*Source: DTN News / National Post By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
(NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - July 19, 2009: For eight years, NATO forces and their local allies have been battling Taliban militia and terrorists. But who are the Taliban, exactly? Many Canadians still do not know. In the third instalment of "Know Thine Enemy," a four-part series presented in partnership with the Washington based Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross explains how Taliban sympathizers infiltrated Pakistan's intelligence services. 
Pakistani new army chief General Ashfaq Kiyani watches President General Pervez Musharraf deliver his speech during a change of command ceremony in Rawalpindi, Nov. 28, 2007.
Pakistan has engaged in a two-month offensive against Islamic militants in the country's Swat region, a campaign that began when the Taliban captured a district just 60 miles from Islamabad, the nation's capital. As the campaign winds down, and local residents begin to return, significant questions remain about future counterinsurgency operations. For example, while Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has asked Washington for his own armed Predator drones for use against the Taliban, regional newspaper Dawn reports that U. S. intelligence officers oppose this move -- in part because several years ago "American officials gave Pakistan advance word of planned Predator attacks, but stopped the practice after the information was leaked to militants."
This relatively minor disagreement highlights an issue that cuts to the heart of many of the challenges Pakistan faces: support for religious militancy within the country's military and Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).
At its founding, Pakistan's military was shaped by the country's colonial experience. Scholar Shuja Nawaz, whose instalment in this op-ed series appeared earlier this week, notes that Pakistan's army began with an elitist orientation, filled at the upper echelons with British officers who "were in turn succeeded by their native clones, men who saw the army as a unique institution, separate and apart from the rest of civil society and authority."
In the 1970s, two major changes had a lasting impact. First, prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto broadened the ISI by creating an internal wing. He wanted to bolster his own power, and had the ISI spy on friend and foe alike. Ironically, the wing Bhutto created would play a role in the coup that toppled him in 1977.
The second change was brought by the man who came to power in that coup, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Zia's religious zeal translated into overtly Muslim public policy positions and imposition of Islamic norms. Zia devoted particular attention to the military, where officers were required to read S. K. Malik's The Quranic Concept of War, and a Directorate of Religious Instruction oversaw
their Islamic education. Religious criteria were incorporated into promotion requirements, and Zia mandated formal obedience to Islamic rules within the military.
At the same time, the demographics of the officer corps shifted. The rank-and-file of the new junior officers came from Pakistan's poorer northern districts. Journalist Zahid Hussain notes that "the spirit of liberalism, common in the 'old' army, was practically unknown to them. They were products of a social class that, by its very nature, was conservative and easily influenced by Islamic fundamentalism."
Pakistani new army chief General Ashfaq Kiyani watches President General Pervez Musharraf deliver his speech during a change of command ceremony in Rawalpindi, Nov. 28, 2007.
Pakistan has engaged in a two-month offensive against Islamic militants in the country's Swat region, a campaign that began when the Taliban captured a district just 60 miles from Islamabad, the nation's capital. As the campaign winds down, and local residents begin to return, significant questions remain about future counterinsurgency operations. For example, while Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has asked Washington for his own armed Predator drones for use against the Taliban, regional newspaper Dawn reports that U. S. intelligence officers oppose this move -- in part because several years ago "American officials gave Pakistan advance word of planned Predator attacks, but stopped the practice after the information was leaked to militants."
This relatively minor disagreement highlights an issue that cuts to the heart of many of the challenges Pakistan faces: support for religious militancy within the country's military and Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).
At its founding, Pakistan's military was shaped by the country's colonial experience. Scholar Shuja Nawaz, whose instalment in this op-ed series appeared earlier this week, notes that Pakistan's army began with an elitist orientation, filled at the upper echelons with British officers who "were in turn succeeded by their native clones, men who saw the army as a unique institution, separate and apart from the rest of civil society and authority."
In the 1970s, two major changes had a lasting impact. First, prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto broadened the ISI by creating an internal wing. He wanted to bolster his own power, and had the ISI spy on friend and foe alike. Ironically, the wing Bhutto created would play a role in the coup that toppled him in 1977.
The second change was brought by the man who came to power in that coup, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Zia's religious zeal translated into overtly Muslim public policy positions and imposition of Islamic norms. Zia devoted particular attention to the military, where officers were required to read S. K. Malik's The Quranic Concept of War, and a Directorate of Religious Instruction oversaw
their Islamic education. Religious criteria were incorporated into promotion requirements, and Zia mandated formal obedience to Islamic rules within the military.
At the same time, the demographics of the officer corps shifted. The rank-and-file of the new junior officers came from Pakistan's poorer northern districts. Journalist Zahid Hussain notes that "the spirit of liberalism, common in the 'old' army, was practically unknown to them. They were products of a social class that, by its very nature, was conservative and easily influenced by Islamic fundamentalism."This new direction was bolstered by the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan soon after Zia came to power. The ISI funnelled money to the anti-Soviet mujahideen, and trained them. As funding for the mujahidin grew, so did the ISI. Though it had a staff of around 2,000 before the Soviet invasion, the ISI retained about 40,000 employees by the time American funding for the war ended in 1989.
Afghanistan fell into civil war after the Soviet-backed regime of Mohammad Najibullah fell in 1992. The ISI remained involved, eventually becoming a major sponsor of the Taliban. Within two years of the fundamentalist group's founding, it captured both Kandahar and Kabul, aided by the ISI. The Taliban brought a harsh version of Islamic law, and ultimately offered Osama bin Laden safe haven.
During this period, ISI agents not only formed relationships with the Taliban, but also sponsored religious militants in India's Kashmir region, and even co-operated with al-Qaeda. The New York Times has noted that the ISI's use of al-Qaeda camps to train fighters may have been revealed in August 1998 when the U. S. killed "several members
of a Kashmiri militant group supported by Pakistan" in retaliatory strikes following the bombing of American embassies in East Africa.
After then-Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf threw in his lot with the U. S. following the 9/11 attacks, he sacked pro-Taliban commanders at the top levels of the ISI and military. But this was too little, too late. Many officers remained tied to the Taliban militants and mujahideen with whom they had built relations over the course of two decades. Moreover, the Frankenstein monster of Pakistan-created jihadist groups was now out of control: Pakistan supported such groups for over a decade, and couldn't simply cut them all off at once.
Today, support for jihadist groups occurs at three levels within Pakistan's ISI and military. First, the ISI has had an institutional policy of support for actors such as Mullah Omar's Taliban, and perhaps other jihadist groups with ties to al-Qaeda at top levels.
Second, elements of Pakistan's ISI and military that are regarded as "rogues" by the U. S. have supported jihadist groups. These elements have been implicated in such recent terrorist incidents as the November 2008 Mumbai "urban warfare" attacks, the July 2008 bombing of India's embassy in Kabul, and a September 2008 bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad. There is also an open question as to whether these "rogue" elements are acting individually, or if they constitute factions within the ISI and the military.
Third, retired ISI and military officers with connections to Islamic militancy often remain influential following their retirement. One example is former ISI head Hamid Gul. In late 2008, the U. S. linked Gul to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and India has demanded his arrest in connection with the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.
There is frequently overlap between these three levels, and it is clear that all three levels of support create problems for Western interests in the region while strengthening jihadist groups. Understanding this dynamic, and formulating sound policies to address it, will be critical to stabilizing South Asia. - Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is the director of the Center for Terrorism Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), and coeditor of a forthcoming book on Pakistan that will be published by FDD Press. An expanded version of this article appears in the spring 2009 issue of the Journal of International Security Affairs.
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