DTN News - AFGHAN WAR NEWS: Multiple Missteps Led To Drone Killing U.S. Troops In Afghanistan

DTN News - AFGHAN WAR NEWS: Multiple Missteps Led To Drone Killing U.S. Troops In Afghanistan

*Though no dereliction of duty was found, a Pentagon investigation raised troubling questions: Among them: Was the Predator missile fired too quickly?

Source: DTN News - - This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources By David S. Cloud and David Zucchino, Los Angeles Times

(NSI News Source Info) HONG KONG - November 6, 2011: (Reporting from Washington)— On the evening of April 5, a pilot settled into a leather captain's chair at Creech Air Force Base in southern Nevada and took the controls of a Predator drone flying over one of the most violent areas of southwestern Afghanistan. Minutes later, his radio crackled.

A firefight had broken out. Taliban insurgents had ambushed about two dozen Marines patrolling a bitterly contested road.

The Air Force captain angled his joystick and the drone veered toward the fighting taking place half a world away, where it was already morning. He powered up two Hellfire missiles under its wings and ordered a crew member responsible for operating the drone's cameras to search for enemy fighters.

It didn't take long to find something. Three figures, fuzzy blobs on the pilot's small black-and-white screen, lay in a poppy field a couple of hundred yards from the road.

"Hey now, wait. Standby on these," the pilot cautioned. "They could be animals in the field." Seconds later, tiny white flashes appeared by the figures — the heat signature of gunfire. "There they are," he said, now sure he was looking at the enemy.

At an Air National Guard base in Terre Haute, Ind., an intelligence analyst whose job it was to monitor the video to help prevent mistakes on the mission also observed the muzzle flashes — but noticed that they were firing away from the embattled Marines.

Marines at Patrol Base Alcatraz, 12 miles from the firefight, watched their screens too, as they kept in contact with both the drone crew and the platoon members, who had set out from the base just an hour earlier. It would be their decision whether to call in a missile strike.

Thirty-one seconds after the pilot reported muzzle flashes, the Marines at Alcatraz ordered that the Predator be prepared to strike if the shooters could be confirmed as hostile. At 8:49 a.m., 29 minutes after the ambush began, they authorized the pilot to fire.

In minutes, two Americans would be dead.

• Graphic: Death by friendly-fire
• Homeland Security adding 3 drone aircraft despite lack of pilots
• Unfounded drone fears
• Anatomy of an Afghan war tragedy
• U.S. deaths in drone strike due to miscommunication, report says
• Air Force denies that computer virus compromised drone aircraft

**** The decision to fire a missile from one of the growing fleet of U.S. unmanned aircraft is the result of work by ground commanders, pilots and analysts at far-flung military installations, who analyze video and data feeds and communicate by a system of voice and text messages.

In addition to the platoon taking fire that morning in Helmand province's Upper Sangin Valley, the mission involved Marine Corps and Air Force personnel at four

locations: Marines of the 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion at Alcatraz, the drone crew in Nevada, the analyst in Indiana and a mission intelligence coordinator at March Air Reserve Base in California.

Senior officers say drone technology has vastly improved their ability to tell friend from foe in the confusion of battle. But the video can also prompt commanders to make decisions before they fully understand what they're seeing. In February 2009, a crew operating a drone over Afghanistan misidentified a civilian convoy as an enemy force. The Predator pilot and the Army captain who called in the airstrike disregarded warnings from Air Force analysts who had observed children in the convoy. At least 15 people were killed. Adding layers of personnel like the analyst in Indiana to cut down on errors also comes at a price: It may slow down the decision to strike when American lives are at risk. The 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion operated in one of the most violent parts of Afghanistan, an area where drones patrolled virtually nonstop. It had recently revised its procedures to speed up Predator strikes, seeking to prevent "delay of missions by injection of comments" from the Distributed Ground System — military terminology for analysts like the one in Indiana. ****

The embattled platoon was part of the Lone Star Battalion, a reserve unit based in Houston. The unit hadn't seen combat for five years when orders came last year to prepare for a nine-month deployment to Afghanistan. Like any reserve unit, the battalion was a pickup team. Some Marines had combat experience, others had none at all. It arrived in Afghanistan in early March of this year. Its 2nd Platoon was sent to Patrol Base Alcatraz. Befitting its name, Alcatraz is a bleak outpost of mud buildings and tents, frigid in winter, sweltering in summer. "There are no showers, laundry facilities, chow hall or pretty much anything else," said a Marine who spent months there. The platoon was put under the 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion, an elite unit whose motto was "Swift Silent Deadly." Its Alpha company, which had arrived in Alcatraz five months earlier, engaged in near-daily gun battles with insurgents. Lt. Christopher Huff, a 24-year-old on his first combat tour, and his Texas reservists were given dangerous duty: patrol Route 611, one of the country's most heavily mined roads. The road cuts north-south through opium fields laced with irrigation ditches and mud walls. Tensions quickly emerged between the newcomers and the other Marines. A master sergeant later said the reservists were ordered "not to go more than 100 meters" off the road. The platoon had a reputation for "not knowing where their guys are located," he said. **** Among the platoon's veterans was Staff Sgt. Jeremy D. Smith, 26, who had enlisted in the Marines in 2003 after graduating from high school in Arlington, Texas. After three tours in Iraq, where his men called him "Warrior Poet" for his sensitive nature and the country music lyrics he wrote, he shifted to the reserves. He got married in April 2009 and talked of getting a job in law enforcement. His Marine enlistment was almost up, so he didn't have to go to Afghanistan. But he had an American flag tattooed on his shoulder, and his email address included the words "last of a dying breed." He volunteered. His proud father, Jerry, called his son "a Marine's Marine" who wanted to be in Afghanistan to lead his men in combat. Another volunteer was Benjamin D. Rast, 23, a burly Navy hospitalman on his first tour. After graduating from high school in Niles, Mich., he went to a local college. He also played a season of semi-professional football, but tore up his knee. Rast enlisted in the Navy in 2008 and was sent to the Naval Medical Center in San Diego. He yearned to see combat. He was assigned to the Lone Star Battalion as a corpsman, the Marines' term for a combat medic. At Camp Pendleton, where the unit trained for five months before its deployment, he was dubbed "Doc Rast." "What if something happens to you? What will I say to everybody?" his father, Robert, asked his son. "Tell them I wanted to be on the front lines covering the guy on my left and on my right," the young man replied. **** Searching for buried bombs had a numbing sameness. Although more than 30 improvised bombs exploded along the road in 2nd Platoon's first month in Afghanistan, it had managed to avoid casualties. The morning of April 6 would start the same way. Huff, Smith, Rast and the rest of the platoon, along with an Afghan interpreter and a bomb-sniffing dog named Susie, left Alcatraz about 7:20 a.m. in four armored trucks, heading north. After half an hour, a bomb exploded beneath the third vehicle, but it caused minimal damage. Huff had planned to conduct foot patrols nearby, so they drove another 300 yards and unloaded. Huff ordered part of the platoon to search the road for more bombs. Seven others, including Smith, Rast and a sniper squad, were told to take positions 50 yards or so west of the road to guard against an ambush. Smith led the team single file down an irrigation canal perpendicular to the road, intending to turn and set up positions as instructed. But walls and other barriers blocked their way, so they went farther west. As they crossed a field, shots suddenly crackled in their direction. "We all hit the deck and returned covering fire," one of the snipers recalled. No one was sure where the shots had come from, he said, but a cluster of buildings about 200 yards to the west seemed likely. Another member of the team, Sgt. Jared Hammonds, a 27-year-old reservist from Conroe, Texas, yelled their coordinates into the radio. Once the shooting let up, the squad ran to the nearest canal and splashed through knee-deep water. They were still trying to get a fix on the insurgents. When vegetation in the ditch forced them into a poppy field, they came under fire again. They dropped to the ground again and fired toward the buildings. *** At the Air National Guard base in Indiana, the Air Force analyst watched the battle unfold on the drone's video feed. The analyst, a technical sergeant in a reserve unit, was to message minute-by-minute reports to the mission intelligence coordinator in California, who could pass them on to the crew controlling the drone. Like the drone pilot, the analyst in Indiana saw three men and muzzle flashes. The analyst typed "3 friendlies in FOV," meaning three non-insurgents in the camera's field of view. A second later, he wrote "Pers are shooting W," meaning they were firing west, away from the Marines on the road. He sent the fragmentary reports to March Reserve Air Force Base, his communications link to the drone crew. A trainee studied the video there under supervision of the mission intelligence coordinator. Almost immediately, the analyst had doubts. "Disregard," he wrote, followed by "Not friendlies," followed by "unable to discern who pers are." But he was certain of one thing: The shots were aimed away from the Marines. The mission intelligence coordinator and the trainee were dubious. They thought the shots were aimed east toward the Marine convoy. The trainee messaged the Indiana analyst to "double check" his coordinates — and didn't relay the information to the drone crew. As debate about the direction of the gunfire continued over the chat system, the analyst did not have access to radio