The Iskander: Unmistakable Message From Medvedev To US

The Iskander: Unmistakable Message From Medvedev To US

(NSI News Source Info) March 12, 2009: Russia will not look on indifferently while the United States deploys the third positioning component of its missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. This was the unmistakable message from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in his no-nonsense state-of-the-nation address recently. If countermeasures are necessary, Russia will deploy the Iskander theater missile system in Kaliningrad. Furthermore, according to Med­vedev, Russia reserves the right to use electronic jamming devices against the missile shield.

The president's position is very simple: deployment of an anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic is a direct threat to Russia's nuclear potential. The 10 ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles planned for Poland cannot, of course, hope to parry a full-scale strike by the Russian Strategic Missile Forces and missile-carrying submarines.

But the strategic importance of these interceptor missiles would increase greatly were the U.S. to deliver a nuclear first strike against Russia. In such a scenario, the interceptor missiles would be forced to contend with the reduced number of missiles that survived the first strike. This would allow the U.S. some hope for success and, for the first time since the 1950s, ‘victory' in a nuclear war. The Iskander theater missile system is Russia's answer to the possible appearance of elements of a U.S. anti-missile system in Eastern Europe. The range of the Iskander in its basic form is 300 kilometers. In the opinion of missile specialists, it can easily be extended to 500 kilometers - and more should Russia decide to walk away from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Additionally, the Iskander can be equipped with more than just ballistic missiles. The system can also launch long-range cruise missiles; R-500s have already been successfully test-fired from the Iskander. The range of a cruise-missile system can potentially exceed 2,000 kilometers, thus making it possible to hit targets across Western Europe. Iskander mobile launchers deployed in Kaliningrad (and possibly in Belarus), even in their standard configuaration, would be capable of delivering a sudden strike, including with nuclear warheads, at most of Poland. Rapid deployment, which takes a few minutes, combined with the characteristics of the missile itself, increase the probability of successfully engaging targets, especially in view of the fact that the main targets - the interceptor missile launchers - are fixed. The deployment of Iskanders and electronic countermeasures in Kaliningrad is certain to produce a response from the United States.

Its first step will be to give Patriot ground-to-air missile systems to Poland (an agreement to pass a Patriot battery of 12 launchers with an ammunition load of 96 missiles to the Wojsko Polskie has already been achieved).

However, Patriots do not guarantee the safety of GBI missile launchers. In order to make them more secure, the U.S. might reinforce Poland's Air Force with modern strike aircraft that are able to destroy the Iskanders before they can launch their missiles. Finally, there is the possibility that U.S. Air Force units and formations could be deployed in Poland. Russia understands the possibility of such a development of events. So, in addition to deploying Iskander missile systems and electronic jamming devices in the Kaliningrad Region, it can strengthen its grouping of ground, air force and air defense troops in the area, both by beefing up existing units to scale, and by sending in additional reserves. Naturally, such an escalation will increase tensions in Eastern Europe. We are currently observing a reopening of the Cold War's European front, which is now moved several hundred kilometers eastwards. Russia started warning about the undesirability and danger of deploying of a U.S. anti-missile system in Europe many years ago.

Its statements have gradually intensified in expression, from regrets over the lack of a normal dialogue to a direct threat to suppress the system by force. Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to chant the mantra of the anti-Iranian purpose of the European missile shield. But the question: "why can't a missile defense system be deployed in Turkey" has never been adequately answered. To sum up, we have the following picture: an "anti-Iranian" missile defense system will be deployed in the next two to three years in an area clearly beyond the reach of Iran's existing and projected missiles, but very convenient for intercepting missiles launched from European Russia in a northern and a north-western direction.

The immediate targets of this system are the 28th, 54th, 60th and other Strategic Missile divisions deployed west of the Urals. A simple look at the numbers shows that although there are several Topols and UR-100s for each American interceptor, this ratio would only stand until the first nuclear strike. The concern is that it could be tempting to initiate a first strike when you have a system that protects against retaliation. It is only to be hoped that a new U.S. administration will hear Russia's case and agree to develop a mechanism of collective security in Europe. If not, future developments in this region could be hard to predict.