Door on arms sales not closed yet
Sunday, Jul 20, 2008: Among the many challenges facing the United States in an election year is the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. Before he leaves office, President Bush must decide whether or not to approve various major sales to the island, including 60 additional F-16s, Patriot PAC III missiles and Apache and Blackhawk helicopters. At present, the Department of State and the National Security Council are holding up these sales. This is an issue which deserves President Bush's immediate attention.
A little history helps illuminate what's going on. In 2001, shortly after President Bush took office, he approved in principle several billion dollars in new arms sales to Taiwan. This decision reflected the President's concern for China's military build-up and a continuing U.S. commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act, which obligates the U.S. to provide the island with weapons to defend itself.
During the eight-year tenure of former Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian, political infighting between the ruling Democratic Progressive Party and the opposition Kuomintang stalled the funding for these weapons purchases. At the same time, Mr. Chen's independence-leaning policies angered China's leaders. Washington was displeased by Mr. Chen's inability to push through the arms purchases, and because his actions and outspokenness interfered with improving U.S.-China relations.
The damage those eight years did to U.S.-Taiwan relations was considerable. Taiwan's relative air, missile defense and antisubmarine warfare capabilities fell further behind as important Taiwan military acquisitions were postponed. China, however, purchased advanced weapons from the Soviet Union and increased funding for its own military research and development programs.
Equally important, mutual confidence between Taipei and Washington may have been permanently weakened. U.S. leaders lost confidence in Taiwan's leaders at a time when the U.S. was becoming increasingly dependent on improved U.S.-China relations. In Taiwan, more than ever, domestic political considerations took precedence over national security issues. And although last year the Kuomintang-dominated legislature in Taipei finally passed a defense budget funding many new arms purchases, the damage to U.S.-Taiwan relations already had been done. The U.S. had become increasingly reluctant to take the heat from China over weapons sales it was not confident Taiwan would follow through on.
When Taiwan's current president, Ma Ying-jeou, assumed office in May, he ushered in a policy of Taiwan-China détente and subsequently has expressed his desire for resumed purchases of U.S. arms. Still, the lingering fallout from the previous eight years and President Bush's personal reluctance to anger Beijing continue to hold up various pending arms sales.
Whether or not President Bush approves some or all arms sales after the Beijing Olympics in August -- he will attend the opening ceremony -- remains an open question. High-ranking officials at State and the White House fear major U.S. arms sales, even then, would undermine Taiwan-China détente and do major damage to U.S.-China relations. They also ask why Taiwan needs more weapons packages now. Why not let the next U.S. President address this issue, while the sale of other, less provocative systems, training and spare parts continue?
Herein lies the crux of the problem. How much risk can the U.S. take with Taiwan's security? If it was certain that Taiwan-China détente would go forward without sacrificing Taiwan's young and still fragile democracy, none of this would be of concern.
Beijing has proven all too often, however, that it will demand much and give little and that it sees the use and threat of force as an instrument of diplomacy. Has it demonstrated otherwise? Taiwan democratically elected a president who ran on a platform of détente with China. What has changed on the China side of the equation?
Until Beijing removes short- and medium-range ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan and reduces the number of combat aircraft and troops on its side of the Taiwan Strait, why should the U.S. delay in responding to Taiwan's requests for arms purchases? It will take months for the next administration to sort out its China/Taiwan policies, only delaying important decisions further. In the meantime, China's pressure on the U.S. will only increase as it continues to finance U.S. debt and leaves Washington worried that it won't cooperate with it in the international arena if the U.S. proceeds with major arms sales.
As Taiwan enters this challenging period of détente with China, it needs strong U.S. moral and material support more than ever. By taking action on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan before he leaves office, President Bush would bolster a democratic Taiwan and make it much easier for his successor to withstand pressure from Beijing as arms sales contracts are concluded and weapons systems are delivered. At the same time, President Ma must assure Washington that he is committed to Taiwan's defense and that if Washington approves the sale of F-16s and other major weapons, Taiwan will follow through with signed contracts and adequate funding.
It is time to demonstrate clearly that, while the U.S. supports Taiwan-China détente, it stands firmly behind Taiwan's democracy.
Washington has been sending various messages through different channels, making it safe to say that the US is not interested in blocking arms sales to Taiwan.
Reports HAVE indicated that the US is planning to halt arms sales to Taiwan, and it is meaningless to discuss responsibility at this stage of the game. Perhaps the government should start brainstorming and try to come up with some ways to coax the White House to change it’s mind.
