Thursday, March 19, 2009

Counterterrorism Funding: Old Fears and Cyclical Lulls

Counterterrorism Funding: Old Fears and Cyclical Lulls
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart STRATFOR
(NSI News Source Info) March 19, 2009: Two years ago, we wrote an article discussing the historical pattern of the boom and bust in counterterrorism spending. In that article we discussed the phenomenon whereby a successful terrorist attack creates a profound shock that is quite often followed by an extended lull. We noted how this dynamic tends to create a pendulum effect in public perception and how public opinion is ultimately translated into public policy that produces security and counterterrorism funding. In other words, the shock of a successful terrorist attack creates a crisis environment in which the public demands action from the government and Washington responds by earmarking vast amounts of funds to address the problem. Then the lull sets in, and some of the programs created during the crisis are scrapped entirely or are killed by a series of budget cuts as the public’s perception of the threat changes and its demands for government action focus elsewhere. The lull eventually is shattered by another attack — and another infusion of money goes to address the now-neglected problem. On March 13, The Washington Post carried a story entitled “Hardened U.S. Embassies Symbolic of Old Fears, Critics Say.” The story discussed the new generation of U.S. Embassy buildings, which are often referred to as “Inman buildings” by State Department insiders. This name refers to buildings constructed in accordance with the physical security standards set by the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, a panel chaired by former Deputy CIA Director Adm. Bobby Inman following the 1983 attacks against the U.S. embassies in Beirut and Kuwait City. The 1985 Inman report, which established these security requirements and contributed to one of the historical security spending booms, was also responsible for beefing up the State Department’s Office of Security and transforming it into the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). It has been 11 years since a U.S. Embassy has been reduced to a smoking hole in the ground, and the public’s perception of the threat appears to be changing once again. In The Washington Post article, Stephen Schlesinger, an adjunct fellow at the Century Foundation, faults the new Inman building that serves as the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York for being unattractive and uninviting. Schlesinger is quoted as saying: “Rather than being an approachable, beckoning embassy — emphasizing America’s desire to open up to the rest of the globe and convey our historically optimistic and progressive values — it sits across from the U.N. headquarters like a dark, forbidding fortress, saying, ‘Go away.’” When opinion leaders begin to express such sentiments in The Washington Post, it is an indication that we are now in the lull period of the counterterrorism cycle. Tensions Over Security There has always been a tension between security and diplomacy in the U.S. State Department. There are some diplomats who consider security to be antithetical to diplomacy and, like Mr. Schlesinger, believe that U.S. diplomatic facilities need to be open and accessible rather than secure. These foreign service officers (FSOs) also believe that regional security officers are too risk averse and that they place too many restrictions on diplomats to allow them to practice effective diplomacy. (Regional security officer — RSO — is the title given to a DSS special agent in charge of security at an embassy.) To quote one FSO, DSS special agents are “cop-like morons.” People who carry guns instead of demarches and who go out and arrest people for passport and visa fraud are simply not considered “diplomatic.” There is also the thorny issue that in their counterintelligence role, DSS agents are often forced to confront FSOs over personal behavio r (such as sexual proclivities or even crimes) that could be considered grounds for blackmail by a hostile intelligence service. On the other side of the coin, DSS agents feel the animosity emanating from those in the foreign service establishment who are hostile to security and who oppose the DSS efforts to improve security at diplomatic missions overseas. DSS agents refer to these FSOs as “black dragons” — a phrase commonly uttered in conjunction with a curse. DSS agents see themselves as the ones left holding the bag when an FSO disregards security guidelines, does something reckless, and is robbed, raped or murdered. It is most often the RSO and his staff who are responsible for going out and picking up the pieces when something turns bad. It is also the RSO who is called before a U.S. government accountability review board when an embassy is attacked and destroyed. In the eyes of a DSS special agent, then, a strong, well-protected building conveys a far better representation of American values and strength than does a smoldering hole in the ground, where an “accessible&# 8221; embassy once stood. In the mind of a DSS agent, dead diplomats can conduct no diplomacy. This internal tension has also played a role in the funding boom and bust for diplomatic security overseas. Indeed, DSS agents are convinced that the black dragons consistently attempt to cut security budgets during the lull periods. When career foreign service officers like Sheldon Krys and Anthony Quainton were appointed to serve as assistant secretaries for diplomatic security — and presided over large cuts in budgets and manpower — many DSS agents were convinced that Krys and Quainton had been placed in that position specifically to sabotage the agency. DSS agents were suspicious of Quainton, in particular, because of his history. In February 1992, while Quainton was serving as the U.S. ambassador to Peru, the ambassador’s residence in Lima was attacked by Shining Path guerrillas who detonated a large vehicular-borne improvised explosive device in the street next to it. A team sent by the DSS counterterrorism investigations division to investigate the attack concluded in its report that Quainton’s refusal to follow the RSO’s recommendation to alter his schedule was partially responsible for the attack. The report angered Quainton, who became the assistant secretary for diplomatic security seven months later. Shortly after assuming his post, Quainton proclaimed to his staff that “terrorism is dead” and ordered the abolishment of the DSS counterterrorism investigations division. Using a little bureaucratic sleight of hand, then-DSS Director Clark Dittmer renamed the office the Protective Intelligence Investigations Division (PII) and allowed it to maintain its staff and function. Although Quainton had declared terrorism dead, special agents assigned to the PII office would be involved in the investigation of the first known al Qaeda attacks against U.S. interests in Aden and Sanaa,Yemen, in December 1992. They also played a significant role in the investigation of the World Trade Center bombing in February 1993, the investigation of the 1993 New York Landmarks Plot and many subsequent terrorism cases. Boom-and-Bust Funding One of the problems problem created by the feast-or-famine cycle of security funding is that during the boom times, when there is a sudden (and often huge) influx of cash, agencies sometimes have difficulty spending all the money allotted to them in a logical and productive manner. Congress, acting on strong public opinion, often will give an agency even more than it initially requested for a particular program — and then expect an immediate solution to the problem. Rather than risk losing these funds, the agencies scramble to find ways to spend them. Then, quite often, by the time the agency is able to get its act together and develop a system effectively to use the funds, the lull has set in and funding is cut. These cuts frequently are accompanied by criticism of how the agency spent the initial glut of funding. Whether or not it was a conscious effort on the part of people like Quainton, funding for diplomatic security programs was greatly reduced during the lull period of the 1990s. In addition to a reduction in the funding provided to build new embassies or bring existing buildings up to Inman standards, RSOs were forced to make repeated cuts in budgets for items such as local guard forces, residential security and the maintenance of security equipment such as closed-circuit TV cameras and vehicular barriers. These budget cuts were identified as a contributing factor in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The final report of the Crowe Commission, which was established to investigate the attacks, notes that its accountability review board members “were especially disturbed by the collective failure of the U.S. government over the past decade to provide adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions to terrorist attacks in most countries around the world.” The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi was known to be vulnerable. Following the August 1997 raid on the Nairobi residence of Wadih el-Hage, U.S. officials learned that el-Hage and his confederates had conducted extensive pre-operational surveillance against the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, indicating that they planned to attack the facility. The U.S. ambassador in Nairobi, citing the embassy’s vulnerability to car bomb attacks, asked the state department in December 1997 to authorize a relocation of the embassy to a safer place. In its January 1998 denial of the request, the state department said that, in spite of the threat and vulnerability, the post’s “medium” terrorism threat level did not warrant the expenditure. Old Fears The 1998 East Africa embassy bombings highlighted the consequences of the security budget cuts that came during the lull years. Clearly, terrorism was not dead then, nor is it dead today, in spite of the implications in the March 13 Washington Post article. Indeed, the current threat of attacks directed against U.S. diplomatic facilities is very real. Since January 2008, we have seen attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities in Sanaa, Yemen; Istanbul, Turkey; Kabul, Afghanistan; Belgrade, Serbia; and Monterrey, Mexico (as well as attacks against Ameri can diplomats in Pakistan, Sudan and Lebanon). Since 2001, there have also been serious attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Karachi, Pakistan; Damascus, Syria; Athens, Greece; and Baghdad, Iraq. Even if one believes, as we do, that al Qaeda’s abilities have been severely degraded since 9/11, it must be recognized that the group and its regional franchises still retain the ability to conduct tactical strikes. In fact, due to the increased level of security at U.S. diplomatic missions, most of the attacks conducted by jihadists have been directed against softer targets such as hotels or the embassies of other foreign countries. Indeed, attacks that were intended to be substantial strikes against U.S. diplomatic facilities in places like Sanaa, Jeddah and Istanbul have been thwarted by the security measures in place at those facilities. Even in Damascus, where the embassy was an older facility that did not meet Inman standards, adequate security measures (aided by poor planning and execution on the part of the attackers) helpe d thwart a potentially disastrous attack. However, in spite of the phrase “war on terrorism,” terrorism is a tactic and not an entity. One cannot kill or destroy a tactic. Historically, terrorism has been used by a wide array of actors ranging from neo-Nazis to anarchists and from Maoists to jihadists. Even when the Cold War ended and many of the state-sponsored terrorist groups lost their funding, the tactic of terrorism endured. Even if the core al Qaeda leaders were killed or captured tomorrow and the jihadist threat were neutralized next week, terrorism would not go away. As we have previously pointed out, ideologies are far harder to kill than individuals. There will always be actors with various ideologies who will embrace terrorism as a tactic to strike a stronger enemy, and as the sole global superpower, the U.S. and its diplomatic missions will be target ed for terrorist attacks for the foreseeable future — or at least the next 100 years. During this time, the booms and busts of counterterrorism and security spending will continue in response to successful attacks and in the lulls between spectacular terrorist strikes like 9/11. During the lulls in this cycle, it will be easy for complacency to slip in — especially when there are competing financial needs. But terrorism is not going to go away any time soon, and when emotion is removed from the cycle, a logical and compelling argument emerges for consistently supplying enough money to protect U.S. embassies and other essential facilities.

