The vessels are manufactured by DCN and have a capacity of 16 M51 SLBM missiles manufactured by Aerospatiale (now EADS Astrium Space Transportation.)
The French Navy's goal is to operate a force of four SSBNs (as with the Royal Navy's Vanguard fleet), of which two are on patrol at any given time.
*Triomphant : Construction began on 9 June 1989; she was launched on 26 March 1994, and entered active service on 21 March 1997.
*Téméraire : Construction began on 18 December 1993; she was launched on 21 January 1998, and entered active service on 23 December 1999.
*Vigilant : Construction began in 1997; she was launched on 19 September 2003, and entered active service on 26 November 2004.
*Terrible : Construction began on 24 October 2000 was launched on 21 March 2008. She is expected to enter active service by 2010.
Sometime on Feb. 3 or 4, the British HMS Vanguard and France's Le Triomphant collided in the mid-Atlantic. The accident probably happened because the two submarines were not aware of each other. NATO operates a traffic control system that alerts allied nations to the deployment zones of friendly submarines. The system is designed to avoid collisions. But because France is not part of NATO's military command structure, it does not provide information on the location of its mobile nuclear arms to that system, according to Julian Ferguson, who commanded one of Britain's four V-class nuclear submarines until retiring in 2006.
"There is a system for operating areas that are reserved for American, British, Norwegian, Dutch and Canadian communities and if you want to go into someone's area of influence you tell them what you are doing. But if you are not in the NATO military structure you don't have to do that," says Ferguson.
The French Navy confirmed to TIME that it does not give the positions of its nuclear armed submarines to NATO forces: "France does not supply any information regarding the position of its nuclear arms or submarines carrying them, because France considers its nuclear arsenal the most vital element in its defense capabilities," says Jérome Erulin, spokesman for France's Navy. NATO sources told TIME that France is not alone in withholding information about nuclear-armed submarines — the Brits and Americans keep the location of their strategic deterrent secret too. In a prepared statement, a NATO spokesman said: "France uses the same procedures with regard to its submarine fleet as all other allies."
But Ferguson says the French are particularly secretive due to their position outside NATO's command structure. And past policy-level discussions suggest a concern over a lack of communication. In 1994, Britain and France discussed closer co-operation between their navies and a possible carve-up of deployment zones for their nuclear submarine patrols. It took until September 2000 for arrangements to be formalized in the U.K.-French Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement. That agreement called for port visits for British and French nuclear-armed submarines and regular exchanges on nuclear policy.
But it's unclear whether it included the exchange of information about nuclear armed submarine positioning, and many arms experts say it probably did not. "The fact that the collision occurred at all indicates that the two allies need to talk more," says Hans Kristensen, who monitors NATO's weapons for the federation of American scientists.
While the intersection of two sonar-equipped nuclear submarines in a vast ocean may seem an unlikely event even without communication, there are environmental anomalies in the Atlantic that make a collision more likely, according to Ferguson. Submarines on a deterrent mission, for instance, tend to congregate in places where they are unlikely to be found by other submarines and spy-planes. "There are oceanographic factors in which you can be on either side of an ocean front where the temperature is slightly different on your side than the others. Where the gulf stream comes across the Atlantic is a prime point of this. Sometimes these barriers can be quite hard — no sound penetrates at all. And if your business is hiding than you would hide in that vicinity. There is an added risk that given the environmental factors maybe you don't hear another submarine in time to do something about it."
The multiple, city-destroying warheads on the French and British submarines are not at risk of detonation from collision, Ferguson said. But had a nuclear reactor been damaged on either boat, it could have poisoned the crew and spread radioactive waste for miles across the Atlantic.
If in fact the collision could have been prevented by better communication between France and NATO, the revelation comes at a politically sensitive time: France is set to re-join NATO's military infrastructure in April. Its secrecy policy on the location of its nuclear-armed subs could come under fire before then, especially as the French say they will not budge on the issue. Explains Erulin of the French Navy: "Because this is so essential to France's strategic defense interests, this is something that will be maintained even after French is fully reintegrated into NATO's military command structure."
Monday, February 16, 2009
Did France's Secrecy Cause A Nuclear Submarine Collision?
Did France's Secrecy Cause A Nuclear Submarine Collision?
