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Monday, September 15, 2008
Is Pakistan fighting militants or harbouring? A blind man can judge for himself!!!!
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Russia eyes Mediterranean as alternative to Sevastopol naval base
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Russian strategic bombers patrol Caribbean
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Iran starts large-scale Air Force, air defense drills
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NATO chief heads for Georgia in show of support against Russia
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Atomic Bomb Plans Still For Sale
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CHRONOLOGY: A.Q. Khan
1936 Khan is born in Bhopal, India.
1952 Khan immigrates with his family to Pakistan.
1961 Khan moves to Europe to complete his studies, first in West Berlin and later at the Technical University in Delft, Holland, where he receives a degree in metallurgical engineering in 1967.
1972 Khan receives Ph.D. in metallurgical engineering from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium.
May: Khan begins work at Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory (FDO), a subcontractor of Ultra Centrifuge Nederland (UCN). UCN is the Dutch partner in the Urenco uranium enrichment consortium.
May 8: Within one week of starting work at FDO, Khan visits the advanced UCN enrichment facility in Almelo, Netherlands to become familiar with Urenco centrifuge operations and the aspects relevant to his own work to strengthen the metal centrifuge components. Khan is not officially cleared to visit the facility, but does so many times with the consent of his employers.
Early 1970s Dutch intelligence begins to monitor Khan soon after he begins work at FDO, concerned by a series of inquiries about technical information not related to Khan's own projects.
1974 May 18: India conducts its first nuclear test, a "peaceful nuclear explosion."
September: Khan writes to Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to offer his services and expertise to Pakistan.
Late: Khan is tasked by UCN at Almelo with translations of the more advanced German-designed G-1 and G-2 centrifuges from German to Dutch, to which he has unsupervised access for 16 days.
Late 1970s and Early 1980s American intelligence officials convince Dutch authorities on two occasions not to arrest Khan for the purposes of monitoring his activities further.
Abdul Qadeer Khan, nuclear scientist, father of Pakistan's nuclear program and rogue nuclear salesman.
1975 October: Khan is transferred away from enrichment work with FDO as Dutch authorities become increasingly concerned over his activities. He is reportedly observed asking "suspicious questions" at a nuclear trade show in Switzerland.
December 15: Khan suddenly leaves FDO for Pakistan with copied blueprints for centrifuges and other components and contact information for nearly 100 companies that supply centrifuge components and materials.
1976 Khan begins centrifuge work with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
July: After conflicts at the PAEC, Prime Minister Bhutto gives Khan autonomous control over Pakistani uranium enrichment programs. Khan founds Engineering Research Laboratory (ERL) on July 31, which focuses exclusively on developing an indigenous uranium enrichment capability.
1978 ERL develops working prototypes of P-1 centrifuges, adapted from the German G-1 design Khan worked with at Urenco. Pakistan enriches uranium for the first time on April 4 at Khan's enrichment facility at Kahuta.
Early 1980s Khan acquires blueprints for the Chinese bomb that was tested in China's fourth nuclear explosion in 1966.
Khan is, reportedly, approached by an unknown Arab country (possibly Saudi Arabia or Syria) requesting nuclear assistance.
Exterior of the A.Q.Khan Nuclear Research Laboratory.
1981 May 1: ERL is renamed A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) by President Zia ul-Haq in recognition of Khan's contributions to the operational enrichment facility at Kahuta.
1983 Khan is convicted, in absentia, in Dutch court for conducting nuclear espionage and sentenced to four years in prison.
1985 Khan's conviction is overturned based on an appeal that he had not received a proper summons. The Dutch prosecution does not renew charges because of the impossibility of serving Khan a summons given Pakistan security and the inability to obtain any of the documents that Khan had taken to Pakistan.
Mid 1980s Pakistan produces enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon. KRL continues work on enrichment and is tasked with research and development of missile delivery systems.
Khan, reportedly, begins to develop his export network and orders twice the number of components necessary for the indigenous Pakistani program. This transition from importer to exporter of centrifuge components is, apparently, completely missed by western intelligence services who believe Khan is only working on Pakistan's domestic nuclear weapons program.
