Many British battalions need bringing up to strength before they can be sent to Afghanistan. Britain has deployed more than 8,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, making it the second largest contingent in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) after the United States. Nearly 70,000 troops are serving in ISAF helping the Afghan government to fight an insurgency led by the Taliban, who were in power between 1996 and 2001. The US plans to send 20,000 extra forces into southern Afghanistan to help British, Canadian and Dutch soldiers battle militants.
Sending more troops, it's patently clear, is a waste of time, money and lives. In fact, sending more troops to Afghanistan will be about as effective as bailing out a boat without plugging the leak.
Three difficult problems fuel the war in Afghanistan. The United States and its allies have failed in their efforts to control any of them.
How can NATO troops quell an uprising when enemy fighters, suicide bombers, weapons agents and support personnel pour over the border from Pakistan at will, without hindrance, day and night?
How can those troops quell an insurgency when the enemy is buying weaponry and enriching himself with drug money as much as $100 million a year from, the United Nations says, the southern areas of Afghanistan he controls.
And how can Western forces enlist cooperation from the government it is trying to protect when government leaders are also sucking up money from the opium farmers at such a voracious rate that Afghanistan is now classified as the fifth most corrupt nation on Earth?
The obvious answer is that, until these problems are brought under control, the war cannot be won.
The Bush administration's strategy for stopping the flow of enemy fighters - paying the Pakistani government to do it - has been an abject failure costing more than $10 billion so far.
The weakness of this approach has been apparent for more than two years, and yet the money still flows. President-elect Barack Obama has suggested he will stop the program. In fact, the West has to recognize that Pakistan cannot, will not, ever step up to the plate and take out the militants in the tribal areas.
So, what can be done? There's only one answer: Close Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, everywhere but in a few heavily controlled crossing points.
That's impossible, right? The 1,500-mile border is rugged, unmarked and in dispute. Closing it would be infinitely harder than controlling the U.S. border with Mexico.
All of that is true, but there's one big difference: Afghanistan is a war zone. Declare the border closed, patrol it with helicopter gunships, and shoot anyone who tries to cross. That may not seal the border, but it should significantly slow the flow of militants. Dedicate some of those new American troops to this mission. Pakistan might appreciate it, given the cross-border attack on a military base this week.
Now, what about the opium? For years now, Afghanistan has grown enough opium to supply more than 90 percent of the world's market for heroin. All of this has grown up since 2002, just after the U.S. invasion. The year before, paradoxically enough, it was the Taliban who managed to shut down the opium trade by warning farmers that they would face retribution if they did not stop growing opium. In 2001, Afghanistan produced no opium, none.
As the size of the crop soared a few years ago, Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, told a visiting American official (who then told me) that he planned to appeal to the farmers' better nature and convince them that growing opium was not good for the nation. Well, that didn't work.
Two years ago, U.S. officials asked for permission to spray the opium crop with Roundup, a nontoxic herbicide, the same one used to spray coca plants in Colombia. Of course, the Afghan government didn't like this idea, saying it would anger the farmers. More likely it would anger the government officials who sit on fat wallets, enriched by the drug trade. Last year, Karzai formally said no, so NATO dropped the idea.
The United States, Afghanistan's patron state, needs to tell Karzai that the price of continued support is the immediate eradication of the opium crops. Sure, the farmers will be angry. But what's worse: enraging some constituents or standing by while these same people hand over $100 million a year to your enemy?
The Afghan war is not lost. But turning the conflict around will require tough decisions. Close the Pakistani border. Shut down the opium trade. Let's not spend seven more years pursuing an enhanced version of a strategy that has already failed.
Joel Brinkley is a professor of journalism at Stanford University and a former foreign policy correspondent for the New York Times.
Monday, January 19, 2009
How To Start Winning The War In Afghanistan / To Conclude Afghan's War, Two Factors Required - Close Pakistani Border (Taliban Reinforecement) ....
