DTN News: Analysts Say Russia's Influence On Iran Very Limited

DTN News: Analysts Say Russia's Influence On Iran Very Limited

*Sources: DTN News / VOA By Andre de Nesnera

(NSI News Source Info) WASHINGTON - July 3, 2009: How to deal with and what to do with Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations is expected to be discussed during the upcoming Moscow summit between U.S. President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitri Medvedev.

The nuclear facility at Brushehr was the focus of a considerable amount of controversy, especially in the United States. The reactor was being built under an agreement between the Russian and Iranian governments for $800-million. Although originally intended to be the location of a German-built reactor in the 1970s, the new reactor was to be built to Russian design specifications, though the original reactor buildings exterior appearance would remain essentially the same. There were two reactors at Bushehr, one was in an advanced stage of completion the other had not been worked on for some time and was not scheduled to be completed as of 2006. Iran was a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), though it had not ratified two additional protocols to the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Program 93 + 2, which was designed to prevent states from developing nuclear weapons covertly, despite IAEA inspections, as Iraq was able to do prior to the Gulf War. Iran maintained that it would not ratify 93 + 2 due to it being denied civilian nuclear technology for Bushehr, despite its positive record with the IAEA. Nuclear power industry contacts between Iran and Russia were based on the inter-governmental agreements of 25 August 1992, on cooperation in the civil use of nuclear energy and in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran. Opposition to Bushehr On 23 February 1998, the US State Department reaffirmed US opposition to Iran's nuclear program. The United States argued that Iran had sufficient oil and gas reserves for power generation, and that nuclear reactors were expensive, unnecessary, and could be used for military purposes. The United States strongly opposed the project, which was permitted under the NPT, and had in the past provided Russia with intelligence information pointing to the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Despite this, the Russians proceeded with work on Bushehr. US opposition to Russian construction of Bushehr rested on three main issues. First was that weapons grade plutonium could be extracted from the reactor allowing the Iranians to construct nuclear weapons. Secondly, the US feared that the Russians and the Iranians were using Bushehr as a cover for the transfer of other sensitive technology that would normally be prohibited. Finally, the US was concerned that the knowledge gained by Iranian scientists working at Bushehr could further Irans nuclear weapons program. US pressure to prevent the construction of Brushehr had not been limited to Russia. On 6 March 1998, during a visit by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Ukraine announced that it would not sell turbines for use with reactors at Bushehr. The contract had been worth $45 million. Five days later, Vice President Gore met with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and discussed, among other things, US concerns over Russian exports of nuclear and missile technology to Iran. Iran claimed that its nuclear program was for peaceful power-generation purposes and that it would help free up oil and gas resources for export, thus generating additional hard-currency revenues. The US had countered that Iran did not possess sufficient natural reserves of nuclear fuel, meaning that it would be dependant on costly imports to sustain a nuclear power program.

Iran's nuclear weapons program is of major concern to the Obama administration.

What is the uranium enrichment plan designed for?

The United States and the European Union believe Iran's uranium enrichment program is designed ultimately to build nuclear arms. Tehran says it only wants to use its enriched uranium for peaceful purposes, such as generating electricity.

In an interview with VOA's "Press Conference USA", former U.S. National Security Adviser (retired Air Force) General Brent Scowcroft said it is essential to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.

"Because I think if Iran is allowed to develop nuclear weapons, it is not so much that they have a few nuclear weapons, but that the response in the region will be a nuclear response and you will have countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and so on, doing the same thing," said Brent Scowcroft.

In an effort to counter the possible nuclear threat from Tehran, the Obama administration is looking at the possibility of stationing a missile defense system in Eastern Europe made up of 10 missile interceptors in Poland and a radar facility in the Czech Republic. U.S. officials have said the system is not targeted against Moscow as stated by Russian officials who remain strongly opposed to the proposed plan.

Daryll Kimball is executive director of the Arms Control Association, an independent research organization.

"A few interceptors in Poland would not negate hundreds of nuclear-armed Russian ballistic missiles," said Daryll Kimball. "But what the Russians are concerned about is that over time, this system that the United States has been developing over the past several years will expand and become a real threat. They are also concerned about it because these facilities - the radar in the Czech Republic and the interceptor base in Poland - are in former eastern bloc countries, they would be literally on the doorstep of Russia."

Bush, Obama differ on missile defense shield in Europe

While the Bush administration was wholeheartedly behind the missile shield plan, President Obama has been more cautious. He has stated that his commitment to the program will be based on the nature of Iran's threat and whether or not the system is technically feasible.

Robert Legvold from Columbia University says President Obama presented his administration's position in a letter to the Russian president in February.

"In effect what he said is, look, this system is designed for a potential Iranian threat," said Robert Legvold. "If that threat diminishes or disappears, then the urgency of going forward with the system also eases. He didn't put it in terms of a quid pro quo - if you help us prevent Iran from going forward, then we promise we won't go forward with the system - that's the way it got reported in the press in a misleading fashion, but he suggested there was a logical connection between the two. The Russians have made it plain that they are not interested in creating that linkage.

"Many experts say whether Tehran decides to curtail its nuclear weapons aspirations could be based on how much pressure Russia exerts on Tehran. But other analysts, including David Kramer, a former senior U.S. State Department official in the Bush administration (now with the German Marshall Fund in the United States), say Russia's influence over Iran is limited.

"I've been skeptical about Russia's ability: one - to have leverage to use over Iran, and two - its willingness to do so, even if it did have it," said David Kramer. "Russia has a lot of interests in Iran: significant trade, nuclear reactor construction, energy, arms sales. And I've been of the view that Russia would much prefer for the United States and other countries to play the role of the bad guy, to lean on Iran, to be the one pushing for sanctions while Russia stays in the background."

The potential Iranian threat will be one of the issues discussed during the upcoming summit meeting in Moscow. Analysts say it will be interesting to see if President Obama will be able to enlist the help of President Medvedev in dealing with Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations.