Monday, September 08, 2008
Dutch Prepare for Large Utility Vehicle Buy
Dutch Prepare for Large Utility Vehicle Buy
(NSI News Source Info) September 8, 2008: The Netherlands’ Ministerie van Defensie has announced a EUR 250+ million project to replace nearly 8,000 light, medium and heavy wheeled logistics and patrol vehicles between 2011-2018. This will not include tactical vehicles such as the Landmacht’s Fennek reconnaissance vehicles, CV90/ YPR/ BvS10 armored personnel carriers, tanks, et. al., but it will replace a significant percentage of the Dutch patrol vehicle and truck fleet.
The project is looking to acquire 7,018 vehicles (including civilian vehicles) plus 3,617 modules, trailers et. al. to adapt the vehicles for specific tasks. The project also expects to order 1,020 modular protection kits, 120 Remotely controlled weapon systems and 1,260 gun mountings.
The accompanying briefing states that the operational vehicles, as opposed to vehicles bought under this program for civilian/domestic use, should be able to operate in the upper levels of the violence/war spectrum. This includes the option of modular add-on protection that can be changed as threat levels from projectiles, shrapnel, land mines, et. al. The mounting of electronic jammers to defeat remotely-detonated IED land mines is also contemplated, and the vehicles should be able to operate in extreme high and low temperature conditions.
The ‘light freight/cargo vehicle’ should be CH-47 transportable, either in the helicopter or underslung, as well as C-130 transportable. All of the operational vehicle types should be transportable in the C-17, AN-124 and A-400M, as well as with the country’s Rotterdam Class LPD ships, by civilian transport vessels and by train. Operational life should be at least 2 years, with a total lifespan of 10-15 years.
Russia postpones launch of European GOCE satellite
Russian, French presidents to hold talks on Georgia in Moscow
Militant leader killed in special operation in Daghestan
Sunday, September 07, 2008
Russia To Carry Out Naval Maneuvers off Venezuela
Anti Missile Showdown Building Between East And West
(NSI News Source Info) Moscow - September 8, 2008: The year 2008 has been the most productive for American missile shield plans since President Ronald Reagan launched his famed Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s.
But the 1980s are also remembered for an unprecedented level of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.
On Aug. 20 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed a U.S.-Polish agreement on a third positioning area for the American missile system in Europe. It looks as if this situation is pushing Russia into another confrontation with the West and could reignite the nuclear missile threat on the European continent.
Today is not an occasion to argue whether Iran's missiles threaten Western Europe, though it is true that an Iranian rocket launched Aug. 18, as part of preparations for orbiting Iran's first satellite, points to a possible threat in the future.
But whether there is a threat from Iran, the Russian military and political establishment is convinced that American anti-missiles in Poland are only part of a plan to build up a U.S. nuclear potential in Europe directed against Russia. Naturally, Moscow is considering retaliatory options. Russian three-star Col.-Gen. Viktor Yesin, first vice president of the Academy for Security, Defense and Law Enforcement in Moscow, thinks that "in reply, Russia could reinforce its air grouping in the Kaliningrad region to neutralize missile silos in Poland."
Another Russian general, Leonid Ivashov, who heads the Academy of Geopolitical Problems in Moscow, believes that "in response, Russia could site Iskander theater missile systems and high-precision cruise missiles in the Kaliningrad region, western Russia, and Belarus."
The generals are right. All this could be done, and perhaps with a measure of success. But there are two factors that not only reduce the military effect of the proposed measures but also make them very dangerous for Western Europe and European Russia.
Under a clause in the agreement, the United States undertakes to provide Poland with 96 Patriot missile systems to modernize and strengthen its air defenses.
Another clause of the agreement declares that the United States will render Poland military assistance if it is threatened by a third state. Should Russia start acting strongly in the Western sector, Poland at once would remind the United States of that point. The Czech Republic and the Baltic states also would demand more guarantees for their security. That could mean only one thing: an immediate appearance near Russian borders of modern conventional weapons capable of hitting targets within European Russia.