How To Start Winning The War In Afghanistan / To Conclude Afghan's War, Two Factors Required - Close Pakistani Border (Taliban Reinforecement) & Shut Down Opium Trade (Taliban Revenue)
(NSI News Source Info) January 19, 2009: In a gunbattle a few days ago, NATO troops killed 12 Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan and stopped a would-be suicide bomber. The fight got little attention because, sadly, in Afghanistan this is more or less routine.
The Afghan conflict now takes more lives each month than the war in Iraq, and the incoming Obama administration plans to dispatch at least 20,000 additional troops to tackle the growing violence. Many British battalions need bringing up to strength before they can be sent to Afghanistan. Britain has deployed more than 8,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, making it the second largest contingent in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) after the United States. Nearly 70,000 troops are serving in ISAF helping the Afghan government to fight an insurgency led by the Taliban, who were in power between 1996 and 2001. The US plans to send 20,000 extra forces into southern Afghanistan to help British, Canadian and Dutch soldiers battle militants.
Sending more troops, it's patently clear, is a waste of time, money and lives. In fact, sending more troops to Afghanistan will be about as effective as bailing out a boat without plugging the leak.
Three difficult problems fuel the war in Afghanistan. The United States and its allies have failed in their efforts to control any of them.
How can NATO troops quell an uprising when enemy fighters, suicide bombers, weapons agents and support personnel pour over the border from Pakistan at will, without hindrance, day and night?
How can those troops quell an insurgency when the enemy is buying weaponry and enriching himself with drug money as much as $100 million a year from, the United Nations says, the southern areas of Afghanistan he controls.
And how can Western forces enlist cooperation from the government it is trying to protect when government leaders are also sucking up money from the opium farmers at such a voracious rate that Afghanistan is now classified as the fifth most corrupt nation on Earth?
The obvious answer is that, until these problems are brought under control, the war cannot be won.
The Bush administration's strategy for stopping the flow of enemy fighters - paying the Pakistani government to do it - has been an abject failure costing more than $10 billion so far.
The weakness of this approach has been apparent for more than two years, and yet the money still flows. President-elect Barack Obama has suggested he will stop the program. In fact, the West has to recognize that Pakistan cannot, will not, ever step up to the plate and take out the militants in the tribal areas.
So, what can be done? There's only one answer: Close Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, everywhere but in a few heavily controlled crossing points.
That's impossible, right? The 1,500-mile border is rugged, unmarked and in dispute. Closing it would be infinitely harder than controlling the U.S. border with Mexico.
All of that is true, but there's one big difference: Afghanistan is a war zone. Declare the border closed, patrol it with helicopter gunships, and shoot anyone who tries to cross. That may not seal the border, but it should significantly slow the flow of militants. Dedicate some of those new American troops to this mission. Pakistan might appreciate it, given the cross-border attack on a military base this week.
Now, what about the opium? For years now, Afghanistan has grown enough opium to supply more than 90 percent of the world's market for heroin. All of this has grown up since 2002, just after the U.S. invasion. The year before, paradoxically enough, it was the Taliban who managed to shut down the opium trade by warning farmers that they would face retribution if they did not stop growing opium. In 2001, Afghanistan produced no opium, none.
As the size of the crop soared a few years ago, Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, told a visiting American official (who then told me) that he planned to appeal to the farmers' better nature and convince them that growing opium was not good for the nation. Well, that didn't work.
Two years ago, U.S. officials asked for permission to spray the opium crop with Roundup, a nontoxic herbicide, the same one used to spray coca plants in Colombia. Of course, the Afghan government didn't like this idea, saying it would anger the farmers. More likely it would anger the government officials who sit on fat wallets, enriched by the drug trade. Last year, Karzai formally said no, so NATO dropped the idea.
The United States, Afghanistan's patron state, needs to tell Karzai that the price of continued support is the immediate eradication of the opium crops. Sure, the farmers will be angry. But what's worse: enraging some constituents or standing by while these same people hand over $100 million a year to your enemy?
