Showing posts with label Drugs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Drugs. Show all posts

Thursday, February 10, 2011

DTN News - DEFENSE NEWS: Bolivia Buys More Arms To Fight Drug Traffickers

DTN News - DEFENSE NEWS: Bolivia Buys More Arms To Fight Drug Traffickers
**Related News dated Jan 19, 2011 - DTN News - DEFENSE NEWS: Bolivia To Receive Combat Aircraft From China
Source: DTN News - - This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources UPI
(NSI News Source Info) LA PAZ, Bolivia, - February 10, 2011: Bolivia is buying six Chinese combat aircraft as part of its effort to correct its image as a country that isn't doing as much as it should to cut off the narcotics trail to North America.

Political feuds between Bolivia and its neighbors and a stormy relationship with Washington hasn't helped Bolivia's campaign against drug overlords who regularly challenge the authority of the state.

Organized crime operators use aircraft to move drugs with impunity in a twin challenge to the government's control of the national airspace and its ineffectual crackdown on fearless drug traffickers in a transnational, multimillion-dollar illicit trade.

After President Evo Morales ordered the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration to leave Bolivia in 2008, accusing U.S. officials of complicity in the drug trade as well as political troubles, the anti-narcotics fight fizzled out. U.S. officials dismissed both charges.

After the row with U.S. anti-narcotics officials, who are active elsewhere in Latin America, particularly Colombia, Bolivia has had even less success than before in stopping the powerful drug overlords.

The deal with China gives Beijing a lucrative entry into the Latin American arms market. Bolivia will pay at least $58 million -- most of it covered by a Chinese government loan -- for six K-8 Karakorum jets that are to be delivered by April.

The K-8 is a low-budget attack aircraft that doubles as a trainer. Also called Hongdu JL-8 or Nanchang JL-8 it is a two-seat intermediate jet initially built jointly by China Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation and state-run Pakistan Aeronautical Complex. China's Hongdu Aviation Industry Corp. is the main contractor for the plane.

Original manufacturing plans for the plane called for some U.S.-made parts but, as difficulties arose over the inclusion of U.S. components, China and Pakistan decided to eliminate those parts and do everything themselves.

Analysts said the deal would be significant for Brazil because Brazilian manufacturer Embraer sees China as a major competitor in small multipurpose aircraft.

Bolivia operates a number of training and cargo planes but none that can face up to the technically advanced drug gangs flying their own aircraft and other paramilitary equipment.

Officials said Bolivia hopes the inclusion of combat aircraft in its anti-narcotics arsenal will discourage cocoa plantations and cross-border drug smuggling.

China has also given Bolivia 10,000 AK-47 assault rifles, cited in professional military media and believed to part of a $60 million deal.

Bolivia is also in negotiation with Russia to buy up to 10 Russian-built MS-7 cargo helicopters, possibly on easy credit terms.

Media reports calculated the government's defense acquisitions are reflected in increased defense spending, which rose by more than 120 percent during the last decade. A survey by El Deber newspaper said the increased spending on military equipment ran counter to the government's pledge to improve education and health and reduce the poverty gap.

Bolivian Defense Minister Ruben Saavedra said the increase in defense spending was also due to an increase in administrative and personnel costs and salary increases for the armed forces.

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  • Tuesday, September 21, 2010

    DTN News: The River Of Afghan Corruption And Its American Source

    DTN News: The River Of Afghan Corruption And Its American Source
    (NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - September 21, 2010: The distinguished American ambassador glibly explains the unprecedented security situation in Afghanistan, blaming the entire mess upon the last 30 years without accepting US responsibility for causing it all. We created the conflict in the first place, by bringing together the criminal enterprises of international arms dealers, opium suppliers, suitcases full of cash, and the most dangerous militants we could gather together from Africa and the Middle East into a “pipeline” which flowed into Afghanistan and from there throughout the region, before abandoning it all to start the first Iraq war. We “abandoned” the war and the Afghan and Pakistani people, but we left the pipeline intact, running at full capacity for the past thirty years. Richard Holbrooke admitted that the core of the problem was the “huge amount of ‘international contracts,’ particularly American military contracts which brought such a lucrative opportunity for . . . this kind of thing,” but he didn’t bother to mention that all of the contracts were initially American, or that the pipeline of weapons, drugs, and militants that supplied the materiel to the contractors, was our pipeline, or that it was still in operation. This is diplomatic deception of the highest order, meant to provide cover for a criminal war and the long-standing criminal American foreign policy which made it all possible. This is the only real problem with Afghanistan, the fact that the governments which are waging war there are run by the same people who have created the dangerous situation to begin with. This is the only problem that affects everything else in the Afghan field of conflict. Cut the American/Pakistani pipeline and the war either ends outright, or slowly winds down, as the flow of money, weapons and foreign fighters simply dries-up, along with the Afghan opium trade which pays for it all. In spite of intimate knowledge of all of this corruption we have sown, Holbrooke places the “cart before the horse,” claiming that the corruption is the problem, and not the deluge of cash, weapons and drugs which fuels the corruption. Without this enormous financial backing, the warlords and drug lords of Afghanistan would be “small potatoes.” There is no limit to American hypocrisy or the galling nerve of American diplomats like Holbrooke, who front for the empire builders as we wage covert war upon the entire world and call it “foreign aid,” or promoting “democracy” or stability.
    Peter Chamberlin may be contacted at peterchamberlin@naharnet.com. Email Online Journal Editor *This article is being posted from Toronto, Canada By DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News, contact: dtnnews@ymail.com *To read this article in original form "The River Of Afghan Corruption And Its American Source ", for link click here.
    Disclaimer statement
    Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information supplied herein, DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News cannot be held responsible for any errors or omissions. Unless otherwise indicated, opinions expressed herein are those of the author of the page and do not necessarily represent the corporate views of DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News.