traffic indicating a strike was imminent. And as he was preparing to strike, the Predator pilot was unaware of the analyst's doubts. **** At Alcatraz, a captain and a gunnery sergeant from 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion's Alpha company had requested air support after the platoon first reported gunfire at 8:20 a.m. When a Marine unit comes under attack, air or artillery support is supposed to be available within 10 minutes. The Predator was circling overhead in seven minutes. The Marines at Alcatraz asked the drone crew to search for Marines along the road and for insurgents to the west. They also pressed Huff to confirm his men's positions. Huff reported that his men were on the road, or within 50 yards of it. In fact, some were more than 200 yards away. At 8:41 a.m., the Predator pilot in Nevada reported seeing the muzzle flashes from three prone figures in the poppy field. The Marine officers quickly issued a "preemptive" order to prepare the Predator to fire. The captain radioed to confirm where platoon members were and told Huff that the Predator was prepared to strike near a low-slung structure marked as Building 58 on detailed military maps "if it was still a viable target." The gunnery sergeant radioed in the captain's call sign to authorize the missile strike eight minutes later. Hearing the order, Huff warned his scattered squad over the radio: "Get your guys down — danger close." Hammonds shouted at a corporal to find Building 58 on their map. "I hear [Huff] on the radio for us to take cover and I relayed it to my guys," he recalled. "Near the canal on the west side is a low wall that I tell everyone to get behind." Smith and Rast were still out in the poppy field. Hammonds' radio blared again: The Hellfire missile would hit in 17 seconds. He shouted at Smith and Rast to hustle. Suddenly the corporal found the building on his map. It was behind them, not the suspected Taliban position farther west. He yelled out, "Building 58 is the wrong building!" **** The missile exploded almost on top of Smith. Running across the field, Hammonds found Rast face down with a large wound behind his ear. Smith lay five yards away, but his condition was clear. "I knew he was dead," Hammonds said. Other Marines rushed to try to save Rast. They restored his pulse, but only briefly. They noticed Hammonds intently searching the ground. "What are you doing?" the sniper team leader demanded. "Trying to find Smith's wedding ring," Hammonds replied. Smith had worn the silver band on a chain around his neck. He found the ring and would return it to Smith's wife, Rachel. **** The Pentagon investigation into the deaths of Smith and Rast, the first friendly-fire deaths known to have been caused by a drone attack, was led by Marine Col. Randy Newman, a former regimental commander in Afghanistan. The incident raised a series of broad questions: How did the battalion's new rules for handling Predator strikes affect the decision to strike? Was the missile fired too quickly? Did the system built to help commanders make better decisions break down again? Newman's 381-page report placed much of the blame on Huff, maintaining that up until the moment the missile was fired, he could have called it off. It criticized Huff for failing to keep track of his men, and two sergeants for sending inaccurate radio reports that misled the lieutenant about their locations — and led the Marines at Alcatraz to call in the drone strike on the wrong location. However, it said the deaths were due to "miscommunications," and that no one was "culpably negligent or derelict in their duties." The names of everyone involved except Smith and Rast — and, in one place, Huff — were redacted in a copy of the report obtained by The Times. In addition to material contained in the report, this article is based on interviews with family members and Marine Corps and Air Force officers involved in the case. The commander of the 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion, Lt. Col. L.K. Hussey, declined to be interviewed. Some ground officers appear wary of distant Air Force analysts who can delay air support for their men under fire. A senior U.S. officer familiar with the incident said the decision to strike as soon as muzzle flashes were seen was understandable "because of the urgency of supporting the guys on the ground, and to pursue a fleeting target." Newman's report said the analysts should have been more aggressive in raising their concerns in the minutes before the missile attack. But the analysts said they were trained not to intercede when U.S. troops were in danger unless they saw women and children present, or evidence of a possible war crime. In the minutes after the attack, an apparently distraught Huff radioed back to Alcatraz that he "didn't know why we had to hit that position," said a Marine officer who received the transmission. While acknowledging that he didn't know some of his Marines were so far away, Huff told investigators that insurgent fire had mostly died down prior to the Predator attack and that he "felt like he had the situation under control." Others, in both the Marine Corps and Air Force, also question the speed of the strike. "We simply ran out of time," the mission intelligence coordinator said. A sergeant in Huff's platoon said that the time between the Predator's arrival overhead and when it fired the missile "was too short to allow for assessment and actions" by Marines on the ground. At the Pentagon, a senior Marine officer described the decision to launch the missile as "a rush to judgment." **** After the Predator pilot learned of the fatal mistake, he asked to be relieved at the controls. "The gravity of the matter overcame my ability to continue focusing on the task at hand," he explained. Replaying the video and voice communications, he was stunned to see that the muzzle flashes were aimed away from the road. He was "completely confused as to how I saw exactly the opposite sitting in the seat." He asked for the video to be stopped and left the building. An Air Force chaplain was waiting outside. david.cloud@latimes.com