US Army Confirms Israeli Nukes

US Army Confirms Israeli Nukes
(NSI News Source Info) March 19, 2009: The Army has let slip one of the worst-kept secrets in the world -- that Israel has the bomb. Officially, the United States has a policy of "ambiguity" regarding Israel's nuclear capability. Essentially, it has played a game by which it neither acknowledges nor denies that Israel is a nuclear power. But a Defense Department study completed last year offers what may be the first time in a unclassified report that Israel is a nuclear power. On page 37 of the U.S. Joint Forces Command report, the Army includes Israel within "a growing arc of nuclear powers running from Israel in the west through an emerging Iran to Pakistan, India, and on to China, North Korea, and Russia in the east." The single reference is far more than the U.S. usually would state publicly about Israel, even though the world knew Israel to be a nuclear power years before former nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu went public with facts on its weapons program in 1986. Several years later investigative reporter Seymour Hersh published "The Samson Option," detailing Israel's strategy of massive nuclear retaliation against Arab states in the event it felt its very existence was threatened. Israel's nuclear arsenal has been estimated to range from 200 to 400 warheads. Yet Israel has refused to confirm or deny it's nuclear capabilities, and the U.S. has gone along with the charade. As recently as Feb. 9 President Barack Obama ducked the question when asked pointedly by White House correspondent Helen Thomas whether he knew of any country in the Middle East that has nuclear weapons. Keeping the blinders on is necessary politically in order to avoid a policy confrontation with Israel. By law, the U.S. would have to cease providing billions of dollars in foreign aid to Israel if it determined the country had a nuclear weapons program. That's because the so-called Symington Amendment, passed in 1976, bars assistance to countries developing technology for nuclear weapons proliferation. Given the U.S.'s long history of selective blindness when it comes to Israeli nukes, it's unlikely that the Joint Operating Environment 2008 report compiled by the Army amount to much more than a minor faux pas. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz, in a March 8 article on the report, observed: "It is virtually unheard of for a senior military commander, while in office, to refer to Israel's nuclear status. In December 2006, during his confirmation hearings as Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates referred to Israel as one of the powers seen by Iran as surrounding it with nuclear weapons. But once in office, Gates refused to repeat this allusion to Israel, noting that when he used it he was ‘a private citizen.' "