    Wednesday, August 18, 2010

    DTN News: Sochi Summit Seeks To Break Curse Of Afghan Heroin

    DTN News: Sochi Summit Seeks To Break Curse Of Afghan Heroin
    Source: DTN News - - This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources including RT
    (NSI News Source Info) MOSCOW, Russia- August 18, 2010: Afghanistan is the world's largest opium producer, and analysts say a regional approach is the key to winning the global war on drugs. It is the second four-nation meeting of its kind. The first one was held in Tajikistan’s capital of Dushanbe last year. Back then leaders focused on cross border projects, security issues and economic recovery of the region. This year the event’s agenda remains the same. Russia is reluctant to get involved in military action in Afghanistan, but continues to seek a role in settling the conflict. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has met with his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai. Russia has been showing its commitment to financially assist the region and Afghanistan in particular. Just several months ago, Russia wrote off the last portion of Afghan debt – $12 billion overall. In connection with this, Russia’s president announced today at the summit that “Russia firmly supports all efforts on the part of Afghanistan to restore peace in the country. We also support the Afghan government’s fight against terror and are ready to provide any help needed to tackle the problem,” Medvedev said. For Russia, Central Asia is a traditional sphere of interest and it has always been sensitive to the instability of the region caused by the Afghan problem. Drug trafficking and Islamic radicalism spreading from Afghanistan are the main security threats. In addition, the drug trade is the main source of finance for Afghan militants. Russia, which became the world’s largest consumer of heroin after the US-military alliance occupied Afghanistan, is striving to break up the drug channeling. An estimated 30,000 people die in Russia annually due to drug abuse, a third of the total world drug death toll. Opium and heroin are pouring into Russia and further into Europe by way of the northern route over the Afghan-Tajik border. Also, Tajiks need no visas to visit Russia, which eases the risk for drug traffickers. Tightening security on the border is one of the central issues of the four-sided talks. President Medvedev is also pushing energy and transportation projects to facilitate economic recovery in the region. Last year Russia finished construction of a major hydroelectric power plant in Tajikistan which produces 12% of all the country’s energy needs. Several other ambitious projects with multi-million investments are being discussed at the talks. Sealing off Afghan’s heroin flow Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan stretches 1,200 kilometres, which is approximately 750 miles. Tajik border guards are being trained by the Russian Federal Security Service under a deal signed back in 2004. The use of different weapons, physical education, combat tactics, and survival techniques are all part of the course. Turning a boy into a soldier is a hard task in itself, but getting him ready to guard one of the trickiest borders in Central Asia is even more difficult. Training sessions are held every day regardless of the time of year. Despite extreme summer heat the troops train in full combat harness to get accustomed to it since it is what they will have to wear on the job. Every six months trained soldiers are sent to guard the border while new conscripts arrive, continuing the cycle. “Terrorism, drug and arms smuggling, and human trafficking have put this region in the global spotlight. That is why there are currently over 20 international organizations, including the UN and the OSCE working in Tajikistan alone,” informs representative of Russian Federal Security Service in Dushanbe Anatoly Mikheyev. Afghanistan produces over 90% of all opium in the world. According to the UN, the death toll from opiates in NATO countries is five times more than all the NATO soldiers who died in Afghanistan since 2001. In Russia, the government says Afghan heroin kills more people in just one year than the whole ten-year-long Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan did. The USSR’s decade in the country resulted in the loss of approximately 15,000 troops. According to Rashid Abdullo, an independent political analyst and the author of dozens of articles about Tajikistan, the flow of drugs is unlikely to stop no matter how strong the border is. “This problem may have various technical solutions. But it will never be fully solved while there is fighting in Afghanistan and global demand for opiates,” said Abdullo. Afghan opium production has grown by a third since the US-led invasion in 2001. It is thought the billion dollar black market brings more money than all foreign investments put together. That is why it is unlikely that even the most advanced border-control system possible would solve the problem completely; for the smugglers, business is simply too good. Aleksandr Selivanov from the Moscow State University for the Humanities believes that there is no way to resolve the situation in Afghanistan without improving the security situation. “It’s not possible to do so because there is currently no stability, and if there is no stability, there is no control,”Selivanov told RT. “A way out could be just building the ring of security and stability with the help of all stake holders in the region, in Central Asia. Mainly, it’s Russia, it’s Afghanistan, it’s Pakistan, and of course it should be, in a way, Iran, [as well as] Tajikistan.” “I don’t think [it is possible to solve the problem by just destroying the poppy fields], because opium makes 52% of the Afghan GDP, and in the heroin market its record is 92% of the world market, so the whole economy is based on the drug market,” Selivanov noted.
    *This article is being posted from Toronto, Canada By DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News, contact:dtnnews@ymail.com