The Afghan war is not lost. But turning the conflict around will require tough decisions. Close the Pakistani border. Shut down the opium trade. Let's not spend seven more years pursuing an enhanced version of a strategy that has already failed.
Joel Brinkley is a professor of journalism at Stanford University and a former foreign policy correspondent for the New York Times.
Many British battalions need bringing up to strength before they can be sent to Afghanistan. Britain has deployed more than 8,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, making it the second largest contingent in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) after the United States. Nearly 70,000 troops are serving in ISAF helping the Afghan government to fight an insurgency led by the Taliban, who were in power between 1996 and 2001. The US plans to send 20,000 extra forces into southern Afghanistan to help British, Canadian and Dutch soldiers battle militants.
Sending more troops, it's patently clear, is a waste of time, money and lives. In fact, sending more troops to Afghanistan will be about as effective as bailing out a boat without plugging the leak.
Three difficult problems fuel the war in Afghanistan. The United States and its allies have failed in their efforts to control any of them.
How can NATO troops quell an uprising when enemy fighters, suicide bombers, weapons agents and support personnel pour over the border from Pakistan at will, without hindrance, day and night?
How can those troops quell an insurgency when the enemy is buying weaponry and enriching himself with drug money as much as $100 million a year from, the United Nations says, the southern areas of Afghanistan he controls.
And how can Western forces enlist cooperation from the government it is trying to protect when government leaders are also sucking up money from the opium farmers at such a voracious rate that Afghanistan is now classified as the fifth most corrupt nation on Earth?
The obvious answer is that, until these problems are brought under control, the war cannot be won.
The Bush administration's strategy for stopping the flow of enemy fighters - paying the Pakistani government to do it - has been an abject failure costing more than $10 billion so far.
The weakness of this approach has been apparent for more than two years, and yet the money still flows. President-elect Barack Obama has suggested he will stop the program. In fact, the West has to recognize that Pakistan cannot, will not, ever step up to the plate and take out the militants in the tribal areas.
So, what can be done? There's only one answer: Close Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, everywhere but in a few heavily controlled crossing points.
That's impossible, right? The 1,500-mile border is rugged, unmarked and in dispute. Closing it would be infinitely harder than controlling the U.S. border with Mexico.
All of that is true, but there's one big difference: Afghanistan is a war zone. Declare the border closed, patrol it with helicopter gunships, and shoot anyone who tries to cross. That may not seal the border, but it should significantly slow the flow of militants. Dedicate some of those new American troops to this mission. Pakistan might appreciate it, given the cross-border attack on a military base this week.
Now, what about the opium? For years now, Afghanistan has grown enough opium to supply more than 90 percent of the world's market for heroin. All of this has grown up since 2002, just after the U.S. invasion. The year before, paradoxically enough, it was the Taliban who managed to shut down the opium trade by warning farmers that they would face retribution if they did not stop growing opium. In 2001, Afghanistan produced no opium, none.
As the size of the crop soared a few years ago, Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, told a visiting American official (who then told me) that he planned to appeal to the farmers' better nature and convince them that growing opium was not good for the nation. Well, that didn't work.
Two years ago, U.S. officials asked for permission to spray the opium crop with Roundup, a nontoxic herbicide, the same one used to spray coca plants in Colombia. Of course, the Afghan government didn't like this idea, saying it would anger the farmers. More likely it would anger the government officials who sit on fat wallets, enriched by the drug trade. Last year, Karzai formally said no, so NATO dropped the idea.
The United States, Afghanistan's patron state, needs to tell Karzai that the price of continued support is the immediate eradication of the opium crops. Sure, the farmers will be angry. But what's worse: enraging some constituents or standing by while these same people hand over $100 million a year to your enemy?
The Afghan war is not lost. But turning the conflict around will require tough decisions. Close the Pakistani border. Shut down the opium trade. Let's not spend seven more years pursuing an enhanced version of a strategy that has already failed.
Joel Brinkley is a professor of journalism at Stanford University and a former foreign policy correspondent for the New York Times.
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