*Link for This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources

By David S. Cloud and David Zucchino, Los Angeles Times

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US Refused Predators UAV To Pakistan, For Being Too Cosy With China

US Refused Predators UAV To Pakistan, For Being Too Cosy With China

(NSI News Source Info) March 11, 2009: Pakistan is using several different types of UAVs along the Afghan and Indian borders. The most effective of these is the Italian Falco UAV, which Pakistan ordered Falco three years ago.

The air force completed evaluation of the Falco a little over a year ago, and put at least four of them into service. Falco is a 924 pound aircraft with a 150 pound payload. Ceiling is 5,000 meters, but it usually operates at lower altitudes (2,000 meters). Endurance is up to 12 hours, but typical missions are 6-8 hours. Max speed is 210 kilometers an hour, although it usually cruises at 150. Falco can be up to 200 kilometers from its ground station. The UAV can take off and land on an air strip, or use a catapult for takeoff and parachute for landing. Pakistan has also been using several Chinese UAVs for the last decade or so. First, they got the ASN-105, a 308 pound aircraft with a payload if 88 pounds and endurance of only two hours. This is a 1980s era design, that has since been replaced by the ASN-206/207. This is a 488 pound aircraft, with a 110 pound payload. The 207 model has a max endurance of eight hours, but more common is an endurance of four hours.

Max range from the control van is 150 kilometers away and cruising speed is about 180 kilometers an hour. A UAV unit consists of one control van and 6-10 trucks, each carrying a UAV and its catapult launch equipment. The UAV lands via parachute, so the aircraft get banged up a lot. This UAV can broadcast back live video, and be equipped for electronic warfare. Pakistan is also developing its own UAVs.

Last year it flight tested the Uqaab. This design looks very similar to models offered by a Pakistani firm, Integrated Dynamics, which has been producing smaller (under 500 pounds) UAVs for the government and commercial market since 1997. The Uqaab also appears similar to the U.S. Army RQ-7B Shadow 200. Pakistan requested Predators from the United States, but this was turned down because it was feared that the Chinese would be allowed to dissect the American UAV and acquire too many production secrets. Pakistan and China have been chummy for decades. No secrets between friends and all that. But European nations, like Italy and Germany, have been willing to sell Pakistan UAVs.

Predator UAV Passes 500,000 Flight Hours

Predator UAV Passes 500,000 Flight Hours

(NSI News Source Info) Creech AFB, Nev. - February 26, 2009: Airmen of the 432d Air Expeditionary Wing here flew an MQ-1B Predator unmanned aircraft in a combat mission in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility Feb. 18, and the flight surpassed the 500,000 flight-hour mark for the aircraft.

Members of the 15th Reconnaissance Squadron flew the milestone mission in support of operations in Iraq.

"A half-a-million flying hours is an amazing accomplishment, and the Airmen of the 15th Reconnaissance Squadron are proud to be a part of this milestone," said Lt. Col. Ken Callahan, the 15th RS director of operations. "The 15th RS currently flies 28 percent of all MQ-1 Predator combat air patrols over Iraq and Afghanistan, and we're able to meet the needs of the joint force commanders for this no-fail 24/7 combat operations mission because of the hard work and dedication of our total force team of active-duty, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard Airmen here."

Declared operational in 1995, the Predator's primary mission is to provide armed reconnaissance, airborne surveillance and target acquisition to commanders in the field. The Predator can be armed with two laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and carries the Multispectral Targeting System, which integrates electro-optical, infrared, laser designator and laser illuminator into a single sensor package.

A US Air Force MQ-1B Predator unmanned aircraft flying a combat mission in south-west Asia logged the 500,000th flight-hour for the aircraft. (USAF photo)

The capabilities of the Predator have made the aircraft a lethal and vital asset to expeditionary operations, said Col. Chris Chambliss, the 432nd Wing and 432nd Air Expeditionary Wing commander.

"The Predator is a perfect example of how (unmanned aircraft systems) support is making a difference in the fight," Colonel Chambliss said. "With the increase in demands for this system, the Predator continues to provide our ground forces direct support with its unblinking eye and persistent stare, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. This 500,000 hour milestone proves how awesome this weapons system is."

The Predator fleet passed 250,000 hours in June 2007, after 12 years of flying. It only took a year and eight months to fly the additional 250,000 hours due to continuous demand for the aircraft by combatant commanders.

The Predator and MQ-9 Reaper UAS are managed by members of the 703rd Aeronautical Systems Group, part of the Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

Members of the Air Force Materiel Command and General Atomics Aeronautical Systems have worked aggressively to deliver the Predator weapon system and the recent milestone is a result of a good partnership, said Col. Christopher Coombs, the 703rd Aeronautical Systems Group commander.

"The (Predator) program's success has been a testament to outstanding teamwork and American ingenuity and innovation, fueled by a desire to not settle for anything less than delivering the most reliable weapons systems to the members of our Armed Forces when called upon to achieve national security objectives," Colonel Coombs said. "The warfighter needed additional support in their arsenal, we surged our efforts to meet the requirements for (UAS) capability, allowing for increased combat air patrols leading to this milestone event."

Along with providing a lethal weapons system, Lt. Gen. Norman R. Seip, the 12th Air Force commander, said the Predator's success is directly attributed to the Airmen who fly, operate and maintain it.