    Sunday, July 04, 2010

    DTN News: Afghanistan Drug Sweep Leaves 63 Dead

    DTN News: Afghanistan Drug Sweep Leaves 63 Dead
    Source: DTN News / The Associated Press
    (NSI News Source Info) KABUL, Afghanistan - July 5, 2010: The Afghan government says 63 drug smugglers and militants have been killed and 14.5 tonnes of drugs and drug-making chemicals have been destroyed in southern Afghanistan. The Ministry of Interior said Sunday that 10 other men involved in the drug trade, including some foreigners, were arrested in a two-day operation conducted by a counternarcotics unit assisted by coalition forces along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan. The ministry said 14 Afghan civilians being held by the militants and smugglers were freed during the operation that ended Sunday at Baramcha in southern Helmand province. Authorities said they also confiscated a cache of weapons, explosives and suicide vests and destroyed two drug laboratories.

    Sunday, February 28, 2010

    DTN News: Afghanistan TODAY February 28, 2010 ~ Russia Blames Nato For Heroin Surge From Afghanistan

    DTN News: Afghanistan TODAY February 28, 2010 ~ Russia Blames Nato For Heroin Surge From Afghanistan Source: DTN News / BBC (NSI News Source Info) MOSCOW, Russia - February 28, 2010: The head of Russia's federal drug control agency has accused Nato of not doing enough to curb the production of heroin in Afghanistan. Victor Ivanov said at least 30,000 people died in Russia every year from heroin, 90% of it from Afghanistan. He blamed the Obama administration for ending a military drive to destroy opium poppy crops in Afghan fields. The US said the practice was alienating farmers and driving them to support the Taliban. This is not the first time Mr Ivanov has lambasted Nato for failing to stamp out drug production in Afghanistan. He said leaving poppy fields guaranteed immunity for drug producers. Russia says the consequence has been a flood of cheap heroin in to Central Asia and Russia. Mr Ivanov said drug production in Afghanistan was now a global destabilising factor, particularly for Russia. Russia is believed to have around five million drug addicts, half of whom are addicted to heroin.

    Wednesday, January 13, 2010

    DTN News: Mexico TODAY January 13, 2010 ~ Mexico’s Deadliest Day In Drug War, 69 Killed In 24 Hours

    DTN News: Mexico TODAY January 13, 2010 ~ Mexico’s Deadliest Day In Drug War, 69 Killed In 24 Hours *Source: DTN News / Int'l Media (NSI News Source Info) MEXICO CITY, Mexico - January 13, 2010: Mexico opened the new year with what could be its most dubious distinction yet in the 3-year-old battle against drug trafficking — 69 murders in one day. Mexican Federal Police escort Teodoro Garcia Simental, known as "El Teo" or "Tres Letras", a member of Tijuana cartels after being presented to the media in Mexico City January 12, 2010. Mexican police on Tuesday captured Garcia Simental, a drug kingpin known for having the corpses of tortured rivals dissolved in acid and blamed for much of a surge in violence in the northern border city of Tijuana, police said.
    The country resembled a grim, statistical dart board on Saturday as law enforcement and media reported the deaths from various regions, including 26 in Ciudad Juarez, 13 in and around Mexico City and 10 in the city of Chihuahua.
    More than 6,500 drug-related killings made 2009 the bloodiest year since President Felipe Calderon declared war on the cartels in late 2006 and deployed 45,000 soldiers to fight organized crime, according to death tallies by San Diego’s Trans-Border Institute.
    Two weeks into 2010, gang bloodshed is becoming more grotesque as drug lords ramp up their attempts at intimidation.
    Last week a victim’s face was peeled from skull and sewn onto a soccer ball. On Monday, prosecutors in Culiacan identified the remains of a former police officer divided into two separate ice chests.
    Using their so-called Narcobarometer, researchers at the University of Trans-Border Institute track and analyze murders in Mexico, hoping to find ways to quell the violence.
    Their tally? Over 20,000 murders since 2001, more than half in the past two years.
    As Mexico tries to develop, the killings jeopardize its international reputation, said Larry Birns, director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs in Washington