On the other hand, such a buildup in areas bordering on Russia, which could tip the balance of strength in the West's favor, is well capable of burying the main instrument of European security -- the 1987 Treaty on Shorter and Medium Range Missiles. The military, including Russia's former chief of the General Staff, four-star army Gen. Yury Baluyevsky, time and again has paraded reasons for returning these missiles to Russia's arsenal.
If this happens, or rather if Moscow decides to withdraw from the treaty, the United States -- unlike Russia -- will not take long to restart production. The Tomahawk BGM-10G ground-based nuclear cruise missiles that were destroyed under the 1987 IMF Treaty are basically similar to sea- and air-launched cruise missiles currently in service with the U.S. air and naval forces.
Nor do things augur well for a new Russian-American document on strategic weapons limitation. Moreover, any moves to pull out of the treaty will put nuclear non-proliferation on the back burner for a long time.
Does Europe need to be "mined" once again to assuage fears of Iran?
Czechs say basic agreement reached on US staff at anti-missile baseThe Czech Republic and the United States have basically agreed on conditions for US forces to be sited at a US anti-missile base in the country, a defence ministry spokesman said on Friday. "During negotiation yesterday and today, a text was basically agreed upon," ministry spokesman Jan Pejsek told AFP. "There are still some details which have to be sorted out. We expect that to happen within the next days." Sealing the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) agreement would clear the way for Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek's fragile government to seek the required parliamentary approval for the US anti-missile package. The centre-right Czech government can be expected to discuss the proposed SOFA in September, the defence ministry said late last month when announcing that major issues around the second main Czech-US anti-missile agreement had been thrashed out. The main diplomatic deal on the base, justified by Washington as a shield against attack from "rogue" states such as Iran but vigorously opposed by Moscow as a threat to its own security, was signed by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Czech counterpart Karel Schwarzenberg in Prague last July. A few weeks later, Poland inked a deal with the United States to host 10 interceptor missiles, its contribution to the missile defence shield, sparking anger and threats of retaliation from Russia. However Topolanek's government is far from certain of winning a vote for the US base. Members of the junior coalition party, the Greens, have spoken out against it and the third coalition party, the Christian Democrats, are also cool to the idea.
US Ponders Whether To Arm And Support Local Afghan Militia Forces
US-India nuclear accord approved
Mi-24P (Mi-25 and Mi-35) Hind Attack / Transport Helicopter, Russia
Mi-24P (Mi-25 and Mi-35) Hind Attack / Transport Helicopter, Russia
(NSI News Source Info) September 7, 2008: The Mi-24 attack / transport helicopter is manufactured by the Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant, based in Moscow, Russia. It entered service with the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, and more than 2,500 have been produced.
The Mi-24 has been deployed in a number of conflicts including Afghanistan and in Chechnya.
The original model (NATO codename Hind-A), designed to carry eight combat troops, was later reconfigured to take on the gunship role (Hind-D).
Later versions, Mi-24P and the export Mi-35P, are also armed with anti-tank missile systems for the engagement of moving armoured targets, weapon emplacements and slow-moving air targets. All versions retain the troop transport capability.
The Mi-24 is in service with Russia and countries of the ex-Soviet Union and has been exported to Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Libya, Mozambique, Nicaragua, North Korea, Peru, Poland, Vietnam and South Yemen. Ten Mi-35 helicopters were delivered by Russia to the Czech Republic in 2005/2006 as part of a debt repayment.
In 2005, ten Mi-35M helicopters were ordered by Venezuela. The first batch of four was delivered in July 2006, the second four in December 2006.
Indonesia placed an order for six additional Mi-35s in late 2006. Deliveries are due to begin in July 2008.
UPGRADES
Russian Army Mi-24s are being upgraded with new avionics including thermal imagers. Other upgrade packages are available, including that of Denel / Kentron of South Africa which includes Eloptro infrared sighting systems and Kentron Mokopa anti-tank missiles, and IAI Tamam which has HMOSP (Helicopter Multi-mission Optronic Stabilised Payload) with FLIR, TV and autotracker, embedded GPS (Global Positioning System) and cockpit multi-function displays.
"Later versions of the Mi-24P are armed with anti-tank missile systems."
The 'Visegrad Four' - Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia - signed an agreement in February 2003 to jointly upgrade up to 105 Mi-24D/V helicopters to NATO standards. This agreement has been abandoned.
However, two Polish Mi-24s are being upgraded to NATO standard as prototypes. In February 2004, BAE Systems was selected as integrator for the avionics systems, which will include an integrated electronic warfare suite.
In December 2005, Bulgaria signed a contract for the upgrade of 12 Mi-24 helicopters to a team led by Lockheed Martin and Elbit. However the contract was subsequently cancelled in February 2007.
The Mi-24 attack / transport helicopter.
Over 2,500 Mi-24 helicopters have been produced.
DESIGN
The design of the Mi-24 is based on a conventional pod and boom, with a five-blade main rotor and three-blade tail rotor. It has retractable tricycle nose-wheel landing gear.
The two crew (pilot and weapons operator) are accommodated in tandem armoured cockpits with individual canopies and flat, bulletproof glass windscreens. The main cabin can accommodate eight troops or four stretchers.
WEAPONS
The helicopter has six suspension weapon units on the wingtips. The Mi24D (Mi-25) and the Mi-24V (Mi-35) are equipped with a YakB four-barrelled, 12.7mm, built-in, flexibly mounted machine gun, which has a firing rate of 4,000-4,500 rounds a minute and a muzzle velocity of 860m/s. The Mi-24P is fitted with a 30mm, built-in, fixed gun mount; the Mi-24VP with a 23mm, built-in, flexibly mounted gun.
The Mi-24P and Mi-24V have four underwing pylons for up to 12 anti-tank missiles. The Mi-24V (Mi-35) is armed with the Shturm anti-tank guided missile system. Shturm (NATO designation AT-6 Spiral) is a short-range missile with semi-automatic radio command guidance. The 5.4kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead is capable of penetrating up to 650mm of armour. Maximum range is 5km.
"Russian Army Mi-24s are being upgraded with new avionics including thermal imagers."
The Mi-24V can also carry the longer-range Ataka anti-tank missile system (NATO designation AT-9), as can the Mi-24P. The Ataka missile's guidance is by narrow radar beam, and the maximum range of the missile is 8km. The average target range is between 3-6km. The target hit probability of the Ataka missile is higher than 0.96 at ranges 3km-6km. The missile has a shaped-charge 7.4kg warhead, with a tandem charge for penetration of 800mm-thick explosive reactive armour.
All Mi-24 helicopters can also be armed with rockets and grenade launchers.
AVIONICS
The Mi-24D is equipped with the KPS-53A electro-optical sighting pod. The most recent Mi-24V and P variants have a digital PNK-24 avionics suite and multifunction LCD cockpit displays, and Geofizika ONV1 night-vision goggles, along with NVG-compatible cockpit lighting. They are fitted with the Urals Optical and Mechanical Plant GOES-342 TV/FLIR sighting system and a laser rangefinder. Countermeasures include infrared jammer, radar warner and flare dispensers. ENGINES
The helicopter is powered by two Isotov TV3-117VMA turboshaft engines, developing 2,200shp each. The air intakes are fitted with deflectors and separators to prevent dust particle ingestion when taking off from unprepared sites. An auxiliary power unit is fitted.
The internal fuel capacity is 1,500kg, with an additional 1,000kg in an auxiliary tank in the cabin or 1,200kg on four external tanks. The fuel tank has self-sealing covers and porous fuel tank filler for increased survivability, and the exhaust is fitted with infrared suppression systems.
China's Carrier programme Takes Shape
China's Carrier programme Takes Shape
(NSI News Source Info) September 7, 2008: The slower something moves, according to cognitive psychologists, the less likely people are to view it as a threat. Slow progress, however, is not no progress – even tiny movements can produce big results over a sufficiently long timeframe.
A case in point is China's aircraft carrier programme. Observers following the saga of the Varyag, the partially built Soviet aircraft carrier purchased by China from Ukraine in 1998, have speculated for years about the vessel's ultimate purpose. Construction on the Varyag stopped with the ship only 60% complete, and lacking electronics and propulsion systems. Did the Chinese plan for, then abandon, a massive retrofit?