President Ma Ying-jeou and key national security officials have been more active recently in talks with the US about arms sales. They know that if US President George W. Bush’s administration freezes arms sales to Taiwan, they will face even greater difficulty restarting sales after the election of either Republican presidential candidate John McCain or Democrat rival Barack Obama.In the past, the Democrats have approved fewer arms deals with Taiwan than the Republicans. Theoretically, a US president should decide the time, quality and quantity of arms sales in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.However, the US president has great discretionary powers. Therefore, even if he does nothing, he does not violate the law. Take former presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, both Democrats. They seldom sold advanced weapons to Taiwan and Clinton even considered temporarily stopping all sales of weapon parts to Taiwan after then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) made his controversial “state-to-state” statement.As for Republican presidents, although Ronald Reagan was forced to sign the 1982 Sino-US Joint Communique; because of changes in the international situation, he still sold a number of important weapons systems to Taiwan and allowed Taiwan to build the Indigenous Defense Fighter with US help. In addition, George Bush sold Taiwan F-16A/Bs and E-2T early warning aircraft and George W. Bush approved eight arms deals at once.Washington has been sending various messages through different channels, making it safe to say that the US is not interested in blocking arms sales to Taiwan. On the contrary, the US wants the Ma administration to officially declare its stance on arms procurement.First of all, American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Director Stephen Young has been in close contact with leaders of both the pan-blue and pan-green camps, making every effort to push through arms sales. The alleged misunderstanding between Taipei and Washington is a great insult to Young. Washington sent former White House chief of staff Andrew Card to congratulate Ma at his inauguration and AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt has visited Taiwan twice since the presidential election. Washington should understand Ma’s determination to increase Taiwan’s defense budget to 3 percent of GDP and his stance on arms sales. During former president Chen Shui-bian’s administration, Chen purposely tied the three most expensive arms deals together: submarines, anti-submarine aircraft and Patriot missiles.The Democratic Progressive Party even talked about selling government-owned land and issuing government bonds to finance the procurements. The pan-blue camp had no choice but to boycott the deals and some US officials took this to mean that they were against arms sales. Through partisan negotiations, the legislature finally passed a three-in-one procurement package after reducing the total value and establishing an annual budget for it. It is highly unlikely that Washington is unaware of the budget the legislature passed.When Chen pushed for the UN membership referendum ahead of the presidential election, the Bush administration refused to sell F-16C/Ds and froze other arms sales to Taiwan, so as not to affect Sino-US cooperation and to avoid escalating the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, things are different now. The US sincerely hopes that Taiwan can strengthen its defense capabilities and therefore it should not freeze arms sales. Otherwise, why would Ma increase Taiwan’s defense budget? The US hopes that Taiwan will strengthen its defense capacity on the one hand, while improving cross-strait relations on the other. From its own experience, Washington knows that national strength is the biggest bargaining chip in negotiations. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal last month, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that as Taiwan improves relations with China, we must not forget that the US is still an important ally of Taiwan. Her comment was made intentionally to show that arms sales to Taiwan remain open. Beijing is trying to “systematize” the freeze of arms sales through US Ambassador to China Clark Randt and Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi. China has always wanted to interfere with US arms sales to Taiwan and would certainly stick its nose in given the chance. Nevertheless, in accordance with Reagan’s six assurances to Taipei, Washington must not allow Beijing to interfere with arms deals between the US and Taiwan.Based on past experience, when the US makes a decision, it can simply inform Taiwan without giving any explanation. Yet Washington allowed Ma to send key security, military and diplomatic officials to participate in the Taiwan-US military meeting in Monterey, California, which opened on Monday. It has also allowed a delegation from the Foreign and National Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan to visit Washington and meet US security and defense officials later this month, showing that the US has not closed the door on arms sales to Taiwan.It is difficult for Taiwan to make its stance on arms sales known because we do not have control over the matter. Taiwan should not allow Washington to demand sky-high prices or offer weapons systems that do not meet our defense needs. Making Washington understand Taiwan’s determination and need for improving our military without hurting the long-term friendship between the US and Taiwan will require great diplomatic and political skill.
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) – Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, USA
July 20, 2008: The US Marine Corps selected General Dynamics Land Systems to develop a new Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) in 1996. The name was changed from advanced amphibious assault vehicle to Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) in September 2003.
The EFV will replace the current amphibious assault vehicle which entered service in 1972. The current requirement is for 573 vehicles comprising personnel variants (EFVP1) and command variants (EFVC1).
The expeditionary fighting vehicle provides the Marine Corp's Marine Rifle Squad with tactical mobility in amphibious operations and in the subsequent ground combat manoeuvres. On land the EFV will carry out manoeuvre and combat operations as part of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force.
"The EFV will replace the current US Marine Corps amphibious assault vehicle which entered service in 1972."
The vehicles will be launched from US Navy amphibious ships at a ship-to-shore distance up to 25nm, i.e. beyond the visual horizon. The vehicles can transit to shore at high speed and travel inland up to 200 miles without refuelling. Once refuelled the vehicles have a range up to 340 miles.
The EFV began System Development and Demonstration (SDD) in 2001. In March 2007, General Dynamics was awarded a continuation of the SDD phase with funding for a Design for Reliability (DFR) phase to September 2008.
Due to reliability issues and concerns about excessive weight, the USMC is negotiating with General Dynamics to repeat the SDD phase and award a second SDD contract, expected in mid-2008. The second SDD phase would complete in 2011 and there are likely to be significant delays from the projected initial operating capability (IOC) in 2014.
The IOC will cover systems for three platoons. One EFV platoon, for marine expeditionary unit deployment, will consist of 13 personnel vehicles and one command vehicle. One platoon will be dedicated to new equipment training and a third platoon will be in production.