    Sunday, December 06, 2009

    DTN News: U.S. Wars And The Opium Trade

    DTN News: U.S. Wars And The Opium Trade
    *Source: Infowars ~ Sean Sailor
    (NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - December 7, 2009: When Turkey in the late 1940s became a site of NATO and US forces its rank became cemented as the number one supplier of opium to the heroin markets of the US and Europe. This illegal opium market was primarily centered in Europe, where the final processing into heroin was done before going on to the market for the rest of the world. Its profits were therefore also made largely by Europeans. In 1968 research ordered by the Nixon Administration revealed that this Turkish opium crop supplied 80% of the opium destined to become heroin for the illegal markets of Europe and the US .(1) The Nixon Administration, claiming a threat to the security of the Nation by this situation in the newly proclaimed “war on drugs”, began a multi-pronged effort to limit the amount of opium produced in Turkey from reaching the United States. (2) The foremost of these (and actually the only one that produced even a modicum of success) was a program to (Above image: Opium cultivation in Afghanistan. ) buy the crop from the farmers in Turkey (where they still grow it to this day) at outlandish figures that increased by the year, eventually reaching over $25 per kilogram the US taxpayer was forced to spend in an attempt to buy up the entire opium crop of Turkey. This decision was made, all the while seeming to ignore the fact that the illegal channels could pay even $100 a kilogram and it wouldn’t affect the price of a $5 New York City addict’s dose by any more than 1c.(3) It also ignored the fact that the crop can be grown virtually anywhere in the world, that when the entire crop in Turkey was then bought (at inflated prices and at the expense of taxpayers) that it would then leave the entire rest of the world to take its place. But by then Turkey’s prominence as the number one supplier of opium to be manufactured into heroin for US demand had already begun to get competition from South East Asia during the Vietnam War, a market which in turn receded after the US pulled out of Vietnam. Now, most average, right-thinking Americans might think that the Nixon Administration’s goal in this effort was to raise the price of a dose of heroin by 1c, thereby making heroin addicts in the US finally realize that its just not worth it anymore. But in any case, that was not the effect. The effect was to hand a monopoly to the new opium market (now suddenly much cheaper!) that had been created as US military involvement in Vietnam ramped up. That was the effect, I’ll let you decide what the goal was. The opium bound for the US heroin market in S.E. Asia was produced primarily in Laos, flown on the CIA’s Air America to Vietnam, where it was converted into heroin then smuggled into the States by US military couriers.(4)(5)
    Now starting in 2002, its Afghanistan. And it has always been a part of the culture there to grow opium poppies, as is true of Turkey, where over 100,000 farmers grow it today legally.(6) However, the Taliban had all but wiped the crop out in Afghanistan in short order after they came to power until… the “war” in Afghanistan began. The year after the beginning of the occupation, (by both UN and US estimates) an over 3000% increase in the production of opium occurred over the Taliban days.(7) As it remains to this day. This opium crop, which as the US Military admits, soldiers now stand guard over… supplies 92% of the illegally produced opium in the world supplying the majority of the heroin for both the United States and Europe. Somehow yet again, a monopoly has been created. The $39 billion that the US has spent in Afghanistan (allegedly) for reconstruction since 2002 must have gone into reconstructing the $65 billion a year opium industry. When you look at the size of the country, the number of people that live there and how desperately poor almost all of are you might tend to think that some of that money is being diverted elsewhere. Now, the corporate controlled media (if they were forced into talking about it, that is) would have you believe that all that money is being diverted to the people dressed in rags working the poppy fields. The same ones that have their schools and weddings blown up in drone attacks. As for myself, I tend to think it might be getting diverted by the people that are entrusted to hand that money out and administrate the country. The same ones that guard over the opium fields… Its just a hunch. Afghanistan opium poppy cultivation, 1994-2007 (hectares). 1) Moynihan, Daniel P. (Assistant to the President) ‘Memorandum for Honorable John N. Mitchell, Attorney General’ (18 September 1969); in: Foreign Relations. 2) “The President is convinced that the problem of narcotics addiction in (Afghanistan opium poppy cultivation, 1994-2007 (hectares). the U.S. has reached proportions constituting a threat to our national stability.” Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Memo: Study of Means to Stop International Traffic in Heroin(Sept 29, 1969): in Foreign Relations 3) Licit and Illicit Drugs Consumers Union ISBN 0-316-15340-0 4) Special Study Mission June ,1971 United States House of Representatives Special Study Mission June ,1971 5) Alfred McCoy The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (Harper and Row, 1972) 6) http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-07-01-voa18-66756627.html?moddate=2008-07-01 7) Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) (PDF). Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001. http://www.unodc.org/afg/reports_surveys.html.
    Disclaimer statement
    Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information supplied herein, DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News cannot be held responsible for any errors or omissions. Unless otherwise indicated, opinions expressed herein are those of the author of the page and do not necessarily represent the corporate views of DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News.