"This milestone is a testament to the continued dedication and perseverance of the men and women of the 432nd Wing," General Seip said. "The exponential growth of UAS weapons systems, Creech AFB and the 432nd Wing has translated into a new era of combat operations - sustained support for ground operations, real-time intelligence collection and the ability to reach out to and affect the enemy at will."

The success of the Predator is nothing short of a success story, said Lt. Gen. Gary North, the Combined Forces Air Component commander and U.S. Air Force's Central commander.

"The Predator weapon system and its Airmen ... from the launch crews in the (area of responsibility) to those that fly the extended mission from distributed sites throughout the U.S. and the (distributed common ground system) crews that process the video are in one word ... remarkable," General North said.

"The persistent stare of the Predator and the deadly persistence, when attack criteria is met, have consistently been a key part of the commander's weapons systems matrix to enable combat successes on the battlefield."With the success rate of the Predator, Gen. John D.W. Corley, the commander of Air Combat Command, said it's clear Airmen have stepped up to the challenges of meeting the insatiable demand for the Predator.

"Airmen are 'all in' the global, joint and combined operations protecting our nation and assuring our allies. Today, UAS Airmen are operating the Predator more than 19,000 hours per month and more than 95 percent of those hours are flown in support of combat operations in Southwest Asia," General Corley said. The Predator's half-million-hour milestone is but one example of our Airmen's contributions in the full spectrum of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations."

Currently more than 30 Predator combat air patrols support warfighters 24/7, 365 days a year over Iraq and Afghanistan.

Pakistani Officials On Board For Drone Attacks: Reports

Pakistani Officials On Board For Drone Attacks: Reports/WSJ

(NSI News Source Info) NEW YORK - February 19, 2009: Although Pakistan's leaders have publicly denounced US missile strikes as an attack on the country's sovereignty, but privately Pakistani military and intelligence officers are aiding these attacks and have given significant support to recent US missions, the Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday quoting officials from both countries. Tribesmen gather at the site of a drone missile attack in Tappi, a village 20 km east of Miramshah. American unmanned Predator aircraft have killed scores of militants in Pakistan in more than 30 missile strikes since August, provoking outrage in the South Asian nation. Two in the past four days have killed more than 50 suspected militants. Yet, with the Taliban pushing deeper into the country, Pakistan's civilian and military leaders, while publicly condemning the attacks, have come to see the strikes as effective and are passing on intelligence that has helped recent missions, say officials from both countries. As a result, ‘the Predator strikes are more and more precise,’ a Pakistani official told WSJ. The newspaper said that eleven of al Qaeda's top 20 commanders have been killed or captured since August because of the Predator missions conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, according to the Pakistani official, and current and former US intelligence officials. Dennis C. Blair, the new US director of national intelligence, said last week that ‘a succession of blows’ to al Qaeda in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas have thrown the group off balance, forcing it to promote inexperienced operators to leadership posts. The Journal said among those killed include al Qaeda military's chief, Khalid Habib; Abu Layth al-Libi, whom US officials described as ‘a rising star’ in the group; Abu Khabab al-Masri, al Qaeda's leading chemical-weapons expert; and Usama al-Kini, who was believed to be involved in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and later planned attacks in Pakistan. Drones help in surveillance and target identification as well as strikes. On Jan. 22, Pakistani paramilitary forces arrested Zabu ul Taifi, a Saudi national and alleged al Qaeda operative, in an operation described by a Pakistani intelligence officer as ‘a direct result of better cooperation’ with the US. An officer from Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's premier spy agency, said Mr. Taifi was located at a safe house in the Khyber Agency, one of the tribal areas that run along the border with Afghanistan, through a combination of human intelligence from Pakistani agents, informants on the ground and aerial surveillance by US drones. Once authorities were confident Mr. Taifi was in the walled, mud compound, Pakistani paramilitary forces backed by helicopters grabbed him, the officer said. Throughout, Predator drones hovered overhead and would have attacked if Mr. Taifi or other suspects had tried to escape, the officer said. In all, Mr. Taifi and six other men —Afghans and Pakistanis —were nabbed in the raid. Maj. Gen Akhtar Abbas, a spokesman for the military, said Pakistan and the US ‘has a long history of military cooperation and intelligence sharing.’ But he said it doesn't include the missiles strikes. ‘We have made our opposition clear,’ he said. ‘The strikes are counterproductive.’