Benazir Bhutto, Former Prime Minister of Pakistan (centre) & Abdul Qadeer Khan (right)
Late 1980s Khan and his network of international suppliers are reported to begin nuclear transfers to Iran. The period of cooperation is thought to continue through 1995 when P-2 centrifuge components are transferred. The Pakistani government claims no transfers occurred after the shipments of P-1 components and sub-assemblies from 1989 to 1991.
1987 Khan is believed to make a centrifuge deal with Iran to help build a cascade of 50,000 P-1 centrifuges.
1988 Iranian scientists are suspected of having received nuclear training in Pakistan.
1989 Iran is suspected of receiving its first centrifuge assemblies and components around this time. The shipped components are likely older P-1 centrifuge components that Khan no longer has use for in Pakistan. Through 1995, Khan is reported to have shipped over 2000 components and sub-assemblies for P-1, and later P-2, centrifuges to Iran.
1990 An Iraqi memo, found during inspections in 1995, indicates that Khan may have offered significant nuclear assistance to Iraq in late 1990. He offered to sell Iraq a nuclear bomb design and guarantee material support from Western Europe for a uranium enrichment program. However, Iraq is believed to have turned down the offer, suspecting it to be a sting and no known follow-ups were made after the 1991 Gulf War.
1994 or 1995 More advanced components for P-2 centrifuges are suspected to have arrived in Iran. B.S.A. Tahir, a Sri Lankan business man and Khan's chief lieutenant, told Malaysian police that Iran paid approximately $3 million for these centrifuge parts.
Monument to A.Q. Khan, father of Pakistan’s nuclear program.
Mid 1990s Khan starts travel to North Korea where he receives technical assistance for the development of the Ghauri missile, an adaptation of the North Korean No Dong design. Khan makes at least 13 visits before his public confession in 2004 and is suspected of arranging a barter deal to exchange nuclear and missile technologies, though the details of any nuclear transfers remain unknown.
Khan is suspected to have met with a top Syrian official in Beirut to offer assistance with a centrifuge enrichment facility.
1997 Khan begins to transfer centrifuges and centrifuge components to Libya. Libya receives 20 assembled P-1 centrifuges and components for 200 additional units for a pilot enrichment facility. Khan's network will continue to supply with centrifuge components until late 2003.
Khan is suspected of beginning nuclear transfers to North Korea around this time, though the dates of the first transfers are highly uncertain. Transfers to North Korea are believed to have continued through 2003, but the Pakistani government claims these transfers ceased in 2001. Over this period, Khan may have supplied North Korea with old and discarded centrifuge and enrichment machines together with sets of drawings, sketches, technical data, and depleted uranium hexafluoride.
1998 India detonates a total of five devices in nuclear tests on May 11 and 13. Pakistan responds with six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30.
2000 September: Libya receives two P-2 centrifuges as demonstrator models and places an order for components for 10,000 more to build a cascade. Each centrifuge contains around 100 parts, implying approximately 1 million parts total for the entire P-2 centrifuge cascade.
A.Q. Khan (far left) and General Pervez Musharraf (far right), President of Pakistan
2001 Libya obtains 1.87 tons of uranium hexafluoride, the gas that is used to feed enrichment centrifuges. The amount is consistent with that required for a small pilot enrichment facility.
March: Khan is forced into retirement. Khan refuses the compensatory position of "advisor to the chief executive" and is later given the ceremonial title of "Special Advisor to the Chief Executive on Strategic and KRL Affairs."
Summer: American spy satellites detect missile components being loaded into a Pakistani cargo plane outside of Pyongyang. Intelligence services assume the cargo to be missile technology traded in direct exchange for nuclear technology, but no hard evidence exists.
December: B.S.A. Tahir signs a $13 million contract with Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE) in Malaysia for 25,000 aluminum centrifuge components.
Late 2001 or Early 2002 Libya receives blueprints for nuclear weapons plans. The plans are reported to be of Chinese origin with Chinese notes in the margins.
2002 December: Shipments begin from SCOPE of aluminum centrifuge components. Four shipments are believed to have been sent from Malaysia to Dubai before August 2003, en route to Libya.
2003 October: The German cargo ship BBC China is intercepted en route to Libya with components for 1,000 centrifuges. The parts were manufactured in Malaysia by SCOPE and shipped through Dubai.
December: Libya renounces its nuclear weapons program and begins the process of full disclosure to the IAEA, including the declaration of all foreign procurements.