    Thursday, December 03, 2009

    DTN News: 'La Familia' North Of The Border

    DTN News: 'La Familia' North Of The Border
    *Source: By Ben West and Fred Burton STRATFOR
    (NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - December 4, 2009: In an indictment handed down Nov. 20, the U.S. Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois accused 15 individuals of being involved in the trafficking of cocaine and other narcotics in the Chicago area. The 15 were arrested in a nationwide counter-narcotics operation led by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) dubbed “Project Coronado,” which was aimed at dismantling the drug trafficking network of La Familia Michoacana (LFM), a mid-sized and relatively new drug cartel based in Michoacan state in southwestern Mexico. The U.S. investigation of LFM has revealed many details about the operation of the group in the United States and answered some important questions about the nature of Mexican drug trafficking and distribution north of the border. LFM stands out among the various drug cartels that operate throughout Mexico for several reasons. Unlike other drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) that have always been focused on drug trafficking, LFM first arose in Michoacan several years ago as a vigilante response to kidnappers and drug gangs. Before long, however, LFM members were themselves accused of conducting the very crimes they had opposed, including kidnapping for ransom, cocaine and marijuana trafficking and, eventually, methamphetamine production. The group is now the largest and most powerful criminal organization in Michoacan — a largely rural state located on Mexico’s southwestern Pacific coast — and maintains a significant presence in several surrounding states. Beyond its vigilante origins, LFM has also set itself apart from other criminal groups in Mexico by its almost cult-like ideology. LFM leaders are known to distribute documents to the group’s members that include codes of conduct and pseudo-religious quotations from Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, also known as “El Mas Loco” (“the craziest one”), who appears to serve as a sort of inspirational leader of the group. Unanswered Questions In April 2009, STRATFOR published a report on the dynamics of narcotics distribution in the United States. It laid out the differences between trafficking (transporting large quantities of drugs from the suppliers to the buyers over the most efficient routes possible) and distribution (the smaller scale, retail sale of small quantities of drugs over a broader geographic area) as well as the various gangs on the U.S. side that are involved in drug trafficking. The report outlined the differences in the resources and skills required to transport tons of narcotics hundreds of miles through Mexico versus picking up those loads at the border and managing the U.S. retail networks that distribute narcotics to the individual buyers on the street. In our April analysis, we identified several intelligence gaps in the interface between the Mexican-based drug traffickers (such as the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltran-Leyva Organization [BLO] and Los Zetas) and the U.S.-based drug distributors (such as MS-13, Barrio Azteca and the Mexican Mafia). One question we were left with was: How deeply involved are the Mexican DTOs in the U.S. distribution network? While it appeared that narcotics changed hands at the border, it wasn’t clear how or even whether the relationships between gangs and drug traffickers had an effect on the distribution of narcotics within the United States. Although we suspected it, there was little evidence that showed cartel involvement in the downstream or retail distribution of narcotics in the U.S. market. Command and Control in Chicago Now there is evidence. The indictment handed down Nov. 20 in Chicago clearly alleges that a criminal group in Chicago was directly conspiring with the drug trafficking organization LFM to distribute shipments of cocaine. The indictment specifically links the criminal group in Chicago to LFM and labels it a “command and control group” run by someone in Michoacan. While the indictment only referred to this person as “individual A,” we suspect that the unidentified person was LFM operational manager Servando Gomez Martinez, the second in command of LFM. The manager of the Chicago command and control group, Jorge Luis Torres-Galvan, and the distribution supervisor, Jose Gonzalez-Zavala, were allegedly in regular contact with their manager in Mexico, updating him on accounting issues and relying on him to authorize which wholesale distributors the group could do business with in the United States. These wholesale distributors also appear to have had close ties to the command and control group. According to the indictment, they were allowed to sell cocaine on consignment — they could wait to pay Zavala once the entire load was sold — an agreement that indicates a great deal of trust between the supplier and the retail distributor. It was likely a matter of the LFM commander in Mexico authorizing their involvement and probably was based on an existing business or extended-family relationship. Due to LFM’s ideological basis, its members should be thought of more as adherents than employees. The group does not operate using the same business objectives as most other major DTOs, so we would expect personal relationships to be more valued than strictly business relationships among LFM members. Another member of the group, Jorge Guadalupe Ayala-German, allegedly operated stash houses in the Chicago area where deliveries of narcotics would come in and shipments of cash would leave. The indictment says Ezequel Hernandez-Patino was responsible for physically delivering the shipments of cocaine to the wholesale distributors, and Ismail Flores with Oscar Bueno were responsible for transporting money south to Dallas, where they would deliver cash proceeds from the sale of cocaine and pick up more cocaine to sell. The indictment does not indicate that Flores or Bueno supplied any other markets between Dallas and Chicago, which suggests that the Chicago-based LFM members were fairly compartmentalized. Project Coronado The larger operation from which the Chicago indictment emerged, the DEA-led Project Coronado, was a joint operation with the FBI, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and numerous other agencies. It followed several similar nationwide sweeps such as Operation Xcellerator, a multi-year effort to dismantle the Sinaloa cartel’s connections in the United States, and Project Reckoning, which went after a Gulf cartel network in the United States that was trafficking cocaine to Italy. Under Project Coronado, the DEA, FBI and ATF, along with other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, have made a total of