7, he also defended DIA's reporting on the situation before that day.
"I wouldn't say we were caught flat-footed," he said during an Aug. 27 interview. "I feel pretty good, from what I know now, about the reporting that we did and the intel community did ahead of" the conflict, which saw Russia occupy much of western Georgia by the third day.
Cardillo repeatedly noted that his agency's job is to "set the table," by providing information about developments in the proper context and with informed analysis of what might happen next, for policy-makers.
"We have a lot of debates about how far you can take a policy-maker," he said. "They have lots of information coming in."
Some former national security officials have said it appears the U.S. president and his team were caught off guard when Moscow ordered its troops to pound Georgia after the former Soviet state went into South Ossetia, a breakaway province, to allegedly take out separatist fighters.
"There certainly were plenty of indicators that business was picking up in the Ossetia border region," said Andrew Kuchins, director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
One of the largest signs, Kuchins said, came in the weeks before the conflict broke out. Russian troops held what he called "a major exercise" in the region, but with a catch: "The troops never left."
Another came Aug. 7, when a group of U.S. military trainers showed up for a session with Georgian troops only to find their cohorts nowhere to be found, Kuchins said. "That should have caused someone to ask: 'Where are they and what the hell are they doing?'" he added.
He called it "a mystery" why the Bush administration and its western allies appeared blind to the possibility that Russia would respond so forcefully.
Making matters worse, Kuchins said, as Russia was moving in, televisions around the world showed "George Bush sitting with Vladimir Putin at the Beijing Olympics," he said. He was referring to the American president and the Russian prime minister. Putin was until several months ago the Russian president and it is widely believed he still is the puppet master inside the Kremlin.
Cardillo said he could not "speak to what [administration] officials knew or how well informed they were.
"If you asked senior officials if they read that report or that cable from DIA, the answer is probably going to be no," the DIA analysis chief said. "They get large books in the morning to read every day. They're busy folks."
Another culprit for what some call a lack of understanding by American analysts and a slow response from the White House could have stemmed from daily monitoring of the long history of Russian-Georgian tensions, which never led to serious fighting, Cardillo said.
"The Georgia-Russia issue has been there for some time," Cardillo said. "There could have been a sense of complacency" throughout the U.S. national security apparatus, he added.
A long list of analysts and former security officials around the globe, in public statements and think tank white papers on both the conflict and the American response, have questioned western leaders' collective shock because Russia had massed tens of thousands of troops, as well as massive numbers of vehicles and weapons along its border with South Ossetia.
The DIA official responded to such questions by stating analysts following such years-long tensions might have based their predictions on what would happen if Georgia sent its troops into the province on past patterns. And never before had Russia responded by starting a war, he noted.
He said U.S. intelligence analysts likely took viewed the situation this way: "'Oh, we've seen this cycle before. Artillery shells cause this reaction. And then, this will happen. Georgia will move here, Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian president, will say a few things. Russia will respond with an exercise north of the border. There will be overflight issues.'"
Kuchins said that sounds like a likely scenario, based on conversations with some intel community insiders.
Although Cardillo expressed confidence in DIA's - and the broader intel community's - reporting before fighting broke out, the agency will review its performance.
"We will ask if we missed something, and did we use the information in a way that was useful to the policy-makers. We will ask if policy-makers saw these reports, if they made a difference in their decision-making processes, and if they were aware of the warning that had been provided," he said. "I relish after-action reports. They're healthy.
"In the grand scheme, if it was at some levels [of the administration] a surprise, then we need to relook at how we do business," Cardillo said.
DIA had only "a couple people who had maintained situational awareness and had an in-depth understanding of that region," he said. That is the result of an effort, conducted "in the open" and with approval of senior defense and intel officials, to build up "analytic rigor" of other hot spots in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, Cardillo said.
In the 1980s, the agency devoted about 80 percent of its personnel to studying the Soviet threat. While Cardillo said he will not build his Russian "bench strength" back to that Cold War-era level, he will beef it up as Moscow continues moving toward a stance that is more and more hostile toward the U.S. and Europe.
"I will not ramp back down to two," he said.
Kuchins said such an increase is sorely needed and speculated DIA probably has a far greater number of analysts studying China.
"The right number is somewhere between two and 80 percent, but certainly higher than two," Kuchins said.
Cardillo grouped Russia with Bush administration nemesis Iran, saying those are two nations on which DIA plans to "increase its analytic rigor."
Analysts around the world are signaling that would be a wise move as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Putin continue ramping up its rhetoric and hostile actions against the west.
Putin told the Russian parliament earlier this summer that it should continue funding the Kremlin's desired annual military spending increases because "only a battle-ready [and] well-equipped military with strong morale can defend" the nation.
But, as some defense experts have noted, Washington was an easy target for criticism no matter how it handled the conflict.
"From the start of the crisis, the U.S. was in a lose-lose situation: It would not risk engagement in military action against Russia, and so Georgia lost its faith in the viability of American support," wrote Alexis Crow, an analyst at the London-based Royal United Services Institute's International Security Studies Department, in a recent report. "Now Washington is in a diplomatic quandary with its European allies, and it remains to be seen how the Bush administration will approach it."
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