Russia's Ka-52 Attack Helicopter

Russia's Ka-52 Attack Helicopter
(NSI News Source Info) March 19, 2009: The Kamov Ka-50 Black Shark (NATO reporting name: "Hokum A") is a single-seat Russian attack helicopter with the distinctive coaxial rotor system of the Kamov design bureau. It was designed in the 1980s and adopted for service in the Russian army in 1995. It is currently manufactured by the Progress company of Arseniev.
During the late-1990s, Kamov and Israeli Air Industries developed a tandem-seat cockpit version, the Kamov Ka-50-2 Erdogan (Turkish for "Born Warrior"), to compete in Turkey's attack helicopter competition. Kamov later designed another two-seat variant, the Kamov Ka-52 Alligator (NATO reporting name: "Hokum B")
The Ka-50 was designed to be small, fast, and agile to improve survivability and lethality. For minimal weight and size (thus maximal speed and agility) it was -- uniquely among gunships -- to be operated by a single pilot only.
Kamov concluded after thorough research of helicopter combat in Afghanistan and other war zones that the typical attack mission phases of low-level approach, pop-up target acquisition, and weapon launch don't simultaneously demand navigation, maneuvering, and weapons operation of the pilot; and thus with well-designed support automation a single pilot can indeed carry out the entire mission alone. However, it is still an unanswered question whether in practice the rank and file of Black Shark pilots would nevertheless suffer from excess fatigue from this combined workload. Like other Kamov helicopters, it features Kamov's characteristic contra-rotating co-axial rotor system, which removes the need for the entire tail-rotor assembly and improves the aircraft's aerobatic qualities -- it can perform loops, rolls, and “the funnel” (circle-strafing) where the aircraft maintains a line-of-sight to target while flying circles of varying altitude, elevation, and airspeed around it.
Using two rotors means that a smaller rotor with slower moving rotor tips can be used compared to a single rotor design. Since the speed of the advancing rotor tip is a primary limitation to the maximum speed of a helicopter, this allows a faster maximum speed than helicopters such as the AH-64. The elimination of the tail rotor is a qualitative advantage because the torque-countering tail rotor can use up to 30% of engine power.
Furthermore, the vulnerable boom and rear gearbox are fairly common causes of helicopter losses in combat; the Black Shark's entire transmission presents a comparatively small target to ground fire. Kamov maintains that the co-axial drive assembly is built to survive hits from 23 mm ammunition like the other vital parts of the helicopter. The zero native torque also allows the aircraft to be fairly immune to wind strength and direction, and to have an unsurpassed turn rate in all travel speed envelopes. The single seat configuration was considered undesireable by NATO. The first two Ka-50 prototypes had false windows painted on them. The "windows" evidently worked as the first western reports of the aircraft were wildly inaccurate. For improved pilot survivability the Ka-50 is fitted with a NPP Zvezda K-37-800 ejection seat, which is a rare feature for a helicopter. Before the rocket in the ejection seat kicks in, rotor blades are blown away by explosive charges in the rotor disc and the canopy is similarly jettisoned. The first Ka-50 prototype was nicknamed "Werewolf", however Kamov's official name for the type is "Black Shark". As the Soviet Union's collapse vastly reduced military spending before Ka-50 could go into full-scale production, a relatively small number of these aircraft have been built. Reportedly Ka-50's development took place in record time, as Kamov had the forethought of placing liaison engineers at major component suppliers and systems subcontractors. The Ka-50 and its modifications have been chosen as the special forces support helicopter while Mi-28 has become main army's gunship.
The production of Ka-50 was recommenced in 2006. It was later announced in late 2008 that only five more Ka-50s would be produced, and that production would be reconfigured to make exclusively the more adaptable and advanced Ka-52s.

Israel May Drop Bid To Incorporate Own Know-How Into F-35 fighter

Israel May Drop Bid To Incorporate Own Know-How Into F-35 fighter
(NSI News Source Info) March 19, 2009: Israel is close to dropping an effort to put its own electronic warfare know-how into Lockheed Martin Corp's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a mainstay of its future strike force, a Pentagon official said on Tuesday.
Incorporating Israel's system into the model being built for it "is not going to happen," said Jon Schreiber, who heads the program's international aspects. "I think our system will meet their requirements with some tweaking, and I think they're starting to come around to that realization themselves," he told Reuters in an interview. The issue is sensitive because senior Israeli military officials had maintained that their aircraft must incorporate electronic warfare technologies developed by state-controlled Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd.
An Israeli embassy spokesman referred a caller to the Defense Ministry, which could not be immediately reached for comment.
Dropping plans for incorporating sensitive Israeli technology onto the F-35 would be a significant departure for Israel. Israeli F-15s and F-16s were modified to carry Israeli electronic warfare, radars, munitions and command and control systems.
Israel is set to become a kind of trailblazer for the F-35, which is being developed by the United States and eight international partners: Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Norway.
Israel has gone further than any non-consortium member toward acquisition, with plans to buy an initial 25 F-35A's in fiscal 2012 for delivery starting in 2014 and an option for 50 more.
The F-35 is a radar-evading, single-engine aircraft, designed to switch quickly between air-to-ground and air-to-air missions while still flying. The models built for Israel would incorporate Israeli-made data links, radios and other command and control equipment, but not the electronic warfare suite, largely because of the high cost of integrating it, Schreiber said.
"They have pretty tight budget constraints and we're attempting to fit their requirements into their budget," he said. Officials from the Pentagon's F-35 joint program office met Israeli procurement officials in New York on Monday to discuss the program, Schreiber added without elaborating on their talks.
"We expect to get a revised letter of request from (Israel) within the next month or so," and anticipate that a government-to-government deal will be concluded by the end of this year or early next year, he said.
U.S. instructor pilots would join Israeli pilots to train at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, on four of the aircraft built for Israel, Schreiber said. By early 2015, the U.S. instructors would transition to Israel to continue training pilots there.
Singapore, the other non-consortium member linked to the program through a special status, appears likely to start buying as many as 100 F-35s a year or two after Israel, Schreiber said. He expected an agreement to be signed with Singapore within the next month detailing security safeguards for program information as a prelude to "more serious discussions" about acquiring the F-35. "
At this point, we don't have any indication from Singapore that they want to put anything unique in the airplane," he said. "They want to go with a plain vanilla airplane."
F-35 competitors include Saab AB's Gripen, the Dassault Aviation SA Rafale, Russia's MiG-35 and Sukhoi Su-35, and the Eurofighter Typhoon made by a consortium of British, German, Italian and Spanish companies.
Lockheed's chief F-35 subcontractors are Northrop Grumman Corp and BAE Systems Plc. Two rival, interchangeable F-35 engines are under development. One is built by United Technologies Corp's Pratt i Whitney unit; the other by a team of General Electric Co and Rolls-Royce Group Plc.