almost 1,200 arrests, seized $32.8 million in U.S. currency and seized 11.7 tons of marijuana, methamphetamines, cocaine and heroin since the operation began in 2005. Dozens of other indictments and criminal complaints (in addition to the Chicago indictment) have been unsealed against associates of the group across the country since Oct. 22, the official culmination of Project Coronado. The other cases revealed more details about LFM’s operations in the United States: how it trafficked methamphetamines and cocaine from Mexico to Dallas, how a cell in Nashville was supplied by a distribution hub in Atlanta, and how a group in New York had obtained automatic assault rifles, high-caliber pistols and ammunition with the intent to smuggle those weapons back to Mexico to supply LFM. LFM has been responsible for a substantial level of violence in southwestern Mexico, and former Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Morina Mora recently called it the most dangerous cartel in Mexico. The Northern District of Texas had the most cases as a result of Project Coronado. It appears that Dallas was a major U.S. hub for LFM, where it managed drug shipments from Mexico to other regions (Chicago and Arkansas were specifically mentioned) and the collection of cash from those distributors before shipping the cash back to Mexico. Dallas is a logical hub for such activity because of its proximity to Mexico and its location along Interstate 35 and Interstate 20, which link Dallas to the rest of the United States as well as points to the south. In at least one case, an individual attempting to smuggle four kilograms of methamphetamines to Dallas passed through the McAllen, Texas, border crossing on a passenger bus but was interdicted by police. Most indictments (including the one in Chicago) pointed out that LFM groups in the United States conducted countersurveillance while moving drug shipments. On one occasion, accused Dallas drug distributor Soto Cervantes changed the location of a meet-up point when he learned that the person he was meeting suspected that he was being followed. The change in location caused the police (who were indeed following the transporter) to call off the surveillance mission in order to not compromise their investigation. As a result, authorities relied primarily on electronic surveillance of the suspects’ communications through wiretaps on home and cellular phones — of which the suspects had many and which they changed frequently. There were other cases when police were unable to follow suspects due to such surveillance detection tactics, when targeted traffickers called off meetings and changed vehicles in an effort to confuse police. While seemingly simple, these tactics indicate a higher degree of tradecraft and professionalism among the suspects linked to LFM, who don’t appear to be members of run-of-the-mill street gangs. It is unclear if these tactics have been institutionalized in the LFM network, but judging by the frequency that police encountered them in various U.S. cities during Project Coronado, they appear to be a standard practice for many if not all LFM members. Implications The details released in the Nov. 20 indictment provide solid evidence that drug trafficking organizations in Mexico (specifically LFM) have established command and control groups inside the United States that report to and receive orders from commanders in Mexico. And this shows that LFM has had an international presence far beyond what we originally suspected and is not just a small-time trafficking group in southwestern Mexico. Whereas most drug distribution in the United States is carried out by individual gangs serving their own interests and operating on their own familiar turf, the criminal group in Chicago working for LFM was carrying out orders issued by a drug trafficking organization some 3,000 miles away. And based on the interaction the Chicago group had with its contact in Mexico, the use of such tactics as countersurveillance measures, the coordination among groups in different cities and reports from STRATFOR sources within U.S. counternarcotics agencies, it is likely that the individual in Mexico was managing several groups throughout the United States. Most criminal enterprises avoid this kind of command and control structure for two reasons. First, distribution in a foreign country is not typically in a Mexican-based drug trafficker’s area of expertise. Their interests tend to focus on their own territory, which they can control much more easily due to their familiarity with and proximity to it. Second, as seen in these latest arrests, U.S. law enforcement agencies are much more proficient at thwarting drug distribution operations than Mexican law enforcement agencies are. (LFM has recently proved very proficient indeed at challenging Mexican security forces.) By passing the drugs off to gangs in the United States, major cartels are also able to avoid a great deal of liability at the hands of U.S. law enforcement. In a way, LFM’s efforts to move downstream, farther from the source of the cocaine, mirror those of other, larger Mexican DTOs that are expanding their control over the supply of cocaine in South America as they move upstream, closer to the source. And this raises the question: Why would LFM want to expand its operations so deeply into the United States when other Mexican DTOs maintain a more superficial presence there? One possible answer is that LFM is much smaller than Sinaloa, Los Zetas and BLO, controls much less territory and gets a smaller share of the narcotics being trafficked through Mexico. By expanding business into the United States, LFM is able to leverage what little control it does have in order to gain access to the highly lucrative retail market. And then there is LFM’s ideological bent, which makes it behave at times more like a cult than a purely pragmatic business. Our answer to the above question is only conjecture. What is certain, at this point, is that there is now a precedent for Mexican DTOs to have a greater influence over their lower-level supply-chain operations in the United States. The details released in the Chicago indictment provide a better understanding of how Mexican-based drug traffickers impact the drug distribution network inside the United States and prove that at least one, “La Familia,” is taking a very hands-on approach.
    This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to http://www.stratfor.com/ Disclaimer statement
    Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information supplied herein, DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News cannot be held responsible for any errors or omissions. Unless otherwise indicated, opinions expressed herein are those of the author of the page and do not necessarily represent the corporate views of DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News.