UCLA Geographers Urge US To Search Three Structures In Pakistan For Bin Laden

UCLA Geographers Urge US To Search Three Structures In Pakistan For Bin Laden (NSI News Source Info) February 18, 2009: While U.S. intelligence officials have spent more than seven years searching fruitlessly for Osama bin Laden, UCLA geographers say they have a good idea of where the terrorist leader was at the end of 2001 — and perhaps where he has been in the years since. In a new study published online today by the MIT International Review, the geographers report that simple facts, publicly available satellite imagery and fundamental principles of geography place the mastermind behind the Sept. 11 attacks against the U.S. in one of three buildings in the northwest Pakistan town of Parachinar, in the Kurram tribal region near the border with Afghanistan. "If he's still alive, he honestly could be sitting there right now," said Thomas W. Gillespie, the study's lead author and an associate professor of geography at UCLA. "It is still the safest tribal area and city in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of northwest Pakistan and one of the only tribal areas that the U.S. has not bombed with its unmanned Predators."

People gather at the site of a suicide attack in a bazaar in the main town of Parachinar, in the Kurram tribal region. At least 22 people were killed on Saturday in spiralling violence in northwestern Pakistan as international concern grew over the deteriorating security situation and al Qaeda threat along the Afghan border. Despite keen interest in the terrorist recluse and a $25 million reward for information leading to his capture, academics have shied away from getting involved in the quest to find him, the researchers contend. Meanwhile, dramatic improvements in remote-sensing imagery have improved the odds of civilians doing so. "We believe our work represents the first scientific approach to establishing bin Laden's current location," said John A. Agnew, study co-author and UCLA geography professor. "The methods are repeatable and could easily be updated with new information obtained by the U.S. intelligence community." The researchers advocate that the U.S. investigate — but not bomb — the three buildings. They warn that if bin Laden indeed remains to this day in the tiny city of Parachinar, or even elsewhere in the relatively thinly populated tribal area of Kurram, he may move to the city of Peshawar (population 1.4 million) in the neighboring tribal area of North-West Frontier Province if Peshawar falls to the Taliban. News reports have warned of that possibility since last summer. "If bin Laden were to move to Peshawar, which would become an option if the Taliban were in control there, the search would become much more complicated," Gillespie said. "It's the difference between looking for someone in L.A. versus in Big Bear," he added, referring to a mountain resort town 90 miles east of Los Angeles. The findings are based on the last information on bin Laden's whereabouts to be made public by U.S. intelligence sources, which have closely guarded the details of any efforts to locate him. One and a half months after the coordinated attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon claimed the lives of more than 3,000 people, a walkie-talkie radio broadcast placed bin Laden in Tora Bora, a cave complex in eastern Afghanistan. In an unsuccessful attempt to capture bin Laden, U.S. forces attacked the caves the following month. Soldiers from the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and U.S. army personnel excavate an al Qaeda grave site known by locals as the al Qaeda martyr memorial. In the village of Markhanai in the Tora Bora area of eastern Afghanistan. DNA samples were taken from 23 bodies unearthed from the cemetery. Canadian troops and U.S. forensic experts hope the DNA samples will identify some of those buried there after being killed in U.S. bombing late last year. al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was believed to have fled Tora Bora in December during weeks of heavy bombing by U.S. aircraft, as pro-U.S. Afghan troops, aided by U.S. Special Forces closed in. But there was also speculation he might have been killed by the air strikes. The four-day mission combed the region of Tora Bora, an area of caves, tunnels and underground bunkers. The UCLA findings rely on two principles used in geography to predict the distribution of wildlife, primarily for the purposes of designing approaches to conservation. The first, known as distance-decay theory, holds that as one travels farther away from a precise location with a specific composition of species — or, in this case, a specific composition of cultural and physical factors —the probability of finding spots with that same specific composition decreases exponentially. The second, island biogeographic theory, holds that large and close islands have larger immigration rates and will support more species than smaller, more isolated islands. Inspired by distance-decay theory, the seven-member team started by drawing concentric circles around Tora Bora on a satellite map of the area at a distance of 10 kilometers — or 6.1 miles — apart. "The farther bin Laden moves from his last reported location into the more secular parts of Pakistan or into India, the greater the probability that he will be in an area with a different cultural composition, thereby increasing the probability of his being captured or eliminated," Gillespie said. Then, informed by island biogeographic theory, the researchers scoured the rings for "city islands" — or distinctly separate settlements of considerable size. "Island biology theory predicts that he would find his way to the largest but least isolated city of that area," said Gillespie, an authority on measuring and modeling biodiversity on Earth from space. "If you get stuck on an island, you would want it to be Hawaii rather than one with a single palm tree. It's a matter of resources." The approach netted 26 cities within a 12.4-mile radius of Tora Bora on imagery from Landsat Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus (ETM+), a global archive of satellite photos managed by NASA and the U.S. Geological Survey. With a 2.7-square-mile footprint, Parachinar turned out to be the largest and fourth-least isolated city, the team determined. "Based on bin Laden's last known location in Tora Bora, we estimate that he must have traveled 1.9 miles over a 13,000-foot-high pass into Kurram and then headed for the largest city, which turns out to be Parachinar," said Agnew, who is the current president of the Association of American Geographers, the field's leading scholarly organization. The researchers ruled out cities on the Afghanistan side of the border because the country was occupied at the time by U.S. and international forces and has been particularly unstable ever since. "The Pakistan side of the border is much better for hiding because of its ambiguous political status within the country and the formal absence of U.S. or NATO troops," Agnew said. Faced with the prospect of picking from more than 1,000 structures clearly portrayed in the satellite imagery of Parachinar, the team decided to come up with a short list of the criteria that bin Laden would need for housing, based on well-known information about him, including his height (between 6'4" and 6'6", depending on the source), his medical condition (apparently in need of regular dialysis and, therefore, electricity to run the machine) and several basic assumptions, such as a need for security, protection, privacy and overhead cover to shield him from being spotted by planes, helicopters and satellites. So they looked for buildings that could house someone taller than 6'4" and were surrounded by walls more than 9 feet tall (both as judged by mid-afternoon shadows depicted on the satellite imagery), and that had more than three rooms, space separating them from nearby structures, electricity and a thick tree canopy. Only three structures fit the criteria. The buildings also appeared to be the best fortified and among the largest in Parachinar. Two are clearly residences, the study states. The third may be a prison. But whatever the third structure is, it has "one of the best maintained gardens in all of Parachinar," the study says. While the three structures meet all six of the criteria that the researchers believe would be required for lodging bin Laden, an additional 16 structures in Parachinar appear to meet five of the six criteria. If bin Laden is not in the first three structures, the U.S. military should investigate these other buildings, the study urges. The outgrowth of an undergraduate geography course in remote sensing, the study lists five 2008 UCLA graduates as co-authors. The students have since gone on to a range of endeavors, from selling real estate and attending law school to earning a master's degree from Oxford University. One now works for a remote-sensing company. Undergraduates had attempted to take on the same study in 2006, but at 30 x 30 meters — or nearly 100 x 100 feet — the resolution of publicly available satellite images of the area at the time was insufficient. In contrast, today's resolution is 0.6 meters, or just under 2 feet, Gillespie said. The remote-sensing company that employs one of the alumni authors plans soon to unveil a 0.4-meter resolution of the entire world. "Technology has caught up to the question," said Gillespie, who serves as the director of the Spatial Demography Group for the UCLA-based California Center for Population Research. "Finding Osama bin Laden: An Application of Biogeographic Theories and Satellite Imagery" is not the first attempt by Gillespie and Agnew to bring scientific analysis to nettlesome political issues. In September 2008, they received widespread attention for a satellite study of the density of lights in the night sky of Baghdad in the time leading up to, during and immediately following the U.S. military surge of 2007. The findings cast doubt on the role claimed by the U.S. military in quelling violence during that time and suggest instead that intra-sectarian conflict was responsible for clearing whole portions of the city, leaving them both dark and devoid of the objects of Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence.