Boeing Plans New Fighter To Vie With Lockheed's

Boeing Plans New Fighter To Vie With Lockheed's
(NSI News Source Info) WASHINGTON - March 19, 2009: Boeing Co unveiled on Tuesday a new multi-role design of its F-15 combat aircraft that would vie for international orders against Lockheed Martin Corp's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Designated the F-15 Silent Eagle, or F-15SE, it incorporates what Boeing calls cost-effective "stealth" technologies as well as redesigned "conformal" fuel tanks that allow for carrying weapons internally to cut the aircraft's radar cross section.
Paul Lewis, a Boeing spokesman, said the projected price was roughly $100 million per copy, including pilot training, spares and support equipment.
By contrast, the F-35 is expected to cost in the upper $60 million range in adjusted 2014 dollars, when full production is due to start, Lockheed Martin spokesman Chris Geisel said in a Feb. 26 emailed statement. Lewis said the F-15SE represented "a fundamentally different approach" compared with Lockheed Martin, which designed the F-35 from scratch to minimize radar detection. "We have selectively applied stealth," he said. "You haven't put all your eggs in one basket.
"The aircraft represents "a balanced, affordable approach designed to meet future survivability needs," Mark Bass, a Boeing vice president, added in a statement.
Improvements in stealth, or radar avoidance, include coatings and treatments on the aircraft. The F-15SE would be able to internally carry air-to-air missiles such as the AIM-9 and AIM-120 and air-to-ground weapons such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition and Small Diameter Bomb.Depending on the specific mission, the new F-15 could carry the special fuel tanks designed to create internal weapons bays or swap them out to optimize fuel capacity and external weapons loads, Boeing said. Richard Abolafia, a fighter-market expert at aerospace consultancy TEAL Group Corp, said the new F-15 had some "strong opportunities, particularly in South Korea, Singapore and Saudi Arabia."
Overseas competitors include Saab AB's Gripen, the Dassault Aviation SA Rafale, Russia's MiG-35 and Sukhoi Su-35, and the Eurofighter Typhoon made by a consortium of British, German, Italian and Spanish companies.Lockheed Martin is developing its F-35 for the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps plus eight international partners: Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Norway.
Jon Schreiber, who heads the F-35 program's international aspects for the Pentagon, told Reuters in an interview Tuesday that he foresaw orders from Israel for an initial 25 F-35s by early next year.

India Worried After Russia Grounds MiG-29s

India Worried After Russia Grounds MiG-29s
(NSI News Source Info) NEW DELHI - March 19, 2009: Russia's decision to ground a large portion of its MiG-29 fighters is reverberating in India, where Defence Ministry sources say they are worried about the timely delivery of MiG-29K aircraft on order for the Navy and Air Force. Sources also say the grounding could hurt the chances for the derivative MiG-35 in India's $10 billion Combat Aircraft order. Indian Air Force (IAF) officials say they won't ground their 60 MiG-29s. The force is short of aircraft, fielding just 31 18-plane squadrons instead of the sanctioned 39.5 and desired 45 units. Russian Air Force officials grounded their 200 MiG-29s after two crashes last year. Many have been returned to flight, but 90 will remain out of action until they can be upgraded. The crashes may also affect talks, said to be near completion, between India and Russia for the purchase of more MiG-29Ks, ministry sources said. The Indian Navy ordered 16 in 2004 for $640 million. Russia unveiled the MiG-35 at the Aero India 2007 airshow in Bangalore, amid Moscow's keenness to sell these planes to India. It was reported that the MiG-35 made its way from Moscow to Bangalore in less than three hours, assisted by in-flight refueling on the way and flying at supersonic speeds. The MiG-35 is a contender with the Eurofighter Typhoon, F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault Rafale, JAS 39 Gripen and F-16 Falcon for the bid of more than 126 multirole combat aircraft to be procured by the Indian Air Force in Indian MRCA competition. Aero India 2007 was the first time that the final version of the MiG-35 fighter was displayed in an international air show. Until then, only the prototype of the MiG-35 had been shown to the public at air shows in Russia and the UK in 2005. It was again demonstrated at Aero India 2009 held at Yelahanka Airbase near Bangaloru where it was flown by an Indian Air Force Pilot.Aero India. The MiG-35 is also competing for the IAF's $10 billion order of 126 combat aircraft against the Lockheed Martin F-16, Boeing Hornet, Dassault Rafael, EADS Eurofighter and Saab Gripen. A senior IAF official said the MiG-35 is structurally identical to the MiG-29 SMT, which includes advanced avionics, radar and enlarged dorsal spine for more fuel. But another IAF official said the MiG-35 is better than its predecessor and comparable to Eurofighter and the F-18. India was the first, and today remains the largest, foreign operator of the MiG-29. Part of the Russian sales pitch is that it ensures commonality with existing planes. Indian Defence Ministry sources said the grounding might hurt the MiG-35's chances, depending on what government holds power after India's May 16 general elections. Sharad Deshpande, a retired Indian Air Force air marshal, said, "The IAF should be in close contact with the Russian design and maintenance experts and would have obtained details of the structural defects/problems experienced by the Russian Air Force. Based on the inputs available, the IAF would have started a thorough inspection of their MiG-29 fleet and taken requisite remedial actions. Under no circumstances would they clear MiG-29 for flying if there is any question mark on its structural integrity and flight safety parameters." Defense analyst Mahindra Choudhary said the IAF and Navy should not buy the MiG-29 derivative, which may be increasingly hard to maintain.

