More MRAPs: Navistar’s MaxxPro Maintains the Pole Position

More MRAPs: Navistar’s MaxxPro Maintains the Pole Position

(NSI News Source Info) August 6, 2008: Navistar subsidiary International Military and Government LLC (IMG) in, Warrenville, IL has now won over $3.5 billion in contracts to date under the MRAP program. The Category I MRUV vehicle’s role is similar to a Hummer’s, albeit with more carrying capacity and much more protection. That has become a staple for IMG’s entry, recently dubbed the “MaxxPro” by its manufacturer. Their collaboration with an Israeli firm who provides up-armored vehicles for the Marines appears to have overcome lukewarm initial interest, and is being ordered in quantity; but even successful survivors of Aberdeen’s tests may not offer enough protection against the class of land mines now seeing wider use in Iraq. Nevertheless, the MRAP program has become a production race – and Navistar is doing very well under those competitive terms; a July 2007 order vaulted them into 1st place for number of MRAP vehicles ordered, and they have kept that position since. That big July 2007 order came hot on the heels of US Secretary of Defense Gates’ request to Congress for an extra $1.2 billion in FY 2007 to fund an additional 2,650 MRAP vehicles, on the grounds that manufacturers appear to be ramping up production faster than previously forecast. Meanwhile, key inputs such as steel and tires which might otherwise have become production bottlenecks are being expedited under a DX rating that gives the MRAP program priority over almost all other military programs. Sen. Biden [D-DE], who often heard responses re: lack of industrial capacity when he began asking why more MRAP vehicles weren’t in theater, is probably feeling almost as happy as Navistar’s Board now that his “put the money together, issue the contracts, and let’s find out” speech [MS Word], embodied in Amendment #739 to the FY 2007 military budget, has become the US military’s go-forward plan. The latest items include over $100 million more in spares and modification related contracts. In 2005, military manufacturers began to plan for the end of the US military’s Hummer orders, and the associated battle to replace it with a new vehicle. By this time, land mines had already been the #1 killer in Iraq for some time now, and a few manufacturers were also looking to break into the American market with solutions to this problem. The technology was not new; indeed, it had been in use for over 40 years. The US military had just been very slow to adopt it, aside from some limited orders the 101st Airborne had placed for South African RG-31 vehicles, limited purchases of Force Protection’s Cougar and Buffalo vehicles for Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, and M1117 Guardian ASV armored cars for US military police units. Worse, the ASVs were produced in New Orleans. Hurricane Katrina interrupted production just as it was ramping up. As realization began to dawn in 2006 that the Hummers and their blast-catching flat bottoms needed a supplement in theater, the US Army and Marines began taking a closer look at mine-resistant vehicles on the market, and key manufacturers began maneuvering for position. The new Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) program would include a smaller Category I MRUV patrol vehicles that seated at least 6 people in total, including the driver and front seat. Category II JERRV vehicles would seat at least 10, and would be large enouh to hold bomb-disposal robots and other useful gear. Force Protection, whose v-hulled Cougar vehicles had catalyzed this realization with their performance in Iraq, offered their Cougars for MRAP CAT I/II. Textron offered the lighter M1117 Guardian armored car. BAE Systems was busy developing their RG-33 family, an update of their proven RG-31s that incorporated new technologies and lessons learned. Protected Vehicles, Inc. (PVI) would submit the Golan, designed in partnership with RAFAEL and the Israeli military. Armor Holdings, who supplied the US military’s FMTV medium trucks and up-armoring for its Hummers, was reportedly working on an up-armored design based on the FMTV. Lacking ready designs or American plants, others chose partnerships as their path to market. General Dynamics partnered with BAE OMC of South Africa and the Canadian government to offer the RG-31, then signed another deal with Force Protection to share production of Cougar vehicles. Truck maker Oshkosh entered the fray with a pair of Partnerships, signing a deal with PVI for their new Alpha MRUV vehicle, and Thales Australia for the larger Bushmaster vehicle that was already serving with Australian forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. German firm KMW’s Dingo had also demonstrated front-line performance with German forces in Afghanistan, but their partner Textron elected to offer their own M1117 instead, eliminating KMW before the competition had even started. Navistar subsidiary International Military and Government LLC (IMG, now Navistar Defense) didn’t have expertise in armored vehicles, but they did know trucks. The firm is used to substantial production numbers, and has a field maintenance network on the front lines. In addition to to being one of North America’s largest producers of civilian commercial trucks and mid-range diesel engines (161,000 vehicles in 2006), it is producing and supporting 2,781 vehicles for the Afghan National Army, and claims 9 additional contracts with the U.S. government for more than 1,000 units each. These contracts encompass include service trucks and buses that have been used in the Iraq reconstruction effort. Production facilities include Garland, TX; Springfield, OH; West Point, MS; Melrose Park, IL (diesel engines); and Tulsa, OK (buses). The key for Navistar would be finding the right partner, with the aim of developing an armored MRAP-candidate vehicle based around IMG’s WorkStar 7000 truck chassis. The Israeli frm Plasan Sasa had been designing and manufacturing up-armoring kits for the Marine Corps’ MTVR trucks for several years, which gave them a solid relationship with the MRAP competition’s key client. The Kibbutz Sasa firm also had experience developing full vehicles; its own light protected vehicle called the Caracal was under review by the US Marines for a different role. Navistar decided that they had found their partner.

