*Nation's Weapons Remain a Real Menace
*Source: DTN News / By Uzi Rubin
(NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - July 13, 2009: On Nov. 18, Iran flew its new Ashura missile for the second time. Although the test was less than a complete success, Iran Defense Minister Mustafa Najjer was sufficiently satisfied to release impressive video footage showing what was clearly a previously unknown large multistage ballistic missile roaring off a mobile launcher. 
A military truck carries a long-range Iranian Shahab-3 Ballistic missile during the annual military parade in a suburb of Tehran, 22 September 2006. Iran announced 27 November 2007 it has built a new missile, "Ashura", with a range of 2,000 kms (1,240 miles), sufficient to put Israel and US bases in the Middle East within easy reach. There has been considerable confusion in recent months about the capacities of Iran's longer-range missiles. Iran in September at its main military parade unveiled a missile labelled Ghadr-1 (Power), which was said to have a range of 1,800 kms (1,100 miles). Some Western military experts claimed that the Ghadr-1 was no more than a Shahab-3 under a different name.
In a series of interviews after the test, Najjer stressed that the new missile, renamed "Sajil," had a range of more then 2,000 kilometers and that it was a two-stage design, powered by composite solid-propellant rocket motors.
Nevertheless, when six months later a group of prominent U.S. and Russian academics released a detailed assessment of Iran's missile and nuclear capabilities, their report made this astonishing statement: "There is no reliable information at present on the state of Iran's efforts to develop solid-propellant rocket motors and therefore no basis on which to make an assessment."
Incredibly, both the unambiguous photographic evidence and the corroboration of Western sources were simply ignored in the May report, "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential, a Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Technical Experts," by the East West Institute in New York.
Discarding any evidence to the contrary, the report judges that Iran's missile industry is incapable of advancing on its own beyond rudimentary Scud-level technology. While grudgingly accepting that "Iran … has qualified engineers who are able to make good use of the technology that is available to them," the report holds that "this does not show that Iran has made a fundamental technological breakthrough."
Pontificating on the "tremendous intellectual and material effort" that the United States and Russia have had to invest more than half a century ago to develop and produce what were at that time modern ballistic missiles, the authors decree that "Iran does not have the infrastructure ... or the scientists and engineers to make substantial improvement in basic rocket components."
As a result, they
condescendingly state that Iran's putative global-range missiles will be "large, visible and cumbersome"; in other words, pretty useless.
Perhaps irked by the disparaging assessment and patronizing tone, and with the ink still wet on the report's print, the "nonexistent" Iranian scientists and engineers quickly fired off another of the Sajil missiles, the third in a row, on May 20. To dispel any lingering doubts, they released color video footage of the entire boost phase, clearly showing the full burn of the first stage, the tricky "fire in the hole" stage separation cum second stage ignition, the discarding of the empty casing of the exhausted first stage and what looked like an activation of a thrust termination system.
One was reminded of the early 1960s newsreels of the first Minuteman flight tests.
But there is more to this than meets the eye. The very existence of the Sajil is living testimony that Iran has secured access to the high-strength steel and specialized precursor materials needed for large-diameter solid rocket motors, and that it now possesses the specialized industrial infrastructure, such as large mixers, casting pits, X-ray machines and test stands, without which such 10-ton-class rocket motors cannot be manufactured, inspected or tested.
All those precursor materials and industrial machinery are strictly controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and by right should have never been available to Iran. Yet, the report cheerfully observes that "there appears to have been some success in recent years in improving the MTCR", and recommends without any hint of sarcasm that "this improvement be maintained and strengthened."
Was there ever a barn door slammed shut so hard after the horses were miles away?
By its own charter, the East West Institute focuses on critical challenges that endanger peace. Nothing endangers peace more than refusal to face the facts and underestimation of the adversary.
Iran's scientists and engineers are as bright, as capable and as innovative as any others. Hence, Iran's putative long-range missiles, if and when deployed, will be neither large nor visible nor cumbersome, but as deadly as whatever the established missile powers deployed at early stages of the Cold War - in other words, a real menace.