Pakistan Key To Afghanistan; While Iran Looks On

Pakistan Key To Afghanistan; While Iran Looks On

(NSI News Source Info) London - February 3, 2009: Peace will only come to Afghanistan if Pakistan can sort out the militants on its side of the border, where US strikes are not helping, the head of Britain's armed forces told The Sunday Times newspaper. Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup said only politics, long term, could bring peace on both sides of the frontier. The chief of the defence staff said that weaknesses in Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government were causing difficulties for the 8,300 British troops battling Taliban insurgents in the troubled south of the country. "The weakness of governance in Afghanistan worries me considerably," Stirrup told the weekly broadsheet. "But governance is not just about what goes on in Kabul. We have to look at the wider picture. "The Taliban movement -- and Taliban is now a catch-all phrase for ideologues, criminals, people with tribal grudges, people who are quite simply guns for hire to keep bread on the table -- is on both sides of the border. "It makes no distinction between one side or the other. Some people move across. Some are based almost exclusively in Pakistan. Some are based exclusively in Afghanistan. "It's impossible to distinguish between those two and actually, in my view, not necessary. The border is not relevant." Stirrup sympathised with the difficulties faced by the Pakistani military, admitting that its success so far had been "limited". "The Pakistan army has a series of very considerable problems," he said, adding it had realised that "the growing insurgency within its own borders is an existential problem for Pakistan." General Ashfaq Kayani, the head of Pakistan's army, "is absolutely clear on the size of the challenge that he faces. "The Pakistan army has become much more sophisticated and much more flexible and adaptable in terms of its approach. "So we have to do all we can to support the military in that shift, but we have to recognise that they can't do it overnight. "Just as in Afghanistan, that kind of insurgency cannot be defeated by conventional military means. It can only be dealt with, in the long term, through politics." He said it was "very important" for the Islamabad government to start changing public sentiment that all would be well if western troops were not in Afghanistan. "While they shouldn't be driven by public opinion, they can't operate in the face of it. The Predator strikes don't help in that regard," he said, referring to US air strikes on the Pakistani side of the border.