    Sunday, November 22, 2009

    DTN News: Sanctions And Strategy

    DTN News: Sanctions And Strategy *Source: By George Friedman STRATFOR (NSI News Source Info) HONG KONG - November 24, 2009: The Iranian government has rejected, at least for the moment, a proposal from the P-5+1 to ship the majority of its low-enriched uranium abroad for further enrichment. The group is now considering the next step in the roadmap that it laid out last April. The next step was a new round of sanctions, this time meant to be crippling. The only crippling sanction available is to cut off the supply of gasoline, since Iran imports 35 percent of its refined gasoline products. That would theoretically cripple the Iranian economy and compel the Iranians to comply with U.S. demands over the nuclear issue. We have written extensively on the ability of sanctions to work in Iran. There is, however, a broader question, which is the general utility of sanctions in international affairs. The Iranian government said last week that sanctions don’t concern it because, historically, sanctions have not succeeded. This partly explains Iranian intransigence: The Iranians don’t feel they have anything to fear from sanctions. The question is whether the Iranian view is correct and why they would believe it — and if they are correct, why the P-5+1 would even consider imposing sanctions. The Assumptions of Sanctions We need to begin with a definition of sanctions. In general, sanctions are some sort of penalty imposed on a country designed to cause it sufficient pain to elicit a change in its behavior. Sanctions are intended as an alternative to war and therefore exclude violence. Thus, the entire point of sanctions, as opposed to war, is to compel changes of behavior in countries without resorting to force. Normal sanctions are economic and come in three basic forms. First, there is seizing or freezing the assets of a country or its citizens located in another country. Second, sanctions can block the shipment of goods (or movement of people) out of the target country. Third, sanctions can block the movement of goods into a country. Minor sanctions are possible, such as placing tariffs on products imported from the target country, but those sorts of acts are focused primarily on rectifying economic imbalances and are not always driven by political interests. Thus, the United States placed tariffs on Chinese tires coming into the United States. The purpose was to get China to change its economic policies. On the other hand, placing sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s or on Sudan today are designed to achieve political and military outcomes. It is important to consider the underlying assumptions of the decision to impose sanctions. First, there is the assumption that the target country is economically dependent in some way on the country or countries issuing the sanctions. Second, it assumes that the target country has no alternative sources for the economic activity while under sanctions. Third, it assumes that the pain caused will be sufficient to compel change. The first is relatively easy to determine and act on. The next two are far more complex. Obviously, sanctions are an option of stronger powers toward weaker ones. It assumes that the imposition of sanctions will cause more pain to the target country than it will to the country or countries issuing sanctions, and that the target country cannot or will not use military action to counter economic sanctions. For example, the United States placed sanctions on the sale of grain to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It discovered that while the sanctions were hurting the Soviets, they were hurting American farmers as well. The pain was reciprocal and there was an undertone of danger if the Soviets had chosen to counter the sanctions with military force. An example of that concerned Japan in 1941. The United States halted the shipment of oil and scrap metal to Japan in an attempt to force it to reshape its policies in China and Indochina. The sanctions were crippling, as the Americans expected. However, the Japanese response was not capitulation, but Pearl Harbor. To understand the difficulties of determining and acting on the assumptions of imposing sanctions, consider Cuba. The United States has imposed extensive economic sanctions on Cuba for years. During the first decades of the sanctions, they were relatively effective, in the sense that third countries tended to comply rather than face possible sanctions themselves from the United States. As time went on, the fear of sanctions declined. A European country might have been inclined to comply with U.S. sanctions in the 1960s or 1970s, for both political reasons and for concern over potential retaliatory sanctions from the United States. However, as the pattern of international economic activity shifted, and the perception of both Cuba and the United States changed within these countries, the political implication to comply with U.S. wishes declined, while the danger of U.S. sanctions diminished. Placing sanctions on the European Union would be mutually disastrous and the United States would not do it over Cuba, or virtually any other issue. As a result, the sanctions the United States placed on Cuba have dramatically diminished in importance. Cuba can trade with most of the world, and other countries can invest in Cuba if they wish. The flow of American tourists is blocked, but European, Canadian and Latin American tourists who wish to go to Cuba can go. Cuba has profound economic problems, but those problems are only marginally traceable to sanctions. Indeed, the U.S. embargo has provided the Castro regime with a useful domestic explanation for its economic failures. Limitations This points to an interesting characteristic of sanctions. One of the potential goals of placing sanctions on a country is to generate unrest and internal opposition , forcing regime change or at least policy change. This rarely happens. Instead, the imposition of sanctions creates a sense of embattlement within the country. Two things follow from this. First, there is frequently a boost in support for the regime that might otherwise not be there. The idea that economic pain takes precedence over patriotism or concern for maintaining national sovereignty is not a theory with a great deal of empirical support. Second, the