(NSI News Source Info) February 17, 2009: A collision between a British nuclear-powered submarine carrying multiple nuclear warheads and a French nuclear submarine armed with a similar payload may have been the result of lack of communication between France and NATO nations, according to a former British submarine commander whose revelations were partially corroborated by an official at the French navy.The vessels are manufactured by DCN and have a capacity of 16 M51 SLBM missiles manufactured by Aerospatiale (now EADS Astrium Space Transportation.)
The French Navy's goal is to operate a force of four SSBNs (as with the Royal Navy's Vanguard fleet), of which two are on patrol at any given time.
*Triomphant : Construction began on 9 June 1989; she was launched on 26 March 1994, and entered active service on 21 March 1997.
*Téméraire : Construction began on 18 December 1993; she was launched on 21 January 1998, and entered active service on 23 December 1999.
*Vigilant : Construction began in 1997; she was launched on 19 September 2003, and entered active service on 26 November 2004.
*Terrible : Construction began on 24 October 2000 was launched on 21 March 2008. She is expected to enter active service by 2010.
Sometime on Feb. 3 or 4, the British HMS Vanguard and France's Le Triomphant collided in the mid-Atlantic. The accident probably happened because the two submarines were not aware of each other. NATO operates a traffic control system that alerts allied nations to the deployment zones of friendly submarines. The system is designed to avoid collisions. But because France is not part of NATO's military command structure, it does not provide information on the location of its mobile nuclear arms to that system, according to Julian Ferguson, who commanded one of Britain's four V-class nuclear submarines until retiring in 2006.
"There is a system for operating areas that are reserved for American, British, Norwegian, Dutch and Canadian communities and if you want to go into someone's area of influence you tell them what you are doing. But if you are not in the NATO military structure you don't have to do that," says Ferguson.
The French Navy confirmed to TIME that it does not give the positions of its nuclear armed submarines to NATO forces: "France does not supply any information regarding the position of its nuclear arms or submarines carrying them, because France considers its nuclear arsenal the most vital element in its defense capabilities," says Jérome Erulin, spokesman for France's Navy. NATO sources told TIME that France is not alone in withholding information about nuclear-armed submarines — the Brits and Americans keep the location of their strategic deterrent secret too. In a prepared statement, a NATO spokesman said: "France uses the same procedures with regard to its submarine fleet as all other allies."
But Ferguson says the French are particularly secretive due to their position outside NATO's command structure. And past policy-level discussions suggest a concern over a lack of communication. In 1994, Britain and France discussed closer co-operation between their navies and a possible carve-up of deployment zones for their nuclear submarine patrols. It took until September 2000 for arrangements to be formalized in the U.K.-French Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement. That agreement called for port visits for British and French nuclear-armed submarines and regular exchanges on nuclear policy.
But it's unclear whether it included the exchange of information about nuclear armed submarine positioning, and many arms experts say it probably did not. "The fact that the collision occurred at all indicates that the two allies need to talk more," says Hans Kristensen, who monitors NATO's weapons for the federation of American scientists.
While the intersection of two sonar-equipped nuclear submarines in a vast ocean may seem an unlikely event even without communication, there are environmental anomalies in the Atlantic that make a collision more likely, according to Ferguson. Submarines on a deterrent mission, for instance, tend to congregate in places where they are unlikely to be found by other submarines and spy-planes. "There are oceanographic factors in which you can be on either side of an ocean front where the temperature is slightly different on your side than the others. Where the gulf stream comes across the Atlantic is a prime point of this. Sometimes these barriers can be quite hard — no sound penetrates at all. And if your business is hiding than you would hide in that vicinity. There is an added risk that given the environmental factors maybe you don't hear another submarine in time to do something about it."
The multiple, city-destroying warheads on the French and British submarines are not at risk of detonation from collision, Ferguson said. But had a nuclear reactor been damaged on either boat, it could have poisoned the crew and spread radioactive waste for miles across the Atlantic.
If in fact the collision could have been prevented by better communication between France and NATO, the revelation comes at a politically sensitive time: France is set to re-join NATO's military infrastructure in April. Its secrecy policy on the location of its nuclear-armed subs could come under fire before then, especially as the French say they will not budge on the issue. Explains Erulin of the French Navy: "Because this is so essential to France's strategic defense interests, this is something that will be maintained even after French is fully reintegrated into NATO's military command structure."