Unlike the HMMWV’s auto-derived frame, IMG’s heavy-duty truck chassis would have the load capacity required to handle the weight of additional armor et. al. – without wearing out early. The final design positions a v-shaped crew compartment on top of that truck chassis, allowing maximum production commonality while using the compartment’s armoring and shape to channel blasts around the crew area. Extensive use of components from IMG’s trucks, including predictive maintenance features, would ensure that their entry was both producible in large numbers and maintainable in the field. In return for this positioning, Navistar’s IMG received a test vehicle production contract for their vehicle – and nothing more. IMG/Plasan Sasa’s MPV was not featured among the early-stage orders [1st set 2nd set] from the US military for low-risk designs, which went to rivals Force Protection (Cougar), BAE (RG-33, RG-33L), General Dynamics (RG-31), Oshkosh/PVI (Alpha CAT I), and PVI (Golan CAT II). Why? One logical conclusion is doubts about its performance. The biggest downside to capsule-mounting a blast-resistant hull on top of a frame is the danger that a mine blast will separate the capsule from the frame, or (more likely) destroy the chassis and immobilize the vehicle in an ambush zone. Moving a v-shaped blast pan beneath the chassis reduces that danger, but that solution creates issues with ground clearance; and – since it offers less of a gap from the blast – with crew survivability. What changed? Two things. One was the Biden Amendment in the Senate, which accelerated funding for MRAP even as the desired number of vehicles for the FY 2007-2008 program rose again from 4,100 to 7,774 vehicles. At that volume, existing vehicle manufacturers would be very hard-pressed to deliver the required quantity in time. Which in turn lent a higher value to producibility, as long as the vehicles offered substantially better protection than a Hummer. Especially with the US Army reportedly looking for 17,000 blast-resistant vehicles of its own by 2010. The second thing that happened was the testing at Aberdeen Proving Ground, which appears to have quieted doubts concerning IMG/Plasan Sasa’s design. Navistar received just the 2nd post-testing order to emerge from Marine Corps Systems Command, behind Force Protection’s early 1,000 vehicle order in April 2007. A May 31, 2007 report from Defense News claims that Navistar officials heard about their win from the offices of minority leader Sen. Trent Lott [R-MS] and Rep. Roger Wicker [R-MS], and Navistar spokesman Roy Wiley added at the time that “We did extremely well during the tests [at Aberdeen], and we are extremely pleased.”

In contrast, Navistar’s trucking competitor Oshkosh failed with both of its purpose-designed vehicles. The firm received 100 advance low-risk orders for the Alpha vehicle, which then failed testing and was removed from the competition. Despite its successful service on the front lines, the v-hulled Australian Bushmaster design never saw a single production order during the MRAP program. It would join Textron’s M1117 on the sidelines. Navistar is extremely close-mouthed about the exact protection approaches they use, even at a general level. What DID can say is that recent years have begun to see solutions to the weaknesses of capsule-mounted vehicles. German armored vehicle maker Krauss-Maffei Wegman’s Dingo 2 uses an innovative approach, which is a v-hulled capsule and a blast pan underneath the chassis that is more of a shallow bowl shape than a “v”. The difference is that this blast pan is made of composites designed to flex with a blast and absorb energy, then return to shape. Their approach was regarded with some skepticism, but proved itself in an October 2005 incident in which a Bundeswehr Dingo 1 survived a 6-7kg/15-pound land mine explosion in Afghanistan with no injuries to its crew. Unfortunately for KMW, however, its American licensee Textron elected to submit a variant of its M1117 Guardian ASV instead. That proved to be a questionable decision; Textron was subsequently removed from the MRAP program, after their vehicles failed Aberdeen’s brutal testing. Plasan Sasa does make composite armors for vehicles, and its Caracal appears to use some form of light belly armor as part of its survivability package. A Dingo-like approach is possible for the MaxxPro MPV, but without inside information it is difficult to say.

Unless otherwise specified, all contracts are issued to International Military and Government LLC in Warrenville, IL. Unless otherwise noted, the Marine Corps Systems Command in Quantico, VA buys MRAP vehicles on behalf of requests from the US Army (12,000), USMC (2,225), Air Force (558), Navy (544), SOCOM (344), and production verification testing (100). Observant readers will note that the USMC has reduced its requirements in the wake of their campaign’s smashing success in Iraq’s Anbar Province, and USAF numbers also dropped slightly. On the other hand, the Army’s increased orders for use in Afghanistan and Iraq more than made up for these declines. Orders continue to be placed under the original MRAP vehicle solicitation, until production verification of vehicles presented for testing in response to the MRAP II solicitation is completed. Based on awarded contracts, MaxxPro’s price per base vehicle is around $520,000 – $550,000. The vehicles must then be fitted with electronics, IED jammers, and other equipment that can add hundreds of thousands of dollars to that base price before it’s sent to the front lines.