Analysis: UAVs Protect U.S. Troops In Iraq

Analysis: UAVs Protect U.S. Troops In Iraq

(NSI News Source Info) January 30, 2009: Unmanned aerial vehicles have proven their worth in the war on terror as reconnaissance and surveillance platforms that provide battlefield commanders with real-time, optically enhanced streaming video of terrain, suspicious movements and intelligence-driven targets of interest. On the brigade level, the Shadow-200 tactical UAV stands out. On the battalion level and lower, it's the Raven, a hand-launched UAV just 38 inches in length, with a 5-foot wingspan and with nose and side-mounted cameras. The battery-operated vehicle is so small, it can be packed in a suitcase and assembled in minutes. It can take to the air for about 60 minutes to provide soldiers in the field with real-time imagery of what lies ahead, although its cameras lack a zoom capability. But neither the Shadow nor the Raven is weapons-capable. The Predator-MQ1, however, is another matter. It's the big boy on the block with lethal punch to its payload, as terrorists in Iraq as well as Afghanistan have found out. "It's one of the most asked-for assets," said Lt. Col. Debra Lee, commander of the Air Force's 46th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron. "There's a kind of bidding war that goes on for its time." The Predator is described by the Air Force as a "medium-altitude, long-endurance aircraft system for interdiction and conducting armed reconnaissance against critical, perishable targets." It's 27 feet long, 6.9 feet high and has a wingspan of 48.7 feet. It's powered by a four-cylinder, 110-hp engine and cruises at speeds from 85 to 135 mph at heights of up to 25,000 feet. Its range is more than 400 miles. The electronics goody bag consists of a daytime variable-aperture TV camera, a variable-aperture infrared camera for low-light/night filming and other sensors that are packed under the nose in a basketball-sized and -shaped housing that rotates 360 degrees. The cameras stream real-time video to centers in the United States as well as to ground commanders closer to its flight sectors through satellite links. The cameras' optical zoom capabilities -- six step, 155x optical zoom -- can be enhanced two times and four times digitally. Its electronics also allow the Predator's cameras to "see" through smoke and haze. Attached to pylons on its wings are two laser-guided AGM Hellfire missiles. A Hellfire launched from a Predator in 2006 killed Iraq's most wanted terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi was the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq and for months had successfully escaped determined U.S. and Iraqi efforts to capture or kill him -- until intelligence about his travels in Diyala province in a particular vehicle was received. A Predator put paid to Zarqawi's orchestration of terror. "The Predator B -- MQ-9 -- can also carry 500-pound bombs," said Lee, normally a B-1 bomber pilot. "We had some here, but they're in Afghanistan now. But we hear we may be getting some again soon." The upgraded Predator is a 40-foot turboprop with a ceiling of 50,000 feet. Lee's unit is located at Joint Base Balad, which is north of Baghdad and west of Baquba. She and her 20 personnel, who include civilian contractors who maintain the Predators and their electronics, handle the birds during takeoff and landing phases.

There Is No Agreement With US For Drone Attacks: Pakistan /Pakistan To U.S.: Stop The Drone Strikes (And More Weapons, Please) / Islamabad: No Deal...

There Is No Agreement With US For Drone Attacks: Pakistan /Pakistan To U.S.: Stop The Drone Strikes (And More Weapons, Please) / Islamabad: No Deal Allowing U.S. Predators Into Pakistan (NSI News Source Info) Islamabad - January 29, 2009: Pakistan has no agreement with the US that allowed drone attacks inside its territory, a foreign ministry spokesperson said Wednesday Jan 28. "There is no understanding between Pakistan and the United States on predator attacks," said Muhammad Sadiq in response to the statement by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates that US would continue such attacks against militants and that Pakistan was aware of this.

But the spokesman rejected the comments and said Pakistan had done more than any other country as far as Al Qaeda is concerned. "We look forward to working closely with the new US administration on all issues, including in the fight against terrorism," he said.

On Tuesday, Gates told a Senate Panel that missile strikes in Pakistan would continue in an effort to root out Al Qaeda members who have based themselves across the border from Afghanistan."Both president Bush and President Obama have made clear that we will go after Al Qaeda wherever Al Qaeda is.

And we will continue to pursue this," he said.Pakistan was expecting that the new US administration under President Barack Obama would bring an end to missile strikes inside Pakistani territory, but Gates' statement Tuesday has cleared the picture that there would be no pause on strikes.

US drones regularly conduct missile strikes on Pakistan's tribal region of Waziristan, which Washington says aimed at targeting Al Qaeda and Taliban militants.

Officials say that US carried out around 50 missile strikes on Pakistan last year, with civilians as majority of the casualties. Earlier, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari said that drone attacks could affect Pakistan-US ties and asked Washington to stop drone attacks. He said that diplomatic and military contacts would be used to stop the US attacks.