Kazan Helicopters Mi-38 Has Potential Market Of Estimated At 300-350 Choppers

Kazan Helicopters Mi-38 Has Potential Market Of Estimated At 300-350 Choppers
(NSI News Source Info) March 19, 2009: Russia has had a hard time finding customers for its new helicopter designs. This is largely because Russia has been so successful in selling the old (updated 1960s design), but reliable, Mi-171. But now they have found a way to fund the new Mi-38 (basically the successor of the Mi-8/17/171 line).
The Mi-38 will have to be certified after the preliminary stage of the tests is over. The general director of the helicopter-making plant in the city of Kazan, Alexander Lavrentyev, is quite careful in his forecasts. According to him, the certification of the new model will be over in 2007, and the series production will probably be launched in 2008. It is supposed that the helicopter-making factory in Kazan will produce three or four other prototypes to test the machine. Each of those helicopters will cost 335 million rubles. Alexander Lavrentyev stated that the project of the new modern helicopter will be estimated at $700-800 million. A half of the sum has been already spent. The Kazan-based factory invested about $125 in the project – the costs are expected to be compensated after 80-90 of new choppers are sold. The helicopter-making factory plans to produce 10-12 machines a year. Therefore, the company will have its money back only after the year 2015. According to market researches, the potential market of the Mi-38 helicopter is estimated at 300-350 choppers. Russian buyers will acquire 200 machines, and every third chopper will be exported. The general director of the company believes that the Mi-38 will be a lot cheaper than its foreign analogues – Italian-British EH-101 (it costs $25-27 million), and the US's Sikorsky S-92 ($20-22 million). The end price of the new Russian aircraft has not been exposed yet.
There is a demand inside Russia for a large, rugged, helicopter to support the growing number of oil and gas development projects in Russia's vast eastern forests. The Mi-38 was developed in the last decade for military use, but seems ideal for the oil industry needs.
The Mi-38 is a 15 ton helicopter that can carry up to six tons and can stay in the air for up to six hours per sortie (cruising at 200 kilometers an hour). Russia can make money selling these for less than $10 million each. The popular Mi-171 is based on the 1975 era Mi-17, which is the export version of original 1960s Mi-8. Weighing about 12 tons, and carrying a four ton load, the Mi-171 has a range of 590 kilometers at a cruising speed of 250 kilometers per hour.
There is a crew of three, and as many passengers as can be squeezed in (about 40 people, but usually just 20 or so.) A sling underneath can also carry up to four tons. Several hundred Mi-171s have been exported. The helicopter is rugged, inexpensive ($4-5 million each) and better suited for less affluent nations. Development of the Mi-38 was completed in 1998 and Russia has been pushing sales hard. There are apparently enough Mi-38 orders to get production started by the end of the year. The Mi-38 is much easier to sell if it is in production, and has some satisfied users.

China's J-10 Jet Fighter Looks Something Like the American F-16 Falcon Jet Fighter

China's J-10 Jet Fighter Looks Something Like the American F-16 Falcon Jet Fighter 
(NSI News Source Info) March 19, 2009: China only publicly admitted its new J-10s jet fighter existed two years ago, even though the first few entered service in late 2003. There are only about a hundred J-10As are in service, and they are being offered to export customers for about $42 million each. Currently, China is producing 2-3 J-10s a month. Pictures recently appeared showing the improved J-10B model. This version carries improved electronics, including better radar warning, a laser range finder and targeting electronics. The new nose cone looks like the one on the F-16, indicating that the J-10B is now ready to be fitted with an AESA (phased array) radar (which is more capable and more reliable than older types, but also more expensive.) The cockpit also has a larger and more detailed HUD (Head Up Display). The J-10 already has a reputation as a maintenance nightmare, and that the Chinese are having a hard time keeping the aircraft operational in reasonable numbers. But the J-10 is the first modern jet fighter designed and built in China. The aircraft is an attempt to create a modern fighter-bomber that could compete with foreign designs. The experiment was not completely successful. Work on the J-10 began over twenty years ago, in an attempt to develop an aircraft that could compete with the Russian MiG-29s and Su-27s, and the American F-16. But the first prototype did not fly until 1998. There were problems, and it wasn't until 2000 that the basic design flaws were fixed. By 2002, nine prototypes had been built, and flight testing was going forward to find, and fix, hundreds of smaller problems. It was a great learning experience for Chinese engineers, but it was becoming apparent that the J10 was not going to be competitive with the Su-27s/30s China was buying from Russia. The J-10 looks something like the American F-16, and weighs about the same (19 tons). Like the F-16, and unlike the Su-27, the J-10 has only one engine. Originally, the J-10 used a Russian AL-31FN engine, but China has been working for a decade to manufacture their own version of this, the WS10A. The WS10A is something of an acid test for them, as it is a powerful military engine, and a complex piece of work. Russia refused to license China to produce the AL-31FN, so the Chinese stole as much of the technology as they could and designed the WS10A. This engine has been tested, and officially approved for production, but apparently still has quality control and performance problems. It's no accident that the J-10 resembles the F-16, because Israel apparently sold them technology for the Israeli Lavi jet fighter. Israel abandoned the Lavi project, because of the high cost and availability of cheaper alternatives (buying F-16s and F-15s from the United States.) But the Lavi was meant to be a super F-16, and incorporated a lot of design ideas from the F-16 (which the Israelis were very familiar with, as they used them, and had developed new components for them.)