PERSONNEL VARIANT (EFVP1)
Both the personnel and the command variant provide voice communications and standard Variable Message Format (VMF) and United States Message Text Format (USMTF) digital information including messages and overlay data.
The vehicles are operated by a crew of three, vehicle commander, gunner and driver. The personnel variant carries 17 fully equipped marines, i.e. a rifle squad of 17 Marines each with individual combat equipment. The vehicle has internal stowage for each marine's ammunition and march-load equipment, i.e. the load for the prosecution of combat operations for extended periods with access to daily resupply.
The vehicle will also be capable of carrying other crews and equipment, and has a cargo capacity of 8,150lb in lieu of infantrymen.
COMMAND VARIANT (EFVC1)
The command variant vehicle, EFVC1, is a command and control platform at battalion and regimental levels and carries the three vehicle crew plus the battalion and regimental staff.
The vehicle is linked to the US Marine Corp's C2I (Command, Control and Intelligence) and the USMC fire support.
The vehicle accommodates the three vehicle crew stations and seven command crew stations. The command variant vehicle is armed with a 7.62mm general-purpose machine gun. The troop commander's station is equipped with voice and data communications, a digital map display and a display downloaded from the vehicles' thermal imaging systems.
CONSTRUCTION
The EFV is of a planing hull design for high speed across water and is constructed of 2519-T87 aluminium, a high-strength aluminium-copper alloy. Integral spall protection is installed and blast-protected seats are fitted. The hull provides protection against armour-piercing rounds and fragmentation devices.
Access to the troop compartment is via a hydraulically operated rear ramp. A troop door is also fitted into the ramp and two sliding hatches are installed in the roof over the troop compartment. The engine compartment is located in the centre of the vehicle and the troop compartment is in the rear of the vehicle up to the sides of the engine compartment. The troop compartment is fitted with armour protected padded seats and seat belts. It is air-conditioned and fitted with an overpressure collective protection system against nuclear, chemical and biological warfare.
WEAPONS
The electronically powered two-man mk46 turret on the personnel variant accommodates the commander on the right and gunner on the left, a fire control system and the main and coaxial weapons.
The mk46 turret incorporates a 30/40mm ATK mk44 Bushmaster automatic gun which has a firing rate of 200 rounds a minute and can fire all standard NATO 30/40mm ammunition.
A general purpose M240 7.62mm machine gun with 600 rounds of ready-to-use ammunition is mounted coaxially with the main gun. Smoke grenade launchers are installed on the hull.
FIRE CONTROL
The vehicle has fire-on-the-move capability and the hit probability is 90% at a range of 1,200m. The turret is equipped with a compact modular sight developed by General Dynamics which includes a thermal imaging sight, laser rangefinder and Kearfott Dual Axis Head Assembly (DAHA). The DAHA is gyroscopically stabilised to 50mrad in azimuth and in elevation and provides the stabilised line of sight for the weapon fire control system on vehicle.
L3 Communications, Cincinnati Electronics was awarded a contract for a 'drop-in' replacement for the thermal sight on the EFV in September 2007. The sight is based on L3, CE's NightConqueror thermal imager, which uses a medium-wave (3.6-5.0 micron) indium antimonide staring focal plane array.
The commander's station is equipped with five forward and one rear-facing periscope sights providing a view of 360° azimuth.
ENGINE
The EFV is powered by a 2,700hp dual-use (for land and water) MTU MT883 Ka-523 diesel engine. The 12-cylinder diesel engine is mounted in the centre of the vehicle. On metalled roads the maximum speed is over 45mph.
The actively damped hydro-pneumatic suspension units, supplied by General Dynamics, and the vehicle's lightweight band track reduce the noise and vibration and give a more comfortable and fuel-efficient ride for the crew.
The continuous moulded lightweight band track was developed by Goodyear and provides traction and strength comparable to the heavier, standard block-type track. The vehicle has seven pairs of road wheels and hydro-pneumatic suspension units fitted with automatic ride height control.
About 80% of the amphibious vehicle's mission is performed on land and 20% in water. The vehicles can be deployed in high-speed amphibious landings in seas up to sea state 3.
In order to sustain movement in the transition between water and land drive, for example in movement in water over high corals reefs which would otherwise cause dangerous hang-ups for amphibious assault vehicles, the vehicle is equipped with a power transfer module supplied by Allison Transmission Division.
The power transfer module automatically shares engine power between waterjets and the vehicle tracks according to how it senses the need. The powertrain and the driveline absorb the transition shock as the vehicle rapidly shifts from one operating mode to another while the vehicle traverses obstacles such as coral mounds in the water.
When the vehicle is afloat, the engine couples via the Power Transfer Module to Honeywell counter-rotating 23in water jets mounted on both sides of the vehicle. In endurance tests and in high water speed tests the vehicles have regularly demonstrated high water speeds of more than 25kt in Significant Wave Heights (SWH) of more than 2ft. In the water, the prow plate opens forwards, the flaps over the water jets open and the hydropneumatic suspension retracts. Five bilge pumps, two electric and three hydraulically driven, are installed to maintain buoyancy.