The vessels are manufactured by DCN and have a capacity of 16 M51 SLBM missiles manufactured by Aerospatiale (now EADS Astrium Space Transportation.)
The French Navy's goal is to operate a force of four SSBNs (as with the Royal Navy's Vanguard fleet), of which two are on patrol at any given time.
*Triomphant : Construction began on 9 June 1989; she was launched on 26 March 1994, and entered active service on 21 March 1997.
*Téméraire : Construction began on 18 December 1993; she was launched on 21 January 1998, and entered active service on 23 December 1999.
*Vigilant : Construction began in 1997; she was launched on 19 September 2003, and entered active service on 26 November 2004.
*Terrible : Construction began on 24 October 2000 was launched on 21 March 2008. She is expected to enter active service by 2010.
Sometime on Feb. 3 or 4, the British HMS Vanguard and France's Le Triomphant collided in the mid-Atlantic. The accident probably happened because the two submarines were not aware of each other. NATO operates a traffic control system that alerts allied nations to the deployment zones of friendly submarines. The system is designed to avoid collisions. But because France is not part of NATO's military command structure, it does not provide information on the location of its mobile nuclear arms to that system, according to Julian Ferguson, who commanded one of Britain's four V-class nuclear submarines until retiring in 2006.
"There is a system for operating areas that are reserved for American, British, Norwegian, Dutch and Canadian communities and if you want to go into someone's area of influence you tell them what you are doing. But if you are not in the NATO military structure you don't have to do that," says Ferguson.
The French Navy confirmed to TIME that it does not give the positions of its nuclear armed submarines to NATO forces: "France does not supply any information regarding the position of its nuclear arms or submarines carrying them, because France considers its nuclear arsenal the most vital element in its defense capabilities," says Jérome Erulin, spokesman for France's Navy. NATO sources told TIME that France is not alone in withholding information about nuclear-armed submarines — the Brits and Americans keep the location of their strategic deterrent secret too. In a prepared statement, a NATO spokesman said: "France uses the same procedures with regard to its submarine fleet as all other allies."
But Ferguson says the French are particularly secretive due to their position outside NATO's command structure. And past policy-level discussions suggest a concern over a lack of communication. In 1994, Britain and France discussed closer co-operation between their navies and a possible carve-up of deployment zones for their nuclear submarine patrols. It took until September 2000 for arrangements to be formalized in the U.K.-French Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement. That agreement called for port visits for British and French nuclear-armed submarines and regular exchanges on nuclear policy.
But it's unclear whether it included the exchange of information about nuclear armed submarine positioning, and many arms experts say it probably did not. "The fact that the collision occurred at all indicates that the two allies need to talk more," says Hans Kristensen, who monitors NATO's weapons for the federation of American scientists.
While the intersection of two sonar-equipped nuclear submarines in a vast ocean may seem an unlikely event even without communication, there are environmental anomalies in the Atlantic that make a collision more likely, according to Ferguson. Submarines on a deterrent mission, for instance, tend to congregate in places where they are unlikely to be found by other submarines and spy-planes. "There are oceanographic factors in which you can be on either side of an ocean front where the temperature is slightly different on your side than the others. Where the gulf stream comes across the Atlantic is a prime point of this. Sometimes these barriers can be quite hard — no sound penetrates at all. And if your business is hiding than you would hide in that vicinity. There is an added risk that given the environmental factors maybe you don't hear another submarine in time to do something about it."
The multiple, city-destroying warheads on the French and British submarines are not at risk of detonation from collision, Ferguson said. But had a nuclear reactor been damaged on either boat, it could have poisoned the crew and spread radioactive waste for miles across the Atlantic.
If in fact the collision could have been prevented by better communication between France and NATO, the revelation comes at a politically sensitive time: France is set to re-join NATO's military infrastructure in April. Its secrecy policy on the location of its nuclear-armed subs could come under fire before then, especially as the French say they will not budge on the issue. Explains Erulin of the French Navy: "Because this is so essential to France's strategic defense interests, this is something that will be maintained even after French is fully reintegrated into NATO's military command structure."
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