Turkish F-35 Supplier To Northrop Grumman Delivers First Structural Assemblies

Turkish F-35 Supplier To Northrop Grumman Delivers First Structural Assemblies
(NSI News Source Info) EL SEGUNDO, Calif. - March 19, 2009:Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc. (TAI), a major international supplier to Northrop Grumman Corporation on the F-35 Lightning II aircraft program, has produced and delivered its first structural assemblies for the jet. The metallic assemblies, which contain more than 100 parts each, represent the next major step forward in TAI's evolving role as a second source supplier of complete F-35 center fuselages. The company delivered its first F-35 composite parts in late 2008. Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc. (TAI), a major international supplier to Northrop Grumman Corporation, has produced and delivered its first structural assemblies for the F-35 Lightning II aircraft. In the photo, a Northrop Grumman employee performs quality inspections on the assemblies, which will be used in F-35 conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) center fuselages currently being produced for the second phase of low rate initial production. The assemblies from TAI will be used in center fuselages for F-35 conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variants. Northrop Grumman, a principal member of the Lockheed Martin-led F-35 industry team, is currently assembling those CTOL center fuselages in Palmdale, Calif., as part of the second phase of F-35 low rate initial production. "We are very encouraged by TAI's steady progress in maturing the production and assembly processes that will be required to eventually produce 400 center fuselages for the program," said Mark Tucker, vice president of tactical systems and F-35 program manager for Northrop Grumman's Aerospace Systems sector. TAI is scheduled to produce this metallic structural assembly for all CTOL center fuselages currently planned for the F-35 program, added Tucker. All of the assemblies will be produced in TAI's manufacturing facility in Ankara, Turkey. Northrop Grumman previously produced the assembly in Palmdale. Northrop Grumman is responsible for the design and production of center fuselages for all three variants of F-35 aircraft: CTOL; short take-off, vertical landing; and carrier-compatible. The F-35 Lightning II program expects to build more than 3,100 aircraft. As a member of the F-35 global industry team, Northrop Grumman is central to the development, production and support of the F-35 Lightning II. The company designed and produces the aircraft's center fuselage, radar and other key avionics including electro-optical and communications subsystems; develops mission systems and mission-planning software; leads the team's development of pilot and maintenance training system courseware; and manages the team's use, support and maintenance of low-observable technologies. Northrop Grumman Corporation is a leading global security company whose 120,000 employees provide innovative systems, products, and solutions in aerospace, electronics, information systems, shipbuilding and technical services to government and commercial customers worldwide.

General Dynamics NASSCO Lays Keel Of Tenth T-AKE Ship

General Dynamics NASSCO Lays Keel Of Tenth T-AKE Ship (NSI News Source Info) SAN DIEGO - March 19, 2009: General Dynamics NASSCO, a wholly owned subsidiary of General Dynamics, March 17., laid the keel for USNS Charles Drew, the tenth dry cargo-ammunition ship in the U.S. Navy’s T-AKE program. Construction of the Charles Drew began in October. The ship is scheduled to be delivered to the Navy in the third quarter of 2010. The ship is named in honor of the African-American physician who was a pioneer in blood preservation and storage. USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE-1), the lead ship of her class of dry cargo ship, was the second ship of the United States Navy to be named for the explorers Meriwether Lewis and William Clark. The contract to build her was awarded to National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) of San Diego, California, on 18 October 2001 and her keel was laid down on 22 April 2004. She was launched 21 May 2005, co-sponsored by Jane Lewis Sale Henley and Lisa Clark, descendants of the ship's namesakes. She was delivered to the Navy on 20 June 2006. The T-AKE is a new Combat Logistics Force (CLF) Underway Replenishment Naval vessel that will replace the current capability of the Kilauea-class ammunition ship, Mars-class and Sirius-class combat stores ships, and when operating in concert with a Henry J. Kaiser-class oiler, the T-AKE will replace the Sacramento-class fast combat support ship. The T-AKE Program will consist of 11 ships with a budget of approximately $4 billion. On March 19, NASSCO will begin construction of USNS Washington Chambers, the eleventh ship of the T-AKE class. The Washington Chambers is scheduled to be delivered to the Navy in the first quarter of 2011. The ship bears the name of the Navy officer who oversaw the early development of U.S. naval aviation. NASSCO has delivered seven T-AKE ships to the Navy and is under contract to build five additional T-AKE ships, including the Charles Drew and Washington Chambers. The Navy has also provided long-lead material funding to NASSCO for two more ships for a total class of 14 T-AKE vessels. Located in San Diego, NASSCO employs more than 4,700 people and is the only major ship construction yard on the West Coast of the United States. In addition to the T-AKE program, the shipyard is also building a series of product carriers for U.S. Shipping Partners L.P. Additional information on NASSCO can be found at http://www.nassco.com/. General Dynamics, headquartered in Falls Church, Va., employs approximately 92,300 people worldwide. The company is a market leader in business aviation; land and expeditionary combat systems, armaments and munitions; shipbuilding and marine systems; and information systems and technologies. More information about General Dynamics is available online at www.gd.com.

U.S. Navy Certifies Lockheed Martin Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System With “Terminal Phase” Capability