2004 February 4: Khan makes a public confession on Pakistani television (in English) of his illegal nuclear dealings. Khan claims that he initiated the transfers and cites an "error of judgment." He is pardoned soon after by President Musharraf and has been under house arrest since. The Pakistani government claims that Khan acted independently and without state knowledge.
March: A container aboard the BBC China (the ship that was previously intercepted) arrives in Libya with one additional container of P-2 centrifuge components. Colonel Qaddafi reports the arrival to American intelligence and the IAEA. The Libyans warn American officials that not all of the components from Libya's orders had arrived and some might still show up in the future.
U.S. Air Force's 21st Century AWACS
U.S. Air F0rce's 21st Century AWACS
(NSI News Source Info) September 15, 2008: The U.S. Air Force has completed testing its latest E-3 AWACS (Air Warning And Control System) upgrades. This Blo
ck 40/45 version consists largely of replacing the 1980s era computers and electronics with modern gear.
This also makes it possible to more quickly upgrade hardware and software (often using off-the-shelf commercial stuff) in the future. Most visibly, the new software eliminates most of the hundreds of switches and knobs that surrounded the monitors and keyboards of the old model.
Not only are many operations automated, but using many functions are now point-and-click on a screen, not a separate switch. The AWACS proved to be a key to victory in the 1991, 2001 and 2003 campaigns.
The key to doing this was knowing where all friendly aircraft were at all times. Directing a lot of warplanes over enemy territory has long been a problem. It was elegantly solved with the development of airborne control aircraft like the E-3. But it took half a century to perfect this approach.
The problem was first noted during World War II, when operations involving over a thousand aircraft in the air at once demonstrated how out of hand things could get. But no technical solution was available. That is, you could not put a radar in an aircraft powerful enough to get the big picture, the entire picture.
However the U.S. Navy did plan to use radar equipped TBF Avengers to control the fighter screen protecting the fleet from Japanese suicide bombing attacks during the planned 1945 invasion of Japan. But the invasion never came off and the Navy pursued the radar equipped control aircraft idea at a more leisurely pace after the war.
The navy E-1 airborne early warning aircraft first flew in 1956 and entered service in 1960. While mainly used to extend the radar coverage of a naval task force, this type of aircraft also had a vital role in controlling large numbers of friendly warplanes in air battles.
The U.S. Air Force also kept working on the problem. By 1953, the Air Force was able to send propeller driven transports (EC 121 Lockheed Constellations), equipped with powerful radar and radio equipment, off the coasts of North America to watch for Russian bombers.
Beginning in 1965, the first of thirty EC 121s was sent to Vietnam, where they controlled combat operations in the northern part of the country. As useful as these aircraft were, it was obvious that, with a little more technology, one could really control air combat operations.
The ultimate solution came in the form of a four engine jet transport converted to a flying radar station and control tower. This was the E-3 AWACS, whose development began in the late 1960s, and the first prototypes were flying in the late 1970s.
The E-3 went into regular use in 1982. Flying far enough inside friendly territory to avoid enemy anti aircraft missiles, the AWACS radar has a radar range of between 200 km (for small aircraft or cruise missiles flying close to the ground) to 600 km (for large aircraft flying at high altitude).
The AWACS tracks several hundred friendly and enemy aircraft at once. The AWACS acts as an airborne command center for aircraft. Friendly planes are kept out of each others way (there was not a single friendly air to air collusion during the 1991 Gulf war, or in any subsequent operations using the E-3.)
Enemy aircraft are spotted, identified and friendly interceptors assigned to take care of the hostile planes. One or more AWACS is used to control an air operation and each can stay up eleven hours at a time, or up to 22 hours with refueling and extra crew on board to man the equipment. Its first wartime workout, during the 1991 Gulf war, was a spectacular success, often in more ways than anticipated.
For example, the use of over a hundred tankers to refuel combat aircraft would not have been possible without the AWACS being there to efficiently link tankers and aircraft needing fuel. Forming up the Wild Weasels, and coordinating their use with the bombers they escorted, was much easier using an AWACS. Just keeping track of who was who and going where would not have been possible without the AWACS.
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Labels:
E-3 AWACS,
U.S. Air Force
Thailand Plans $191.3M Arms Purchase
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Georgia lost up to 3,000 men in S. Ossetia conflict - source
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