(NSI News Source Info) February 6, 2009: The nation should be outraged by the news that military officials knew as far back as 1994 that the Humvee vehicle was a "deathtrap" against roadside bombs.
According to a new inspector general's report, the Pentagon knew the Humvee didn't have enough armor to protect its occupants against improvised explosive de
vices, a shortcoming that later had devastating effects against American military personnel in the Iraq war.
The inspector general's report says that officials from both the Army and Marines assessed the Humvee performance following the first Gulf War and the U.S. expedition into Somalia and found it lacking, to say the least. A 1994 report found the Humvees "even with a mine-protection retrofit kit developed for Somalia remained a deathtrap in the event of an anti-tank mine detonation."
The assessment proved to be chillingly accurate. Troops in Iraq have sustained four times the casualties from roadside bombs while riding in Humvees than in the newer Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles.
With the information available 15 years ago, why didn't the Pentagon act upon it then and start development of a Humvee replacement?
Defense analyst John Pike of globalsecurity.org told USA Today that development of a mine-resistant vehicle in the 1990s wasn't seen as a "good career move." The military already had spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the Humvees. Military planners back then also assumed future wars would be fast-moving blitzes rather than long ground campaigns.
This was a tragic miscalculation. Do those who made those bad decisions back then have trouble sleeping now at night? If they don't, they should.
Unfortunately, the devotion to the Humvees — with their low clearance, flat bottoms and light weight — didn't end in the 1990s.
The recent report looked at the Marine Corps response in the early years of the Iraq war. Despite repeated requests from field commanders in 2005 for MRAPs, the Marine's Combat Development Command didn't either create a plan to field the vehicles or obtain funding for them. The inspector general is now looking into the Army's response during th
e same time period.
Is it possible to hold anyone to account for these wrongheaded decisions? If so, let's do it.
Additionally, the Pentagon must take these reports to heart and learn from past mistakes. Our troops, their safety and our military objectives should take precedent over blind loyalty to expensive equipment, especially the ineffective kind.
vices, a shortcoming that later had devastating effects against American military personnel in the Iraq war.
The inspector general's report says that officials from both the Army and Marines assessed the Humvee performance following the first Gulf War and the U.S. expedition into Somalia and found it lacking, to say the least. A 1994 report found the Humvees "even with a mine-protection retrofit kit developed for Somalia remained a deathtrap in the event of an anti-tank mine detonation."
The assessment proved to be chillingly accurate. Troops in Iraq have sustained four times the casualties from roadside bombs while riding in Humvees than in the newer Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles.
With the information available 15 years ago, why didn't the Pentagon act upon it then and start development of a Humvee replacement?
Defense analyst John Pike of globalsecurity.org told USA Today that development of a mine-resistant vehicle in the 1990s wasn't seen as a "good career move." The military already had spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the Humvees. Military planners back then also assumed future wars would be fast-moving blitzes rather than long ground campaigns.
This was a tragic miscalculation. Do those who made those bad decisions back then have trouble sleeping now at night? If they don't, they should.
Unfortunately, the devotion to the Humvees — with their low clearance, flat bottoms and light weight — didn't end in the 1990s.
The recent report looked at the Marine Corps response in the early years of the Iraq war. Despite repeated requests from field commanders in 2005 for MRAPs, the Marine's Combat Development Command didn't either create a plan to field the vehicles or obtain funding for them. The inspector general is now looking into the Army's response during th
e same time period.
Is it possible to hold anyone to account for these wrongheaded decisions? If so, let's do it.
Additionally, the Pentagon must take these reports to heart and learn from past mistakes. Our troops, their safety and our military objectives should take precedent over blind loyalty to expensive equipment, especially the ineffective kind.Is Humvee A "Deathtrap"? Of Course Not!!!!!!!! The Whole Issue Has Been Politicalized
British Forces existing modified Land Rover (Photo/Image By NSI: Land Rover aforementioned) being maintained in Iraq and Afghanistan. The viewers can judge for themselves whether Humvee or Land Rover are protective vehicles.
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