U.S. Navy Certifies Lockheed Martin Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System With “Terminal Phase” Capability
(NSI News Source Info) MOORESTOWN, NJ - March 19, 2009: Lockheed Martin’s latest Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System with flight test-proven terminal intercept capability recently received full certification from the U.S. Navy. This newest upgrade to the operational BMD system deployed today adds the capability to defeat short-range ballistic missiles as they re-enter the atmosphere in their final (terminal) stage of flight. The system is already certified to defeat longer range ballistic missiles above the atmosphere. By June 2009, Aegis BMD version 3.6.1 will be installed in the U.S. Navy’s 17 of 18 Aegis BMD-equipped ships. Beginning next summer, Aegis BMD version 3.6.1 will also be installed on three additional Aegis-equipped ships, all homeported on the east coast, being modified to perform ballistic missile defense. Separate from the 3.6.1 installations, the Aegis BMD capable ship USS Lake Erie (CG 70), is being fitted with the next Aegis BMD spiral that includes an improved on board computing capability and the Standard Missile-3 Block IB. USS Lake Erie will begin sea trails of this next spiral in 2009. The Navy’s latest upgrade certification of the proven sea-based missile defense system followed a thorough government test and evaluation, including a June 2008 test mission with the Aegis BMD cruiser USS Lake Erie. In the test, Lake Erie’s SPY-1B radar detected and tracked a ballistic missile test target, and computed a targeting solution to guide two SM-2 Block IV missiles to a successful endo-atmospheric (within the atmosphere) intercept. “Build a little, test a little, learn a lot– that is the systems engineering backbone behind Aegis,” said Orlando Carvalho, vice president of Lockheed Martin’s Surface/Sea-Based Missile Defense line of business. “We understand the importance of fielding ever-more-capable ballistic missile defenses, and the role Aegis’ continuous development has in the Navy’s and Missile Defense Agency’s plans to field that capability.” The Missile Defense Agency and the Navy are jointly developing Aegis BMD as part of the United States’ Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Currently, a total of 20 Aegis BMD version 3.6-equipped warships – 18 in the U.S. Navy and two in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force – have the certified capability to engage ballistic missiles and perform long-range surveillance and track missions. The Aegis Weapon System is the world’s premier naval defense system and the sea-based element of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Its precision SPY-1 radar and missile system seamlessly integrate with its own command and control. Its ability to detect, track and engage targets ranging from sea-skimming cruise missiles to ballistic missiles in space is proven and unmatched. The Aegis BMD Weapon System also integrates with the BMDS, receiving track data from and providing track information to other BMDS elements. The 88 Aegis-equipped ships currently in service around the globe have more than 950 years of at-sea operational experience and have launched more than 3,500 missiles in tests and real-world operations. In addition to the U.S. and Japan, Aegis is the maritime weapon system of choice for Australia, Norway, South Korea and Spain. Lockheed Martin is a world leader in systems integration and the development of air and missile defense systems and technologies, including the first operational hit-to-kill missile defense system, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3). It also has considerable experience in interceptor systems, kill vehicles, battle management command, control and communications, precision pointing and tracking optics, as well as radar and other sensors that enable signal processing and data fusion. The company makes significant contributions to nearly all major U.S. Missile Defense Systems and participates in several global missile defense partnerships. Headquartered in Bethesda, Md., Lockheed Martin is a global security company that employs about 146,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. The corporation reported 2008 sales of $42.7 billion.

Russian-Chinese Exercises To Be Held In China In Summer

Russian-Chinese Exercises To Be Held In China In Summer
(NSI News Source Info) MOSCOW - March 19, 2009: Russian-Chinese military exercises dubbed Peace Mission 2009 will be held in the summer in northeastern China, the Russian Defense Ministry said Wednesday. The first bilateral counterterrorist exercises Peace Mission were held in Russia and the eastern Chinese province of Shandong in August 2005, involving warships, aviation, and over 10,000 servicemen including marines and paratroopers. "The final decision on the date, venue, name and forces involved will be made at bilateral consultations to be held in the last 10 days of March," a ministry source said. The Chinese Defense Ministry said Tuesday that joint maneuvers were aimed at developing a strategic partnership between Russia and China. The agreement to hold the exercises was reached at last year's meeting between the two countries' defense ministers.

Russia Has Not Delivered S-300 Missile Systems To Iran - Source

Russia Has Not Delivered S-300 Missile Systems To Iran - Source
(NSI News Source Info) MOSCOW - March 19, 2009: Iran has not yet received any S-300 air defense systems under a 2007 contract and the deal depends on the leadership in Moscow, a Russian military exports source said on Wednesday. "S-300 systems have not been yet delivered to Iran under the contract concluded two years ago. The contract itself, though, is being gradually executed," the source in the Federal Military-Technical Cooperation Service told RIA Novosti. Iranian media have repeatedly reported, citing senior security officials, that Russia has started delivering elements of the advanced version of the S-300 missile to Tehran. "Russia is interested in fulfilling the contract, which is worth hundreds of millions of dollars," the source said, adding that the future of the contract would largely depend on the current situation in international affairs and the position of the Russian leadership. The latest version of the S-300 family is the S-300PMU2 Favorit, which has a range of up to 195 kilometers (about 120 miles) and can intercept aircraft and ballistic missiles at altitudes from 10 meters to 27 kilometers. The S-300PMU-1 (Russian C-300ПМУ-1,US DoD designation SA-20A, NATO reporting name SA-20 GARGOYLE) was also introduced in 1992 with the new and larger 48N6 missiles for the first time in a land-based system and introduced all the same performance improvements from the S300FM version including the increased speed, range, TVM guidance and ABM capability. The warhead is slightly smaller than the naval version at 143 kg (315 lb). This version also saw the introduction of the new and more capable 30N6E TOMB STONE radar. The S-300PMU-1 was introduced in 1999 and for the first time introduces several different kinds of missiles in a single system. In addition to the 5V55R, 48N6E and 48N6E2 missiles the S-300PMU-1 can utilise two new missiles, the 9M96E1 and 9M96E2. Both are significantly smaller than the previous missiles at 330 and 420 kg (728 and 926 lb respectively) and carry smaller 24 kg (53 lb) warhead. The 9M96E1 has an engagement range of 1-40 km (1-25 mi) and the 9M96E2 of 1-120 km (1-75 mi). They are still carried 4 per TEL. Rather than just relying on aerodynamic fins for manoeuvring, they use a gas-dynamic system which allows them to have an excellent probability of kill (Pk) despite the much smaller warhead. The Pk is estimated at 0.7 against a tactical ballistic missile for either missile. The S-300PMU-1 typically uses the 83M6E command and control system, although it is also compatible with the older Baikal-1E and Senezh-M1E CCS command and control systems. The 83M6E system incorporates the 64N6E (BIG BIRD) surveillance/detection radar. The fire control/illumination and guidance radar used is the 30N6E(1), optionally matched with a 76N6 low altitude detection radar and a 96L6E all altitude detection radar. The 83M6E command and control system can control up to 12 TELs, both the self propelled 5P85SE vehicle and the 5P85TE towed launchers. Generally support vehicles are also included, such as the 40V6M tow vehicle, intended for lifting of the antenna post. S-300PMU-2 vehicles. From left to right: 64N6E2 detection radar, 54K6E2 command post and 5P85 TEL. The S-300PMU-2 Favorite (Russian C-300ПМУ-2 Фаворит – Favourite, DoD designation SA-20B), introduced in 1997, is an upgrade to the S-300PMU-1 with range extended once again to 195 km (121 mi) with the introduction of the 48N6E2 missile. This system is apparently capable against not just short range ballistic missiles, but now also medium range tactical ballistic missiles. It uses the 83M6E2 command and control system, consisting of the 54K6E2 command post vehicle and the 64N6E2 surveillance/detection radar. It employs the 30N6E2 fire control/illumination and guidance radar. Like the S-300PMU-1, 12 TELs can be controlled, with any mix of 5P85SE2 self propelled and 5P85TE2 trailer launchers. Optionally it can make use of the 96L6E all altitude detection radar and 76N6 low altitude detection radar, just like the S-300PMU-1. It is considered one of the world's most effective all-altitude regional air defense systems, comparable in performance to the U.S. MIM-104 Patriot system. The Russian Foreign Ministry said on Wednesday that military-technical ties between Moscow and Tehran had always been transparent and confirmed that S-300 air defense systems had not been supplied to Iran yet. "We have delivered to Tehran a variety of equipment for defense purposes, which cannot destabilize the situation on the region," the ministry said in a statement. Iran recently took delivery of 29 Russian-made Tor-M1 air defense missile systems under a $700-million contract signed in late 2005. Russia has also trained Iranian Tor-M1 specialists, including radar operators and crew commanders. The S-300 system is significantly superior to the Tor-M1. Commenting on the S-300 deal, Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, suggested that the Kremlin regards military-technical cooperation with Iran as leverage in a political game with the West. "Moscow is using the S-300 contract, as well as its cooperation with Iran in general, simply as a tool in a political tradeoff with the West, rather than as a means to satisfy its fundamental defense and commercial interests," Pukhov said. Meanwhile, he said that arms deliveries to Iran are important to Russia because Moscow is quickly losing its positions on key Asian arms markets in China and India. "In these circumstances, it would be unwise to ignore the Iranian market with its potential demand valued at $300-500 million a year," the analyst said. Pukhov warned that if Russia continued its cautious and two-faced policy in relation to Iran, Tehran would eventually choose China as key arms supplier, which could in the near future offer the Islamic Republic competitive products in all segments of the arms market.