sanctions allow a regime to legitimize declaring a state of emergency — which is what sanctions intend to create — and then use that state of emergency to increase repression and decrease the opportunity for an opposition to emerge. Consider an extreme example of sanctions during World War II, when both the Axis and Allies tried to use airpower as a means of imposing massive economic hardship on the population, thereby attempting to generate unrest and opposition to the regime. Obviously, strategic bombing is not sanctions, but it is instructive to consider them in this sense. When we look at the Battle of Britain and the strategic bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, we find that countereconomic warfare did not produce internal opposition that the regime could not handle. Indeed, it could reasonably be argued that it increased support for the regime. It is assumed that economic hardship can generate regime change, yet even in some of the most extreme cases of economic hardship, that didn’t happen. Imposing an effective sanctions regime on a country is difficult for two reasons. First, economic pain does not translate into political pressure. Second, creating effective economic pain normally requires a coalition. The United States is not in a position to unilaterally impose effective sanctions. In order to do that, it must act in concert with other countries that are prepared not only to announce sanctions but — and this is far more important and difficult — also to enforce them. This means that it must be in the political interest of all countries that deal with the target to impose the sanctions. It is rarely possible to create such a coalition. Nations’ interests diverge too much. Sometimes they converge, as in South Africa prior to the end of apartheid. South Africa proved that sanctions can work if there is a coalition that does not benefit extensively from economic and political ties with the target country, and where the regime is composed of a minority within a very large sea of hostility. South Africa was a special case. The same attempt at a sanctions regime in Sudan over Darfur has failed because many countries have political or economic interests there. It is also difficult to police the sanctions. By definition, as the sanctions are imposed, the financial returns for violating them increase. Think of U.S. drug laws as a form of sanctions. They raise the price of drugs in the United States and increase the incentives for smugglers. When a broad sanctions regime was placed on Iraq, vast amounts of money were made from legitimate and illegitimate trading with Iraq. Regardless of what a national government might say (and it may well say one thing and do another) individuals and corporations will find ways around the sanctions. Indeed, Obama’s proposed sanctions on corporations are intended precisely for this reason. As always, the issue is one of intelligence and enforcement. People can be very good at deception for large amounts of money. The difficulty of creating effective sanctions raises the question of why they are used. The primary answer is that they allow a nation to appear to be acting effectively without enduring significant risks. Invading a country, as the United States found in Iraq, poses substantial risks. The imposition of sanctions on relatively weaker countries without the ability to counter the sanctions is much less risky. The fact that it is also far less effective is compensated for by the lowered risk. In truth, many sanction regimes are enforced as political gestures, either for domestic political reasons, or to demonstrate serious intent on the international scene. In some cases, sanctions are a way of appearing to act so that military action can be deferred. No one expects the sanctions to change the regime or its policies, but the fact that sanctions are in place can be used as an argument against actions by other nations. This is very much the case with Iran. No one expects Russia or China (or even many of the European states) to fully comply with a sanctions regime on gasoline. Even if they did, no one expects the flow of gasoline to be decisively cut off. There will be too many people prepared to take the risk of smuggling gasoline to Iran for that to happen. Even if the U.S. blockaded Iranian ports, the Caucasus and Central Asia are far too disorderly and the monetary rewards of smuggling are too great of an incentive to make the gasoline sanctions effective. Additionally, the imposition of sanctions will both rally the population to the regime as well as provide justification for an intense crackdown. The probability of sanctions forcing policy changes or regime change in Iran is slim. Balancing Acquiescence and War But sanctions have one virtue: They delay or block military action. So long as sanctions are being considered or being imposed, the argument can be made to those who want military action that it is necessary to give the sanctions time to work. Therefore, in this case, sanctions allow the United States to block any potential military actions by Israel against Iran while appearing domestically to be taking action. Should the United States wish to act, the sanctions route gives the Europeans the option of arguing that military action is premature. Furthermore, if military action took place without Russian approval while Russia was cooperating in a sanctions regime, it would have increased room to maneuver against U.S. interests in the Middle East, portraying the United States as trigger-happy. The ultimate virtue of sanctions is that they provide a platform between acquiescence and war. The effectiveness of that platform is not nearly as important as the fact that it provides a buffer against charges of inaction and demands for further action. In Sudan, for example, no one expects sanctions to work, but their presence allows business to go on as usual while deflecting demands for more significant action. The P-5+1 is now shaping its response to Iran. They are not even committed to the idea of sanctions. But they will move to sanctions if it appears that Israel or the United States is prepared to move aggressively. Sanctions satisfy the need to appear to be acting while avoiding the risks of action. This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to http://www.stratfor.com/
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