Wishful thinking will not help here, and the United States would do well to base its policy on cold facts rather than on selective fancy.
Uzi Rubin is president of the Rubincon consulting firm and founder of the Israel Missile Defense Organization.
A military truck carries a long-range Iranian Shahab-3 Ballistic missile during the annual military parade in a suburb of Tehran, 22 September 2006. Iran announced 27 November 2007 it has built a new missile, "Ashura", with a range of 2,000 kms (1,240 miles), sufficient to put Israel and US bases in the Middle East within easy reach. There has been considerable confusion in recent months about the capacities of Iran's longer-range missiles. Iran in September at its main military parade unveiled a missile labelled Ghadr-1 (Power), which was said to have a range of 1,800 kms (1,100 miles). Some Western military experts claimed that the Ghadr-1 was no more than a Shahab-3 under a different name.
In a series of interviews after the test, Najjer stressed that the new missile, renamed "Sajil," had a range of more then 2,000 kilometers and that it was a two-stage design, powered by composite solid-propellant rocket motors.
Nevertheless, when six months later a group of prominent U.S. and Russian academics released a detailed assessment of Iran's missile and nuclear capabilities, their report made this astonishing statement: "There is no reliable information at present on the state of Iran's efforts to develop solid-propellant rocket motors and therefore no basis on which to make an assessment."
Incredibly, both the unambiguous photographic evidence and the corroboration of Western sources were simply ignored in the May report, "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential, a Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Technical Experts," by the East West Institute in New York.
Discarding any evidence to the contrary, the report judges that Iran's missile industry is incapable of advancing on its own beyond rudimentary Scud-level technology. While grudgingly accepting that "Iran … has qualified engineers who are able to make good use of the technology that is available to them," the report holds that "this does not show that Iran has made a fundamental technological breakthrough."
Pontificating on the "tremendous intellectual and material effort" that the United States and Russia have had to invest more than half a century ago to develop and produce what were at that time modern ballistic missiles, the authors decree that "Iran does not have the infrastructure ... or the scientists and engineers to make substantial improvement in basic rocket components."
As a result, they
condescendingly state that Iran's putative global-range missiles will be "large, visible and cumbersome"; in other words, pretty useless.
Perhaps irked by the disparaging assessment and patronizing tone, and with the ink still wet on the report's print, the "nonexistent" Iranian scientists and engineers quickly fired off another of the Sajil missiles, the third in a row, on May 20. To dispel any lingering doubts, they released color video footage of the entire boost phase, clearly showing the full burn of the first stage, the tricky "fire in the hole" stage separation cum second stage ignition, the discarding of the empty casing of the exhausted first stage and what looked like an activation of a thrust termination system.
One was reminded of the early 1960s newsreels of the first Minuteman flight tests.
But there is more to this than meets the eye. The very existence of the Sajil is living testimony that Iran has secured access to the high-strength steel and specialized precursor materials needed for large-diameter solid rocket motors, and that it now possesses the specialized industrial infrastructure, such as large mixers, casting pits, X-ray machines and test stands, without which such 10-ton-class rocket motors cannot be manufactured, inspected or tested.
All those precursor materials and industrial machinery are strictly controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and by right should have never been available to Iran. Yet, the report cheerfully observes that "there appears to have been some success in recent years in improving the MTCR", and recommends without any hint of sarcasm that "this improvement be maintained and strengthened."
Was there ever a barn door slammed shut so hard after the horses were miles away?
By its own charter, the East West Institute focuses on critical challenges that endanger peace. Nothing endangers peace more than refusal to face the facts and underestimation of the adversary.
Iran's scientists and engineers are as bright, as capable and as innovative as any others. Hence, Iran's putative long-range missiles, if and when deployed, will be neither large nor visible nor cumbersome, but as deadly as whatever the established missile powers deployed at early stages of the Cold War - in other words, a real menace.
Wishful thinking will not help here, and the United States would do well to base its policy on cold facts rather than on selective fancy.
Uzi Rubin is president of the Rubincon consulting firm and founder of the Israel Missile Defense Organization.
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