NATO To Boost Troop Numbers In Afghanistan Ahead Of Elections

NATO To Boost Troop Numbers In Afghanistan Ahead Of Elections
(NSI News Source Info) KABUL - March 19, 2009: NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said on Wednesday in Kabul that the military alliance's forces in Afghanistan need to be beefed up ahead of presidential and provincial polls slated for August. Scheffer said that an increase of four battalions in the NATO contingency would be necessary to ensure security before, during and after the elections, set for August 20. An International Security Assistance Force battalion comprises 1,000 men. U.S. soldiers stand guard near the site of an explosion in the outskirts of Kabul, Afghanistan, Sunday, March 15, 2009. In the capital Kabul, a suicide bomber on foot who was targeting a NATO patrol but instead killed two Afghan civilians Sunday, said Lt. Gen. Abdul Rahman Rahman, Kabul's police chief. The bomber also wounded 14 other civilians, the Interior Ministry said in a statement. No foreign troops were wounded or killed, the statement said. Incumbent President Hamid Karzai's term of office ends on May 21. New elections must be held 30-60 days before his term expires. Elected in 2004, Karzai's popularity has fallen over his failure to tackle violence and corruption. He has however expressed a desire to run for a second five-year term. There is a real danger of Taliban attacks in Afghanistan's southern provinces during the elections, especially in the Helmand Province, where much of the fighting between NATO and Taliban forces has taken place. Germany and Italy have already promised hundreds of additional troops to support some 70,000 foreign soldiers already in Afghanistan. Poland also said on Wednesday it may send an additional 400 troops. According to the Afghan Constitution, elections were to be held in April of this year. However, polls were put off due to financial and technical complications. Another problem is the lack of registered voters in the country, which according to various sources comprises 4.5- 9.5 million. In addition, no one actually knows how many Afghans live in or outside the impoverished country. If less than 50% of those Afghans living there vote, then the polls could be declared invalid. According to the United Nations, Afghanistan's population today comprises 25-27 million people. The last attempt to hold a census was in 1979. Another attempt at a census, sponsored by Japan, also ended in failure in the summer of 2008 because of instability in the country.

Russia's Second S-400 Air Defense Regiment Put Into Service And Active

Russia's Second S-400 Air Defense Regiment Put Into Service And Active
(NSI News Source Info) MOSCOW - March 19, 2009: The second regiment equipped with advanced S-400 Triumf air defense missile systems has been put into combat service in Russia, the defense minister said on Tuesday. The S-400 Triumf is a new generation air defense system developed by the Almaz Central Design Bureau as an upgrade of the S-300 family. Its NATO reporting name is SA-21 Growler. The S-400 was previously known as S-300PMU-3. It overshadows the capabilities of the other systems from the S-300 series, and its range is claimed to be at least 2 times greater than that of the MIM-104 Patriot system. Russian sources have claimed the S-400 is capable of detecting and engaging targets out to a range of 400 km (250 miles), including aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, including those with a range of 3,500 km and a speed of 4.5 km/s. It has also been claimed that the S-400 is capable of detecting and engaging stealth aircraft. In 2007, Russia successfully conducted live firing tests of the S-400 air defense complex at the Kapustin Yar firing range in south Russia's Astrakhan Region, and deployed the first missile regiment equipped with the new system to protect the airspace surrounding Moscow and industrial zones in the center of Russia's European territory. The S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler) air defense system is expected to form the new cornerstone of Russia's theater air and missile defenses up to 2020 or even 2025. The S-400 is designed to intercept and destroy airborne targets at a distance of up to 400 kilometers (250 miles), twice the range of the U.S. MIM-104 Patriot, and 2.5 times that of the S-300PMU-2. The system is also believed to be able to destroy stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, with an effective range of up to 3,500 kilometers (2,200 miles) and a speed of up to 4.8 kilometers (3 miles) per second. A regular S-400 battalion comprises at least eight launchers with 32 missiles and a mobile command post, according to various sources. The new state arms procurement program until 2015 stipulates the purchase of enough S-400 air defense systems to arm 18 battalions during this period.