In fact, the Varyag may already be performing its ultimate mission of training the next generation of Chinese sailors and naval aviators. More broadly, the Varyag is but one step in the proverbial thousand-mile journey, the outline of which is clearer with some long-term perspective.
Observers following the saga of the Varyag, the partially built Soviet aircraft carrier purchased by China from Ukraine in 1998, have speculated for years about the vessel's ultimate purpose.
China reached a deal with Russia in late 2006 for up to 50 Su-33 fighter aircraft, which the Sukhoi aviation bureau designed specifically for carrier operations.
The Varyag did not actually make it to China until 2002 because Turkey feared that the vessel, which required towing, could founder in the Bosphorus and impede shipping.
CHINESE CARRIER AMBITIONS
Indeed, the first clear evidence of China's carrier ambitions emerged two decades ago. In 1985, China bought a decommissioned Australian aircraft carrier for scrap – but before it went under the torch, Chinese engineers apparently studied the ship's design and used the flight deck for pilot training.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Chinese companies bought two decommissioned Russian anti-submarine carriers, the Minsk and Kiev. China converted both to civilian purposes, but again, Chinese naval architects had the opportunity to study both.
Sandwiched between these sales was the deal for the Varyag, which did not actually make it to China until 2002 because Turkey feared that the vessel, which required towing, could founder in the Bosphorus and impede shipping. After an extended drydock visit, the Varyag was moved to the northern Chinese port of Dalian, its current residence.
Recent speculation over the uses of the Varyag has focused on the repainting of the ship in navy gray and its apparent inactivity in terms of civilian uses. Although these facts are suggestive, they are not as significant as the tight perimeter security surrounding the ship.
Most significantly, China reached a deal with Russia in late 2006 for up to 50 Su-33 fighter aircraft, which the Sukhoi aviation bureau designed specifically for carrier operations.
While some analysts believe that China wants to deploy a carrier by 2010, skeptics raise a number of questions that cast doubt on the existence of such a goal. However, alternative answers are available for these questions – and taken together, the 'column B' answers are even more worrisome for those nations, such as India, who fear China's regional ambitions.
CARRIER PROGRAMME QUESTIONS
Why was the Varyag was bought stripped? In an age of rapidly evolving technology, China may have believed that the original electronics suite was obsolescent anyway. Similarly, China may have felt that its own steam turbine technology would be an improvement on the earlier-generation Russian propulsion systems, which were never the most reliable to begin with. What mattered was the implementation and effectiveness of the Varyag's structural design – the element of the ship least sensitive to technological change.
If seagoing aviation is so important to China, why did it scrap the Minsk and Kiev? Tellingly, the Soviets classified these ships as 'heavy aircraft-capable cruisers' primarily oriented toward anti-ship and anti-submarine operations.
China does not want a carrier for these reasons: consistent with its vision of asymmetric warfare, China would attack US surface warships with subs and long-range missiles, and may regard US sub-hunting as an overly challenging and expensive proposition relative to the rewards it could plausibly bring. China wants a carrier for the same reasons that US war planners like them so much: flexible inshore and overland power projection in remote locations such as the Indian littoral and Persian Gulf, which carries an ever-increasing supply of inbound oil and outbound trade.
"If seagoing aviation is so important to China, why did it scrap the Minsk and Kiev carriers?"
Why did the Chinese reportedly decline French and Spanish offers to build carriers for them in the 1990s? Tellingly, the Chinese were least impressed by the French offer, which was contingent on Chinese purchases of the accompanying electronics and aircraft (unlike the Russian fire sales of stripped-down vessels). Given its great-power aspirations, China probably feels duty-bound to make rather than buy – and may believe the learning experience of building its own may be more beneficial in the long term.
In this light the long gestation period of the Chinese aircraft carrier programme results neither from technological backwardness nor low prioritisation, but rather from a 'just-in-time' approach to assembling components of a grand maritime strategy.
**Don't operate a carrier until US carriers can be neutralised
**Don't subject a carrier to sea trials until the associated aircraft and pilots have been tested and trained – which can be done initially through simulated 'short runway, timed landing' training on land
**Don't fit a carrier out until the last minute, to allow component technology to develop as much as possible.
Patience, it seems, is not only a virtue, but good common sense as well.
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